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Theatre as mimesis, the actor as mimic: can we still think in these terms, two and a half 
millennia after antiquity?  The Meaning in Mimesis puts canonical texts of acting theory 
by Plato, Diderot, Stanislavsky, Brecht, and others back into conversation with their 
informing paradigms in philosophy and aesthetics, in order to trace the recurring impulse 
to theorize the actor’s art and the theatrical experience in terms of one-to-one 
correspondences.  I show that, across the history of ideas that is acting theory, the 
familiar conception of mimesis as imagistic representation entangles over and over again 
with an “other mimesis”: mimesis as the embodied attunement with alterity, a human 
capacity that bridges the gap between self and other.  When it comes to the philosophy of 
the theatre, it is virtually impossible to consider the one-to-one of representation or re-
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The Meanings in Mimesis 
 
 
We cannot escape mimesis.  Although we might try to dismiss it as an antiquated 
aesthetic orthodoxy, a paradigm rightfully discredited by Romantic theories of artistic 
expression, mimesis is still very much with us.  When theory turns to the operations of art 
or the mechanisms behind contagious social behavior, mimesis keeps re-surfacing, 
persistently, even relentlessly.  There are at least three reasons why this is so.  First, 
mimetic thinking is so thoroughly interwoven into Western philosophy and aesthetics that 
any turn back to this history of ideas requires grappling with the many meanings that 
mimesis has carried within it.  Second, mimesis terminology has long been associated 
with certain fundamental human phenomena: acts of mimicry, imitative social behavior, 
the performance and re-performance of identity, and the summoning of otherness in the 
medium of the self.  These phenomena are basic to social life, and so they will keep 
happening, and so philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists will keep talking 
about them, for as long as humankind makes the effort to understand itself. 
 The third reason why the mimesis concept keeps returning to us is that it houses 
within its core a provocatively simple – and powerfully seductive – conceptual schema: 
that of one-to-one correspondence.  Mimesis is redefined in terms of the one-to-one in 
Plato’s Republic, where the term comes to describe the correspondence among ideal 
form, material entity, and artistic image as well as that between the human subject and 
the behavioral models provided by epic and tragic poetry.  (Of course, for Plato, the one-
to-one-to-one correspondence between form, object, and image is a progressively 




reality).  The Republic also introduces the metaphor of the mirror and the analogy 
between poetry and visual art – two hallmarks of mimetic theory – into discussions of 
artistic production, so that the overall ontology of art can be better theorized in terms of a 
duplicative model-to-copy schema.  Although Plato’s conception of mimesis will be 
significantly transformed over the centuries, the one-to-one thinking at its core continues 
to shape discussions of art in classical antiquity, during the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries (after the rediscovery of antiquity during the Renaissance), and within the 
theoretical return to mimesis of the early twentieth through early twenty-first centuries. 
 Mimesis, then, is a remarkably adaptable concept, but one that retains its core 
identity – that provided by the one-to-one schema – across its various manifestations.  
Mimesis has surely been Western aesthetics’ most successful conceptual “meme” – that 
is, an entity that has replicated itself within and across intellectual cultures with 
remarkable efficiency.  The success of mimesis has been both a good and a bad thing.  At 
its worst, the mimesis concept provides a restrictive template for thinking, which either 
closes down thought – for example, when eighteenth-century aestheticians uncritically 
recycle the “imitation of nature” formula ad infinitum – or invites a perverse kind of 
ingenuity, as philosophers of art endeavor to invent – in the realm of theory – the ideal or 
empirical originals that art is purported to “imitate.”  For those of us writing in the 
twenty-first century, there is another danger: that we take up mimesis as a vague 
placeholder term, chosen over “representation” for its pleasingly antique ring, and use it 
to ward off difficult questions about the fundamental human processes that sustain artistic 
production and reception.  On the other hand, when it functions at its best, the mimesis 




performing arts – produce meaning by making otherness present in the here-and-now.  
This otherness made present may come in the form of a “representation” of another time 
or another place, of a memory or association sparked in the mind of an observer, or of 
qualities of alterity summoned in the person of the artist.  Over its long and varied 
history, the mimesis concept has both opened up and closed down avenues into these 
crucial areas of inquiry. 
 Re-thinking mimesis in terms of a relationship between identity and alterity has in 
many ways been the most important shared concern of the various theoretical returns to 
the concept over the past century.  Walter Benjamin imagined the human capacity to 
perceive and produce resemblances – even the “nonsensuous similarities” between 
language and experience – as “a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to 
become and behave like something else.”  Benjamin goes so far as to propose that “there 
is none of [mankind’s] higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a 
decisive role” (Benjamin 1978:333).1  In The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and 
Horkheimer approach “mimetic behavior” as an “organic adaptation to others” that 
emerges from humanity’s “biological prehistory” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972:180), 
but which has since been repressed by civilization’s rationalizing impulse and co-opted 
by fascist mass movements.  Of course, the theme of the self’s adaptation to otherness is 
by no means an invention of early twentieth-century mimetic theory: this concern is 
already integral to Plato’s Republic, motivating the banishment of poetry from his ideal 
                                                        
1 Many of the ideas presented in “On the Mimetic Faculty” are either restated or given 
more extensive treatment in “Doctrine of the Similar” (also written in 1933).  For 
example, in the latter essay, Benjamin writes that the “gift of seeing resemblances is 
nothing but a weak rudiment of the formerly powerful compulsion to become similar and 




polis and standing behind the famous discussion of mimesis as artistic image-making in 
Book X. 
Mimesis also functions as a key concept in important works of literary criticism 
during the twentieth century: Eric Auerbach re-thinks mimesis as a schema of figuration 
and fulfillment in his Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature 
(1946), and Paul Ricouer’s three-volume Time and Narrative (1983-85) takes Aristotle’s 
Poetics as its departure-point but divides mimesis into a tripartite model of narrative 
emplotment.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, mimesis as a narrative 
principle co-exists with various conceptions of mimesis as a psychic, behavioral, or 
cultural phenomenon: literary theorist René Girard uses the term “mimetic desire” to 
describe a subject’s unconscious adoption of another’s desire for an object; feminist 
philosopher Luce Irigaray encourages women to “play with mimesis” (Irigaray 1985:76), 
taking up the performance of gendered identities to expose these as roles rather than 
biological norms; and postcolonial theorist Homi Bhaba examines the colonial subject’s 
mimicry of the colonizer as an ambivalent, subversive, and even menacing form of 
imitation.2  
Mimetic thinking has also entered a new vogue within the social and natural 
sciences.  Taking imitation as an operative principle of human culture (as did Aristotle), 
the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins has coined the term “meme,” used earlier in 
this introduction, to describe a unit of cultural replication that reproduces ideas, beliefs, 
and behaviors in a fashion akin to the way genes transmit human traits across 
                                                        
2 See Girard’s Deceit, Desire, and the Novel (1961), Irigaray’s This Sex which Is Not One 




generations.3  Recent collections like Nick Chater and Susan Hurley’s Perspectives on 
Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science (2005) look at imitation as a form of 
brain activity, a mode of learning in children, a mechanism for behavioral contagion, and 
a driver of cultural evolution.  Cognitive neuroscience’s “mirror neuron” theory – which I 
will touch upon in the coda to this study – speculates that a correspondence in neural 
activity between observer and agent may enable us to understand the intentions and 
emotions of other human subjects.  The diverse efforts of the above theorists, 
philosophers, and scientists suggest that the mimesis concept can still be put to 
productive use – but that, in making use of it, we may need to get beyond its historical 
formulations, or to excavate their neglected complexities, in order to build additional 
layers of nuance on the solid but potentially reductive foundation of the one-to-one.4 
Mimesis has also made a relatively recent and highly significant re-appearance on 
the scene of theatre scholarship.  Elin Diamond sets out to “unmake” mimesis with the 
tools provided by feminist theory and Brechtian thought.  The mimesis Diamond 
deconstructs is, essentially, that of Plato’s Republic X: a way of seeing and knowing that 
forces otherness into self-sameness.5  Martin Puchner also re-engages with Plato by 
taking up the Republic’s distinction between mimesis and diegesis (“telling,” “narrative”) 
in his influential account of modernist anti-theatricality, Stage Fright (2002).  Graham 
                                                        
3 See Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene (1976). 
4 The twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have also seen several historians of ideas 
take a retrospective look at mimesis.  See, for example, Arne Melberg’s Theories of 
Mimesis (1995), Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf’s Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society 
(1992), Stephen Halliwell’s The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts, Modern Problems 
(2002), and Matthew Potolsky’s Mimesis (2006).  The twentieth century’s many efforts to 
revise mimesis have also produced a need to review these revisions – a need met by 
collections like Mihai Spariosu’s Mimesis in Contemporary Theory (1984). 
5 See Elin Diamond, Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on feminism and theater (London and 




Ley, who begins his selective survey of theatrical theory from Plato to performance 
studies with classical mimetic theory, notes that the mimesis concept holds an enduring 
fascination for criticism even as theory often takes the concept for granted.  For Ley, 
unconsidered invocations threaten to turn mimesis into a “desperately exhausted 
philosophical concept” like “representation” (Ley 1999:295).  Joseph Roach has very 
recently made a call to renovate mimesis, asking that theater and performance scholars 
take up Auerbach’s notion of the “figura” to consider how performance unfolds as a 
reciprocal process of expectation and retrospection, of pre-signification and 
actualization.6  Thinking about mimesis as an embodied process of “imitation by 
substitution” (Roach 2010:1083) extends Roach’s influential discussion of performance 
as “surrogation” in Cities of the Dead (1996). 
Let us hope that Roach’s call to re-open “the question of mimesis” – rather than to 
uncritically recycle mimeticist orthodoxies – will be taken up by the field of performance 
studies, which has tended to view mimesis as a dangerous bugaboo.  “Mimetic theater” 
(Schechner 1988:63) has often been posited as the “other” that performance is not.  
Under this view, cultural performance and performance art are actual, transformative, and 
performative – that is, performance actually does something – while “mimetic theater” 
must be content with a modus operandi of illusory re-duplication.  Mimetic theater may 
give its audiences some cheap thrills, but has no transformative impact on their lives or 
the lives of its actors.  We find an attack on mimeticism in Peggy Phelan’s Unmarked 
(1993), which champions performance as a mode of “representation without 
reproduction,” a “representational economy” in which “the reproduction of the Other as 
                                                        
6 See Joseph Roach, “Performance: The Blunders of Orpheus,” PMLA 125.4 (October 




the Same is not assured” (Phelan 1993:3).  Diana Taylor’s The Archive and the 
Repertoire approaches “mimetic representation” in terms of “an actor assuming a role” 
(Taylor 2003:30) or of “a break between the ‘real’ and its representation” (14).  
Performance studies’ anti-mimetic move is in some ways perfectly understandable: it is a 
basic argumentative device to put another paradigm at a distance in order to consolidate 
one’s own (we will find this move being made by many of the thinkers I examine in this 
study).  But the danger in such a move is that, for the sake of rhetorical efficiency, the 
theorist constructs a reductive version of the rejected paradigm – a version that does not 
do justice to the paradigm’s complexity or variability. 
As it leaves behind its phase of disciplinary self-definition, performance studies 
may be taking up a more nuanced stance on mimesis.  Rebecca Schneider’s Performing 
Remains (2011), for example, approaches the gap between the ideal and the real, between 
the original and the copy, as an “ancient (and tired) Western anxiety” rather than a still 
pressing ontological problem.  Binding the mimesis concept into her exploration of the 
temporality of re-enactment, Schneider asks that we see mimesis not as “the antithesis of 
some discreet authenticity or pure truth, but a powerful tool for cross- or intra-temporal 
negotiation,” for bringing about the interaction or inter-animation of one time with 
another time (Schneider 2011:30-1).  Invoking Aristotle, Schneider also asks us to accept 
that “mimesis is what we do” (18) – and Schneider’s “we” seems to include theatre 
practitioners and performance artists along with those of us who engage in everyday and 
occasional performances out of love or obligation. 
While my concerns in this study do overlap with several of the above attempts at 




closest to those of anthropologist and performance theorist Michael Taussig’s influential 
Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (1993).  Taussig’s mimetic 
faculty is the “the capacity to Other” (Taussig 19), which “tak[es] us bodily into alterity” 
(Taussig 1993:40) and sustains ritual enactments and totemic practices.  When it comes 
to the life of society, within and across generations, mimesis is “the nature that culture 
uses to make second nature” (70) – that is, a physiological capacity enabling the 
formation of the bodily habits that make up culture.  Like Taussig, I am most interested in 
thinking about mimesis in terms of the body – or, better, in giving mimesis back its body, 
for, as I will show, the earliest meanings of mimesis in classical Greece center on acts 
and performances that call upon the capacity to embody otherness. 
The “compulsion to become Other” (33) that drives Taussig’s mimesis can also be 
conceived as a first principle of theatricality or the primal impetus behind the cultural 
practice that is acting.7  Taussig’s work has already proved inspirational to a number of 
theatre scholars and performance theorists,8 but my aim is a new one: to re-engage with 
mimesis on the terrain of acting theory, the heterogeneous body of discourse that has 
examined the art of the stage performer from antiquity to the present.  The story about the 
actor’s mimesis that I will tell over the following pages leaps from classical Greece to 
eighteenth-century France, and then to the first half of the twentieth century, in showing 
how mimetic thinking has informed four formative moments in acting theory’s history of 
                                                        
7 Taussig implies rather than argues for a connection between mimesis and theatricality: 
“Once the mimetic faculty has sprung into being, a terrifically ambiguous power is 
established; there is born the power to represent the world, yet that same power is a 
power to falsify, mask, and pose” (Taussig 1993:43).  The “anti-theatrical prejudice” that 
Jonas Barish traces from the Greek world to the middle of the twentieth century houses 
within it an intense anxiety over the power of mimesis (see Barish 1981). 




ideas.  I also show that invocations of mimesis – as well as instances of one-to-one 
conceptualization that do not explicitly take up mimesis terminology – reappear again 
and again in more recent theatre and performance scholarship. 
Since Plato’s transformative discussion of mimesis, the concept has carried two 
distinct meanings: mimesis as an ontological classification, under which art is defined as 
the imagistic or quasi-imagistic reproduction of an ideal or empirical reality, and mimesis 
as an embodied phenomenon, through which human beings assimilate themselves to 
otherness.  This second meaning of mimesis – what I will call the “other mimesis” in 
aesthetic theory’s history of ideas – goes underground after Plato’s intervention.  It raises 
its head again and again across the centuries, however, sometimes under vocabularies 
linked to the Greek mimesis – like imitatio in Latin, “imitation” in English, imitation in 
French, and Nachahmung in German – but also in terms like “sympathy,” “contagion,” 
“identification,” “empathy,” and “intersubjectivity.”  One-to-one thinking about selfhood 
and otherness also arises in vocabularies familiar to contemporary scholars in the fields 
of theatre of performance studies: “the restoration of behavior,” “citationality,” 
“surrogation,” and “kinesthetic empathy.”9  In the theory of the theatre, it is virtually 
impossible to consider the one-to-one of representation or re-enactment without at the 
same time grappling with the one-to-one of identification or vicarious experience. 
 While this study will necessarily concern itself with mimeticist theories of 
theatrical “imitation” or “representation” – and, in particular, how such theories visit 
themselves upon the figure of the actor – my main objective will be in raising to 
prominence historical discussions of the “other mimesis” as an important but neglected 
                                                        




dimension of theatrical theory.  In the theory and practice of acting, this “other mimesis” 
– mimesis as an embodied attunement with otherness – comes in two modes.  The first 
form of attuning connects actor and spectator in the here-and-now; the second form 
enables a performer to summon qualities of otherness through the resources of body, 
voice, and imagination.  In the first mode, self and other are materially discrete but 
intersubjectively connected beings: actor and spectator.  In the second mode, the absent 
other comes to presence in the being of the performer.  As I will show, the conceptually 
difficult issues of vicarious connection and performative summoning arise to entangle 
and complicate theories of theatrical representation again and again across acting theory’s 
history of ideas. 
 In chapter one, I return to classical Greece to examine the “other mimesis” at its 
origins and to trace its transformation into the abstract model-to-copy schema that would 
later become the more dominant meaning of mimesis.  I begin by examining the earliest 
surviving instances of mimesis terminology in the poetry, drama, history, and philosophy 
of the sixth through fourth centuries B.C.E.  These instances describe the embodiment or 
actualization of otherness by a human being through the resources of body and voice – 
mimesis as “mimicry” or “impersonation,” to oversimplify the matter.  Following the 
suggestion of the pioneering classicist Eric Havelock, I ask that we consider this 
embodied mimesis within the context of Greek musico-poetic culture as it evolved from 
orality toward literacy.  In this culture, paideia (“education”) consisted in the imitative 
learning of metrically regulated sequences of poetic speech-and-song and 
choreographically patterned movements of choral dance.  We can best understand Plato’s 




performance culture in which the bodies, voices, and psyches of young Athenians were 
molded by the combination of musical objectivity and emotional subjectivity embedded 
in poems as “oral entities.” 
When mimesis became a philosophical keyword in the fifth century BCE, 
however, the term began to take on more conceptually abstract meanings: it was applied 
to the nature of representation by the visual arts as well as forms of ethical 
correspondence, for example.  Thus we arrive at Plato’s mimesis in Book X of the 
Republic: mimesis as a form of ontologically degraded image-making, a debased copying 
of material objects that are themselves copies of ideal forms.  Turning mimesis into a 
term generally applicable to the visual as well as the performing arts requires an analogy: 
one that claims that, in representing the phenomena of the world, artworks do something 
very much like what human beings do when they embody otherness within themselves.  I 
conclude my first chapter by gesturing to the historical development of acting theory and 
showing how this foundational analogy of Western aesthetics revisits itself again and 
again upon the figure of the actor. 
 Chapter two shifts to the birth of modern acting theory out of oratorical theory in 
eighteenth-century France.  By this time, the more abstract mimesis of Republic X has 
evolved into the “imitation of nature” doctrine, and the French theorists of stage 
declamation assume “imitation” as the theatre’s essential ontology.  However, one-to-one 
thinking also surfaces when these theorists – like Luigi Riccoboni, Rémond de Sainte-
Albine, and Antoine-François Riccoboni – write obsessively about the contagiousness of 
affective experience between actor and spectator.  In doing so, they take up a conception 




back through Descartes’s analysis of the passions of the soul to Galenic physiology and 
classical pathos theory.  Divided since Plato’s intervention, the two meanings of mimesis 
in performance – as verisimilar duplication and the embodiment of alterity – merge once 
again when acting theorists like Sainte-Albine argue that the theatre’s “truth of 
Representation” depends upon the shared sensation of passion, a kind of mimetic 
experience undergone by the actor and felt vicariously by the spectator.  I conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le Comédien, which overturns the 
orthodoxy of passionate contagion and forwards in its place a theoretically perfect – and 
pristinely bodiless – conception of the actor’s mimesis.  Diderot’s modèle idéal – a vision 
of the role pre-conceived in imagination and then grafted onto the actor’s performing 
body – is the offspring of Plato’s mirror, and this phantasmic double will haunt the figure 
of the actor from the end of the eighteenth century to the present. 
 Soon after Diderot penned his Paradoxe, the mimetic paradigm would be shaken 
by Romantic conceptions of expressivity, which conceived the artistic process as 
outpouring, growth, or emanation rather than reflection or duplication.  But one-to-one 
thinking continued to hold strong within acting theory’s history of ideas for another 
century – until the paradigm-shift effected by the Russian director and systematizer of 
actor-training Konstantin Stanislavsky.  Stanislavsky wrote in response to treatises on 
aesthetics and theatrical art by Diderot, Pushkin, Tolstoy, and the French actor Benoît-
Constant Coquelin.  He also wrote under the influence of German Romanticism, Idealist 
philosophy, and the spread of Hindu philosophy through European intellectual culture 
during the nineteenth century.  The synthesis of Romanticism, Idealism, and Hinduism in 




the absolute, between humanity and divinity, or, in matters of artistic practice, between 
the subjectivity of the artist and the objectivity of the work, and between the ideal image 
and the material form that emanates from this image.  Stanislavsky carries the paradigm 
of oneness into acting theory, forwarding a conception of acting as genuine action, rather 
than the imitation of action or the representation of character. 
For Stanislavsky, acting is a primary act, marked by the actor’s experience of an 
organically unified self and a “sense of belief and truth” within fictional given 
circumstances.  Stanislavsky’s conception of theatrical truth is therefore highly 
subjective, but it is also intersubjective: the oneness of the actor with himself is marked 
by the phrase “I am,” and the spectator, who feels at one with the actor’s truthful 
behavior, is able to render the judgment, “I believe you.”  However, despite his debt of 
influence to nineteenth-century accounts of subjective oneness, which clash with the 
dualism of mimetic thinking, Stanislavsky cannot entirely escape one-to-one 
conceptualization, nor can any practical philosophy of acting avoid reckoning with the 
various phenomenon of mimesis-as-embodiment.  I show how a transformed mimeticism 
runs through Stanislavskian thought, and how Stanislavsky, despite his general rejection 
of imitation as a theoretical model and a practical technique, sometimes preserves a 
positive role for imitative self-likening in the actor’s art. 
Chapter four explores the renewal of mimetic thinking and imitative practice in 
Bertolt Brecht’s essays on the theatre.  Brecht writes against Stanislavsky’s “art of 
experiencing,” but he also constructs his vision of an “epic” theatre against accounts of 
Einfühlung (typically translated as “empathy”) in German philosophy, psychology, and 




Einfülung (literally, “in-feeling” or “one-feeling”) describes the capacity of aesthetic 
contemplators to feel-themselves-into or feel-themselves-at-one-with their objects of 
contemplation – an operation that, in Brecht’s early theatrical theory, the epic actor must 
disrupt.  The mature Brecht, however, allows for some moments of one-to-one 
identification – between actor and character, and between spectator and actor-as-
character – along with a form of embodied attunement that may jar even more strongly 
with our assumptions about the Brechtian theatre: Brecht believes that by feeling-at-one-
with the actor’s Leichtigkeit – “lightness” or “ease” in gesture and movement – the 
spectator can achieve a freedom of body and mind that will enable the critical attitude, 
the ideal mode of consciousness for both Brecht’s actor and spectator.  Clarifying 
Brecht’s stance on Einfühlung helps us see that a dual mimesis drives the operations of 
the epic theatre: a Marxist mirroring of the social world, which produces accurate but 
critical “images” of happenings between human beings, and an embodied mimesis that 
allows actors to model qualities of body-and-mind for audiences.  In his late writings on 
the theatre, the mature Brecht strives to bring about a theoretical reconciliation between 
the one-to-one of Einfühlung and the one-against-another of dialectics – a reconciliation I 
attempt to push further in the chapter’s conclusion. 
I have chosen the above four bodies of thought for their conceptual richness but 
also for their momentousness within acting theory’s history of ideas: Greek philosophy 
provides us with European thought’s first analyses of the performing arts; the treatises on 
oratorical and theatrical declamation of eighteenth-century France launch the theory of 
the stage actor as a sustained, modern conversation; Stanislavsky effects a paradigm-shift 




a new degree of technical and theoretical precision; Brecht provides the most powerful 
anti-Stanislavskian conception of the actor’s mission for much of the twentieth-century.  
In addition, in leaping across time and place from chapter to chapter, I am in fact 
following closely what I call Russo-European acting theory’s “main line” of theoretical 
influence: Diderot had read Plato; Stanislavsky read and wrote against Diderot; Brecht 
read Plato and Diderot and wrote against Stanislavsky.  The connections are clear and 
traceable.  I have chosen to leave aside certain theorists of acting whose contributions 
hold great historical importance but which nevertheless lie outside this main line of 
influence (for example, the German actor-theorists Konrad Ekhof and August Wilhelm 
Iffland, the French prophet of the “Theatre of Cruelty” Antonin Artaud, and, more 
recently, the directors Anne Bogart and Tadashi Suzuki, whose actor-training techniques 
make up an alternative paradigm for the early twenty-first century).  
 Finally, in a short coda, I point toward other strands of mimetic thinking about the 
actor’s art: in the “Biomechanical” theory of Vsevolod Meyerhold and Sergei Eisenstein, 
in the philosophy of theatrical energetics of Jerzy Grotowski and Thomas Richards, and 
in the way contemporary “mirror neuron” theory is being applied within the field of 
theatre and performance studies.  I conclude by challenging theatre scholars and 
performance theorists to move beyond the limits of one-to-one conceptualization by 
referring to their own experiences as practitioners and spectators.  Acknowledging and 
analyzing the complexity of subjective and intersubjective experience in the theatre is the 





If, as I believe, we cannot escape mimesis, either as an aesthetic concept or a 
human phenomenon, we should embrace this fact.  We should use the concept as Plato 
did – as a provocation to dialectic that gets us somewhere, rather than a set of parallel 
conceptual grooves (the one-to-one) that takes us round and round in circles, so that we 
repeat intellectual conversations rehashed many times before.  Broaching the question of 
use requires a note on methodology: any historian of ideas, in sifting through source 
texts, will generate thinking that exceeds the contents of this material.  This is inevitable, 
and useful.  What intellectual historians must guard against, however, is ventriloquizing 
the thinkers of the past – that is, voicing their own views after the preamble “Plato 
states,” “Diderot argues,” or “Brecht proposes.”  And they must just as strenuously guard 
against being ventriloquized by the arguments and concepts they encounter – that is, of 
slipping into unconscious recapitulation of opinions they have set out to examine and 
critique.  In this latter respect, mimetic theory is particularly dangerous territory, for 
following the evolution of one-to-one thinking through the history of philosophy and 
aesthetics can quickly become a form of brainwashing. 
Keeping the above in mind, I have done my best to exert self-discipline in matters 
of intellectual compartmentalization.  In the body of each chapter, I summarize and 
explicate a set of texts, making connections between them, placing them within broader 
theoretical conversations, and, when it comes to texts of acting theory, situating them in 
relation to the theatrical practices of their period.  I save my own extensions and 
extrapolations for the end of each chapter sub-section, and I give myself space to leave 
behind my source texts in pursuing their core questions in the conclusion to each chapter.  




master.  If I have given myself scope to go as much as one-fifth beyond the philosophers, 
aestheticians, and theorists of the theatre with whom I engage over this course of this 
study, I will be well satisfied. 
I have not set out to rewrite the history of aesthetics or to police the multiple 
significances that mimesis terminology has carried.  In thinking about mimesis in terms 
of the inseparable practices of acting and spectating, however, I am attempting to endow 
the mimesis concept with some measure of concreteness – an experiential concreteness 
that it once possessed, but has now lost.  As I will show in chapter one, mimetic theory 
began as what literary historian M.H. Abrams would call a highly “pragmatic” theory of 
art – one concerned with the transformative effects of artworks upon their receivers.10  
Returning mimesis to the performing body – or, better, giving mimesis back the body it 
once had – can help us grapple with how art works upon its receivers, and how artists 
work upon themselves to make otherness materially present.  This move can also help us 
avoid the easier route of constructing theoretical unrealities to fit ontological 
assumptions.  In this connection, the art of the actor can keep us grounded in embodied 
actuality.  After all, if “[t]he fundamental move of the mimetic faculty taking us bodily 
into alterity is very much the task of the storyteller too” (Taussig 1993:40), then mimesis 
as a psycho-physical capacity comes into play even more crucially in the technique of the 
actor, whose task it is to embody otherness in the here-and-now as well as to enable the 
vicarious experience of otherness in those who watch from a distance. 
                                                        





1.  Embodying Otherness: 
Mimesis, Mousike, and the Philosophy of Plato 
 
 
A priestess of Apollo gives voice to a foreign dialect.  A flute-player makes a sound like 
a Gorgon’s cry.  A Trojan spy adopts the loping gait of a wolf.  An Athenian woman 
disguised as a man infiltrates the city assembly.  A tragic poet puts on the clothes and 
bearing of a woman in order to compose female roles.  The disciple of an esteemed 
philosopher emulates his mentor.  An Athenian youth learns choral dance.  An epic poet 
sings the words of Achilles, Agamemnon, and Odysseus.  A tragic actor impersonates 
Clytemnestra, Antigone, or Hecuba.  What does any of these acts of embodiment have to 
do with mimesis? 
In this chapter, I aim to rethink the mimesis concept by refreshing its earliest 
meanings: the significations and connotations carried by mimesis terminology in texts 
and fragments of Greek poetry, drama, history, and philosophy from the sixth through the 
fourth centuries BCE.  I argue that, taken together, the earliest instances of mimesis 
terminology should be approached as describing phenomena of  “embodiment” or 
“actualization” (rather than “imitation” in a contemporary sense), with one crucial 
qualification: that the entity or quality actualized is recognized as also existing elsewhere 
or “outside” the mimetic embodiment.  In other words, the entity or quality made present 
by mimesis is perceived as “other” to the mimos (the one who mimics) or the mimema 
(the mimic thing).  I understand mimesis as the summoning of otherness within the self, 




qualities of body and voice recognized as “other” are manifested, in the moment of 
enactment, nowhere but in the medium of the self that summons them. 
 Re-embodying mimesis puts me on a collision course with Plato – in particular, 
with Book X of the Republic, which remakes mimesis as an ontologically debased mode 
of image-making.  Here Plato assimilates the mimesis concept to his static and 
hierarchical conceptual universe, opening up an ontological breach between ideal model 
and mimetic copy, with lasting consequences for aesthetic theory.  However, I intend to 
show that Platonic thought preserves a sense of mimesis as an embodied and affective 
process of self-likening, particularly in the discussions of the way classical Greek 
culture’s various genres of musico-poetic performance shape individual and collective 
character (ethos) in both the Republic and the Laws. 
The broadest aim of this chapter is to put the enactive body summoning otherness 
back at the heart of the human phenomenon that is mimesis.  Doing so will help us realize 
that when fifth-century Greek philosophy abstracted the mimesis concept to include more 
conceptual forms of correspondence, it laid down a foundational analogy that would 
shape the evolution of aesthetics in the classical era as well as the period between the 
Renaissance and the rise of Romanticism.  This foundational analogy likens the “second 
nature” brought into bodily being by the mimetic faculty with the so-called “imitations” 
produced by artistic practices like painting, sculpture, and written poetry. 
Ironically, in the Renaissance and beyond, this analogy is brought to bear upon the figure 
of the theatrical performer, and the actor’s art is theorized through constant comparison 




 When the Greeks used the term mimesis, I argue, they were referencing a 
fundamental capacity of the body in performance: the ability to summon otherness within 
the self.  I here use the word “performance” in a broad, not specifically theatrical sense, 
which includes forms of musico-poetic performance as well as performances that 
spontaneously emerge out of the flow of everyday life.  Some classical scholars seeking 
to reconstruct an “original” or “root” sense for the mimesis word-group have used 
theatrical terms like “drama” and “impersonation” to approximate these early 
significations.  For example, G.F. Else speculates that mimesis and its variant forms at 
first “denoted a dramatic or quasi-dramatic representation, and their extension to 
nondramatic forms like painting and sculpture must have been a secondary development” 
(Else 1958:78).  The impulse of the theatre scholar to leap at this mimesis-theatre 
conjunction – in order to stake a claim for the mimesis concept as “belonging” to the 
theatre as a form of practice and a field of study – must be kept down.  To retroactively 
endow mimesis with a “dramatic” or even “quasi-dramatic” coloring before Plato and 
Aristotle made it a central concept in their theories of tragedy amounts to revisionist 
theatricalization.  We should avoid using the theatre as the sole lens through which we re-
examine mimesis, for the mimetic faculty – as the human capacity to embody otherness – 
is more basic to human culture than the theatre as an art form and more basic to the 
mental-and-physical life of social actors than the skill-sets employed in theatrical 
“impersonation.”  In this connection we can cite Aristotle’s famous observation that 
the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference 
between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living 
creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is 





Mimesis is a fundamentally human process – a “conditio humana” (Gebauer and Wulf 
1995:1).  It is not inherently “theatrical” (whatever that might mean), but it does make 
theatre possible.  By this I mean that the mimetic faculty provides enactments of 
otherness, whether embedded in ritual proceedings, mime performances, or theatrical 
productions, with their essential impetus and appeal.  And if, as Michael Taussig 
proposes, “the fundamental move of the mimetic faculty taking us bodily into alterity is 
very much the task of the storyteller too” (Taussig 1993:40), it makes sense to re-
examine the fundamental meanings of mimesis by engaging with the embodied practices 
of the epic, lyric, and tragic poets of ancient Greece – one of the earliest families of 
storytellers in the European tradition.  By doing so, we may be able to rescue mimesis 
from theoretical ideality and return it to the bodily substance of lived reality. 
 At this point, a note on translation is required.  Throughout this chapter, I will 
quote translations that render the noun mimesis as “imitation” and the verb mimeisthai as 
“imitate.”  However, I ask the reader to replace these words in imagination with 
“embody” or “actualize.”  I also ask that the reader take a moment to consider how such 
substitutions change the sense of the passages in question.  It is unfortunate that the 
English language possesses no verb-form with a close homophonous connection to the 
Greek mimeisthai, the verb-form from which the word mimesis (as a noun of process) 
appears to derive.  The Spanish language, however, does possess such a word: mimetizar 
(“to copy, to imitate”).11  I therefore propose an Anglicization of the Spanish, 
“mimetize,” to be used sparingly throughout this chapter at those moments when it is 
                                                        




most necessary to emphasize mimesis’s dynamic and processual nature.12  Using 
“mimetize” at selected moments will also highlight the inadequacy of alternative English 
verbs like “imitate,” “copy,” “mimic,” or “ape,” all of which appear as translations of 
mimeisthai in standard editions of classical texts from the late nineteenth century to the 
present.  These various translations confuse the cluster of related connotations that 
classical Greek poets, philosophers, and historians were deliberately or unconsciously 
invoking when they took up mimesis terminology. 
 
Mimesis before Plato 
 
 
Though Plato’s transformative adoption of mimesis was in many ways radical, his 
treatment of the concept drew on a long and varied history of terminological usage.  
Instances of the mimesis word group are scattered across texts and fragments of fifth-
century poetry, drama, history, and philosophy.  The mimesis word group includes 
several variants: 
1) The noun mimos (usually translated as “mime” or “mimic”), which designates 
someone carrying out an imitative activity in a general sense as well as the 
performer of the specific dramatic genre of mime;13 
2) the verb mimeisthai (usually translated as “to imitate” or “to mimic”); 
3) the noun mimesis (“imitation,” “mimicry”), which first appears in the fifth 
century BCE; 
4) the noun forms mimema (singular) and mimemata (plural), which describe an 
“imitation” or “imitations” as material objects or concrete phenomena;  
5) the adjective mimetikos, which describes something that is imitative in its 
nature or capable of mimetic activity; 
6) and the noun form mimetes (“imitator”), which designates the executor of 
mimetic activity, and which does not appear until the fourth century BCE. 
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Taussig 1993:106). 
13 Greek “mime” of the period in question consisted in dialogue-based sketches 
employing crude, earthy humor and not in the silent performance genre of expressive and 





The terms above were used in a variety of contexts, to communicate a range of meanings, 
which classical scholar Stephen Halliwell has divided into five primary categories: 
“visual resemblance”; “behavioral emulation/imitation”; “impersonation, including 
dramatic enactment”; “vocal or musical production”; and “metaphysical conformity” (see 
Halliwell 2002:15). 
A number of classical scholars working just after the midpoint of the twentieth 
century labored to reconstruct an “original” meaning of mimesis, though others since 
have argued that the existing evidence is too scarce to allow anything more than 
speculation.14  Hermann Koller’s Die Mimesis in der Antike: Nachahmung, Darstellung, 
Ausdruck [“Mimesis in Antiquity: Imitation, Representation, Expression”](1954) sparked 
this scholarly trend by arguing that mimesis terminology was at first associated with the 
representational and expressive qualities of Dionysian cultic performances.  Gerald F. 
Else’s “‘Imitation’ in the fifth century” (1958) refuted Koller’s view by painstakingly 
assembling the earliest instances of mimesis terminology in order to argue for their “root 
sense” in “a miming or mimicking of the external appearance, utterances, and/or 
movements of an animal or a human being by a human being” (Else 1958:78).  Else 
located the “original center of gravity” of mimesis terminology in a “‘mimic’ sense” 
associated with “‘live’ imitation” (Else 1958:82, 83); he also claimed that noun form 
mimos carried lingering associations with the genre of Sicilian mime.  Else traced a 
semantic movement away from the early sense of mimic mimesis as “dramatic or quasi-
dramatic representation” toward “a more abstract and colorless range of meaning,” which 
included ethical emulation and visual representation in inanimate media (Else 1958:78, 
                                                        




82).  Göran Sörbom went further in endowing mimesis with dramatic origins, speculating 
that the root word in the group was mimos and that its related terms carried the basic 
metaphorical meaning: “to behave like a mime actor (or as people do in the mimes)” 
(Sörbom 1966:39).  According to Sörbom, the metaphor’s gradual naturalization allowed 
a more abstract set of meanings, conveying a general sense of similitude or 
correspondence.  However, classicist Stephen Halliwell, in his Aesthetics of Mimesis: 
Ancient Texts and Modern Problems (2002), perhaps the most comprehensive intellectual 
history of the mimesis concept to date, calls the search for the root meanings of mimesis 
an “alluring” but “fruitless enterprise” and deems the etymology of mimesis terminology 
“irrecoverable” (17). 
Else may go too far in claiming an original “‘mimic’ sense” for mimesis.  
Nevertheless, even if his argument for a “center of gravity” overreaches itself, the cluster 
of early fragments that Else analyzes does seem to occupy a semantic field outlined by 
the act of vocal-and-physical mimicry.  I therefore put forward the following proposition 
not as a philological claim but rather as a thought-experiment in re-conceptualizing 
mimesis: that we need not locate the fundamental meaning of mimesis in the practice of 
acting or in the dramatic genre of mime, but in the act of mimicry that exists at their core, 
and in the mimetic faculty that enables such an act.  Both miming and acting, whether 
they arise spontaneously in social interaction or are deliberately orchestrated for public 
performance, rely upon the fundamental human capacity to summon other ways of being 
in the medium of the self.  This capacity to bring otherness into bodily presence is 
actually – rather than metaphorically – redeployed within the performing arts.  It may be 




forms of correspondence – such as ethical emulation and visual representation – through 
metaphorical comparison with this basic human faculty.  As we shall see, none of the 
earliest surviving usages of the mimesis word-group need be interpreted in terms of the 
model-to-copy schema that we now associate with the ontology of mimesis-as-
representation.  
 Let us turn now to some early instances of mimesis terminology that refer to 
musico-poetic performance practice.  The set of practices comprising what the Greeks 
called mousike – the undifferentiated complex of poetry, song, dance, and instrumental 
accompaniment so central to their culture – were fundamentally arts of embodiment.  To 
the Greeks, mousike simply meant the province of the Muses, and it should be kept in 
mind that the central function of the nine Muses was their divine patronage of rhythmic 
speech delivered in performance.  No Muses presided over what we would today call the 
“visual arts” of painting and sculpture – indeed, as has often been noted, the Greeks had 
no notion of the aesthetic as a discrete sphere and no word for “art” in the general sense 
that the term connotes today.  The Greek culture of mousike exploited the human capacity 
to manifest otherness in body and voice, and mimesis terminology was used to describe 
both this capacity and other elements of musical performance (like instruments) which 
themselves mimic this capacity. 
The Delian Hymn to Apollo (ca. 600 BCE) is the first text in which the verb-form 
mimeisthai appears in a performance context, and here it still retains its “mimic” 
coloring: a chorus of Delian priestesses is described by the poet as able to mimic 
(mimeisthai) different dialects: “they can imitate the tongues of all men and their 




continues: “each [audience member, perhaps at a festival gathering of Ionian tribes,] 
would say that he himself were singing, so [well] the beautiful song is fitted to them” (in 
Sörbom 1966:59).  Here there is a sense of fitness to the priestesses’ vocal 
impersonations, in that they accurately capture the accents they attempt, leading to 
recognition and admiration in the audience.  But there is no model-to-copy divide: the 
imitated accents do not exist prior to and separate from the maidens’ performance; rather, 
they pour out of the singing mouths of the priestesses in the act of mimetizing.  The 
rightness of the vocal “imitations” produced derives from the assessment of the listeners, 
not from some form of ontological comparison. 
In the Problems, Aristotle ventures an explanation for why people enjoy listening 
to familiar songs more than unfamiliar ones: “It is because it is more obvious when the 
singer […] hits the target” (in Barker 1984:190).  Singing a song sung (or heard) before, 
like imitating a foreign dialect, is a mimetic act.  The rightness or wrongness of this act – 
whether or not the singer or speaker “hits the target” – is immanent within the mimetic 
act itself; it is inherent in the activities of singing and listening.  The listener does not 
compare what he or she is hearing with another song in his or her “mind’s ear”; rather, he 
or she listens-to-and-assesses the actual song, perceiving qualities of rightness or 
wrongness in the song itself.  There is no model-to-copy comparison within the conscious 
experience of the listener. 
In a fragment of one of Pindar’s Parthenian Odes, the singer uses the verb 
mimeisthai when she tells the listener that “to the notes of the lotus-pipe shall I mimic in 
song a siren-sound of praise, such as husheth the swift blasts of Zephyr” (in Sörbom 




all of making a copy, of repeating in all their details, the song of sirens” (Sörbom 
1966:62).  We could substitute the phrase “give voice to” for the verb “mimic” in the 
translation above, except that we would need to stipulate that the singer’s act is a giving 
voice to an “other” voice (the voice of a siren).  This other voice, however, exists 
nowhere except in the Greek mythic imagination and in the singer’s vocalization that 
summons it. 
In another Pindar fragment – this time, from a hyporcheme, a genre of lyric 
performance – the verb mimeisthai seems to be used in connection with a danced scenario 
of a hunt, in which the performer is to embody both the hunter’s horse, hunting dog, and 
quarry.  As Else writes: “The solo dancer is to mimic the actions of the bitch and her 
prey, including the tossing of the latter’s head” (Else 1958:77).  The ancient authorities 
on dance – like Xenophon, Lucian, and Plutarch – are unanimous on the fact that it was 
mimetic.  Furthermore, in sources like the Onomasticon of Pollux (ca. late second century 
CE), many of the names of the various choral dances listed – like “the owl,” “the crane,” 
and “the kneading-trough” – “suggest imitation […] of an action or an animal or a 
person” (Zarifi 2007:242).15 
Mimesis terminology also arises in discussions of musico-poetic performance 
when instruments are endowed with the ability to mimic the mimicry of the human voice.  
The aulos flute, accompaniment for Dionysian revels as well as the lyrical passages in 
tragic performance, was regarded by the Greeks as capable of capturing the timbre of the 
human voice.  Pindar’s twelfth Pythian Ode (lines 18-21) imagines Athena inventing “the 
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in cult, which required dancers to enact (for example) movement through the Cretan 





many-voiced music of flutes, that so, by aid of music, she might imitate the cry exceeding 
shrill that burst from the ravening jaws of [the Gorgon] Euryale” (in Sörbom 1966:59).  
The verb in the passage cited is mimeisthai, and Pindar here imagines that the many 
“voices” of which wind instruments are capable were devised to fulfill a mimetic 
function.  Another key example of what we might call instrumental mimesis comes in the 
earliest extant occurrence of the plural noun-form mimoi: in Aeschylus’s Edonians, the 
ancient instruments known as bull-roarers seem to be regarded, metaphorically, as 
“mimes” (mimoi) who imitate the bellowing of bulls, although, under another 
interpretation, the sounds might be produced by human performers (see Else 1958:74-5, 
Halliwell 2002:17, Sörbom 1966:54).  As a final example of instrumental mimesis, the 
chorus in Euripides’s Iphigenia at Aulis describes the Trojan prince Paris as a young boy, 
imitating the sounds of the aulos on his simple shepherd’s pipe (the syrinx).  More 
precisely, the chorus says that Paris blows mimemata of the aulos (see Sörbom 1966:67-
8).  It would be odd indeed to translate mimemata here as “representations” or even 
“imitations”; like the “impressions” performed by vocal mimic, Paris’s mimemata are 
sounds that actualize certain qualities of “other” sounds, though these qualities of 
otherness are recognized as present in the mimemata themselves. 
 Moving on from discussions of musico-poetic performance within poetry and 
drama, we find mimesis terminology applied to acts of impersonation outside the context 
of mousike in a number of Greek tragedies and comedies.  For example, Aeschylus puts 
the verb mimeisthai into the mouth of Orestes in the Choephori (“Libation Bearers”) as 
he prepares to disguise himself in order to enter his familial house and exact revenge 




I shall come with this man to the gate of the courtyard, 
with Pylades, a stranger and a spear-friend to the house. 
And we will both speak the dialect of Parnassus, 
copying the sound of the Phocian tongue. (Aeschylus 1970:41) 
 
The word translated as “copying” above is mimeisthai.  The success of Orestes and 
Pylades’s impersonation will certainly depend upon their mimicry of the chosen accent, 
but also upon their ability to simulate the bearing and affect of strangers to the House of 
Atreus.  In other words, some acting will be required of Orestes and Pylades. 
In the tragedy Rhesus, attributed to Euripides, the Trojan spy Dolon disguises 
himself in a wolfskin and adopts the animal’s gait in order to infiltrate the Greek camp 
after dark.  About to set out upon his stealthy exploit, Dolon brags: 
 Over my back a wolfskin will I draw, 
 And the brute’s gaping jaws shall frame mine head: 
 Its forefeet will I fasten to my hands, 
 Its legs to mine: the wolf’s four-footed gait 
 I’ll mimic, baffling so our enemies […].16 
 
The verb translated as “mimic” in the above passage is mimeisthai, and Dolon is 
described by the play’s chorus as a mimos soon after this moment.  Perhaps we cannot 
call Dolon’s act an “impersonation,” since he is a man embodying the movement 
qualities of an animal.  But in this instance of a man summoning wolfness within himself, 
we find the same elements as the example from the Choephori: the convincing 
embodiment of qualities of otherness, with an intention to deceive – and high stakes for 
success or failure.  Again, the presence of the “model” is immanent in Dolon’s 
performance: when a man summons the physicality of a wolf – in the context of ritual 
enactment, choral dance, or intra-tragic performance – the observer does not see a wolf.  
                                                        




The “referent” is not phenomenally present to the observer’s consciousness.  Rather, the 
observer recognizes wolfness in the embodied qualities of the summoner’s performance. 
 In the comedies of Aristophanes, mimesis often enables transgressive or 
provocative acts of gender performance – of the embodiment of otherness across the 
perceived divides of gender difference.  The verb form mimeisthai arises in 
Aristophanes’s Ecclesiazusae (“The Assembly Women”), when Praxagora convinces the 
women of Athens to disguise themselves as men, so that they can infiltrate the city’s 
assembly and pass a series of radical communitarian proposals.  Praxagora tells her 
followers to dress themselves in men’s tunics and shoes, affix false beards to their faces, 
and then, “leaning on your sticks / Off to the Meeting, piping as ye go / Some old man’s 
song, and mimicking the ways / Of country fellows” (Aristophanes 1924:271).  Here 
again the context is one of disguise and impersonation: the women are costuming 
themselves as men, but they are also calling upon an intimate, bodily familiarity with 
men’s ways – their ways of walking, singing, and conducting themselves generally – in 
order to simulate masculine behavior.  Of course, the “women” of the Ecclesiazusae 
would have been played by male actors, so the embodiment of gender difference would 
already be part of the performance in the amphitheater of Dionysos.  This embodiment of 
femininity, however, would probably have tended toward exaggeration and caricature, 
given the tone and aims of Aristophanic comedy.  There may have even been a kind of 
doubled Brechtian estrangement at work in the male performers’ mimetizing of their 
female characters’ mimetizing of masculine characteristics.17  Of course, the embodiment 
                                                        
17 Brecht’s “Exercises for Acting Schools” highlight the gestures and attitudes associated 
with gender roles by having female actors carry out stereotyped male behaviors and vice 




of femininity by male actors – what Froma Zeitlin calls “playing the other” – was also a 
staple of tragedy, both as a protocol of Athenian performance culture and within fictional 
dramatic events (as when Dionysos dresses Pentheus as a bacchante in Euripides’s 
Bacchae).18 
 In Aristophanes, mimesis terminology also describes a more specifically theatrical 
mode of impersonation than in the above instances.  At several moments, figures within 
the comedies attempt to embody a particular character or personage well known to 
themselves and well known to their prospective “audiences.”  In Aristophanes’s Clouds, 
Dionysos costumes himself as Heracles – with iconic club and lionskin – in order to 
duplicate successfully Heracles’s feat of journeying to the underworld.  Dionysos uses 
the mimesis verb-form to describe his attempt to impersonate Heracles – an attempt that 
is revealed as unsuccessful and ridiculous when Dionysos meets the actual Heracles, who 
cannot contain his mocking laughter.   Bungled mimesis – the failure to convincingly 
embody a model – is a basic device of comedy from the Greeks to the present.  The 
spectator’s perception of laughable wrongness – often juxtaposed with the character’s 
total confidence in his or her “acting” – is elicited in Greek comedy both “Old” and 
“New,” the Roman comedy of Plautus and Terence, Elizabethan comedy, and the 
commedia dell’arte, along with more contemporary comic genres. 
 Dionysos’s impersonation of Heracles in the above example carries a meta-
theatrical – or, perhaps better, meta-mythic – dimension: here a character is aware of the 
correspondence between his or her situation and the situation of a character from pre-
existing drama or myth.  This Aristophanic meta-awareness also arises in Wealth, when 
                                                        




the slave Cairo dances with happiness, crying out that he is “mimicking” the Cyclops (see 
Else 1958:80, Sörbom 1966:71).  In this passage, Aristophanes quotes from the Loves of 
Galatea and Cyclops, a burlesque by the dithyrambic poet Philoxenus of Cythera.  The 
character Cairo may simply be drawing a situational parallel between himself and the 
character of Philoxenus’s Cyclops – as he later does with the mythological characters 
Circe and Odysseus.  It is also possible, however, that at this moment the performer 
playing Cairo also takes up the metrical structure and danced movements of Philoxenus’s 
dithyramb, so that a citational mimesis – the embodied citation of an earlier poetic 
performance – compounds the situational mimesis previously described.19 
 Perhaps the most interesting episode of mimetic performance in Aristophanes’s 
oeuvre comes in Thezmophoriazusae (also translated as Women at the Thesmophoria), 
where Aristophanes depicts a visit by Euripides to the tragic poet Agathon.20 Agathon is 
caught in the act of composing a new play: he is dressed in feminine garments, and 
alternates between portraying a Priestess chorus-leader and a chorus of Trojan women, 
singing falsetto to the accompaniment of a lyre.  Explaining the usefulness of his 
accoutrements and bodily adjustments, Agathon explains: 
 I change my clothing along with my purpose. 
 For it’s necessary that a poet-man have habits 
 according to the plays that he must write. 
                                                        
19 In the Thezmophoriazusae, Aristophanes provides other instances of the parodic 
performance of gender traits as well as previous tragic models.  In this play, Euripides’s 
kinsman Mnesilochus disguises himself as a woman in order to advocate for his son-in-
law at an assembly of women who wish to pass judgment on the tragic poet for his 
disrespectful dramatic treatment of female characters.  The play also contains a scene 
parodying Euripides’s Helen (produced just a year earlier than the Thezmophoriazusae, in 
412 BCE), with Mnesilochus again performing exaggerated femininity as the Greek 
princess. 
20 This is the same tragic poet Agathon (c. 448-400 BCE), known to be a close friend of 




 For example, if one is writing feminine plays, 
 One’s body must participate in their habits. […] 
 If you’re writing about masculine things, that which you need 
 Is there in your body; but if we don’t have it, 
 Then it must be captured by imitation [mimesis].21 
 
Agathon’s mimesis is an embodied process, a trying-on-for-size of the corporeal ways of 
being (tropoi) that must be actualized convincingly in performance.  Agathon does not 
experiment with different ways of “representing” the feminine, but, through the exercise 
of the mimetic faculty, partakes in the physical habits of women in order to stimulate his 
creative imagination – and, presumably, his ability to enter into the mental and emotional 
states of his female characters.  For classicist Anne Duncan, the “mimetic body” of 
Agathon is “fundamentally indeterminate,” “neither fully male nor fully female,” and the 
tragedian’s embodied mimesis “puts into question the distinctions between poet and 
work, actor and role, masculine and feminine, body and costume” (Duncan 2006:33).  An 
“early figure for the actor,” the “gender- and genre-bender” Agathon provokes “anxieties 
about mimesis and identity that will haunt the ancient world for a thousand years” (27). 
Euripides says of Agathon’s mimetic method, “I was the same way at his age, 
when I began to write” (Aristophanes 1996:104), suggesting that Aristophanes may not 
be depicting Agathon’s process as ridiculously eccentric but as a variant of standard 
compositional practice – although one parodically heightened by the lampooning context.  
Evidence in Aristotle’s Poetics may also suggest that the mode of enactive composition 
the fictionalized Agathon undertakes was not idiosyncratic.  In Chapter XVII of the 
Poetics, Aristotle encourages the poet “to imagine his material to the fullest possible 
extent while composing his plot-structures and elaborating them in language.  By seeing 
                                                        




them as vividly as possible in this way – as if present at the very occurrence of the events 
– he is likely to discover what is appropriate, and least likely to miss contradictions” 
(Aristotle 1987:50).  It is unclear here whether Aristotle means that the poet ought to take 
the perspective of a spectator at a theatrical performance or a witness at fictional dramatic 
events.  Aristotle goes on to urge that “so far as possible, the poet should even include 
gestures in the process of composition: for, assuming the same natural talent, the most 
convincing effect comes from those who actually put themselves in the emotions; and the 
truest impression of distress or anger is given by the person who experiences these 
feelings” (50).  While imaginative visualization is necessary in developing narrative 
coherence and detail – the discovery of “what is appropriate” and the editing out of 
“contradictions” – physicalization of gesture is necessary in order to generate the 
emotional dimension of the poetic score. 
Since tragic gesture in Aristotle’s day would have hardly been naturalistic, we can 
imagine the tragic poet of Poetics XVII experimenting with choreographic schemata, 
stylized dance-movements, in the medium of his own body.  The Greek poet’s process of 
artistic creation did not occur in confrontation with a blank page; instead, the poet, in a 
mode of enactive composition, simultaneously produced words, meter, dance movement, 
and musical accompaniment.  These elements were not layered onto each other, as in 
most contemporary processes of theatrical production, which tend to begin with the text 
as blueprint, but born as an organic unity out of the poet’s embodied imagination.  The 
poet’s process of creation, both in Aristophanes’s Thesmophoriazusae and in Poetics 
XVII, unfolds as enactment more than the “making” (poesis) of an artifact in a medium 




 Cataloguing the instances of mimesis terminology discussed above, we find 
usages that describe: acts of vocal or physical mimicry; the faculty of mimicry deployed 
within musico-poetic performance contexts (by human beings and, metaphorically, by 
musical instruments); the embodiment of gendered characteristics; and the impersonation 
of particular figures from myth or drama.  We are thus moving closer to a more 
contemporary conception of the actor’s task: the impersonation of character within 
fictional circumstances.  However, during the fifth century, mimesis terminology is also 
applied to forms of self-likening more abstract than the embodied acts of imitation 
explicated above.  During this period, G.F. Else perceives a line of semantic drift from 
mimesis terminology’s “original center of gravity” in “‘live’ imitation” to a more 
conceptual, “generalized sense” operating more on the level of analogy rather than 
physiology (Else 1958:82). 
One key example of the possible trend toward generalization is the appearance of 
ethical mimesis: the reproduction of behavior without actual mimicry.  We have 
examples of this analogy-based ethical sense in Thucydides, when the generalship of 
Pausanias is called a mimesis of a tyranny,22 and when the Athenians are deemed “a 
model which some follow, rather than the imitators of other peoples” (in Sörbom 
1966:33).  Another such instance comes in the elegiac poetry of Theognis (active in the 
sixth century BCE): “none of the unskilled will be able to emulate/match [mimesthai] 
me” (in Halliwell 2002:15).  However, Eric Havelock disputes the degree of abstraction 
in instances like the aforementioned, insisting that they still carry the fundamental 
connotation of “sympathetic behavior” – of “doing what someone else does” or 
                                                        




“becoming like him” (Havelock 1963:56-7).  Havelock accuses classical scholarship of 
importing into these early Greek examples “the Platonic abstract reduction of [the 
mimetic] process to a relationship between original and copy” (58). 
Ethical mimesis also takes place between philosophers and their disciples.  In his 
Memorabilia, the philosopher Xenophon (ca. 430-350 BCE), a contemporary and admirer 
of Socrates and an elder contemporary of Plato, argues that Socrates inspired a desire for 
goodness in his followers not through direct didacticism, “but, by letting his own light 
shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such 
excellence” (in Sörbom 1966:35).  This instance might at first seem less concretely 
corporeal than the mimic acts of musico-poetic performers, but, taking Havelock’s 
warning to heart, we should not ignore the element of mimetic behavior involved in the 
relationship between a disciple and an esteemed teacher.  The absorption by a student of 
the physical idiosyncrasies of a teacher or other role-model is by no means limited to 
forms of physical practice and even occurs within disciplines commonly understood as 
involving the transfer of more abstract, conceptual forms of knowledge.  The 
contemporary philosopher Simon Critchley has observed that 
philosophy can be seen to be embodied in a way of life.  Thus, to endorse or 
champion the views of a particular philosopher might lead to a certain mimicking 
or attempted emulation of that life.  One sees this all the time professionally, 
where the students of a charismatic and famous philosopher will not only defend 
his or her doctrine, but also imitate their hand gestures, hesitations, verbal tics, 
and even their smoking, drinking, and sexual habits.  Discipleship is not too 
strong a word for what is taking place here.  (Critchley 2001:61) 
 
Perhaps “discipleship” is not strong enough a word for the mimetizing Critchley 
describes.  “Incorporation” might serve better.  The asymmetrical dynamics of authority 




mimetic absorption: the intense shaft of attention which the disciple focuses upon the 
authority figure, along with the former’s wholehearted belief in the latter’s intellect or 
wisdom, may indeed lead to a particularly potent form of openness to mimetic 
absorption. 
In classical Athens, philosophy was itself a form of a performance practice: 
Socrates struck up debates with passersby in the agora (Athens’ marketplace and place of 
assembly) and Aristotle lectured as he walked the grounds of the Lyceum (a gymnasium 
and public meeting place).  Did Plato feel Socrates “in him” as he held court at the 
Academy?  Did Aristotle notice upsurges of “Platonism” – as a way of being as well as a 
philosophical approach – in his body and voice as he walked and talked at the Lyceum?  
If so, it may be that Aristotle also – and unwittingly – manifested characteristics of an 
idiosyncratically “Socratic” sensibility, passed on down the genealogy of philosophic 
performance through the “medium” of Plato’s body-and-consciousness. 
 If speaking about ethical emulation in terms of mimesis does not involve a radical 
abstraction of the concept, the meanings of mimesis I have assembled above are 
significantly transformed when the concept is applied to the visual arts – painting and 
sculpture, in particular.  Mimesis now describes the presentation of otherness in a 
medium other than that of the human body.  Athenian philosophers may have begun to 
discuss the artistic image under the rubric of mimesis during the late fifth and early fourth 
centuries (see Halliwell 2002:124), but evidence for this background to Plato’s 
transformative discussion of artistic mimesis has been lost.  Xenophon’s Memorabilia has 
sometimes been argued to be the earliest surviving site of conjunction between the visual 




“appearance” (phainomena) – a foundational conjunction for aesthetic theory.  The 
Memorabilia may therefore give us some insight into philosophical approaches to visual 
art by Socrates and his circle.  It is also possible, however, that the text was written as 
late at the 350s BCE, meaning that Plato’s more developed philosophy of art may have 
exerted an influence on Xenophon. 
In the third chapter of the dialogic Memorabilia, Xenophon orchestrates a 
conversation between Socrates, the painter Parrhasius, and the sculptor Cleiton.  
Xenophon’s Socrates proposes that painting should be understood as “the imaging of the 
visible world” (eikasia ton horomenon).  Within this imaging, the character (ethos) or 
state of soul (psuche) of a represented figure “shows through” (diaphainein) the painterly 
rendering of physical bearing and facial expression, so that painting can indeed “realize” 
or “produce” (energazesthai) the “appearance of life” (to zotikon phainesthai) within an 
inanimate medium.23  This last claim houses an interesting internal tension between a 
seemingly “quasi-vitalistic quality” in artistic mimesis (Halliwell 2002:123) and the 
notion that painting and sculpture must deal in appearances rather than actualities. 
Because the date of composition of the Memorabilia is uncertain (it may post-date 
Plato’s Republic) and its situation within the philosophical climate of its time is also 
unclear, we cannot know whether Xenophon was innovating when he applied mimetic 
terminology to the visual and plastic arts.  Stephen Halliwell argues forcefully that he 
was not24 and points to a fragment of Aeschylus’s satyr play Theoroi as the main 
evidence to the contrary.  The passage in question contains the earliest surviving instance 
                                                        
23 My discussion of the Memorabilia relies heavily on Halliwell 2002:122-24 and 
Sörbom 1966:78-105. 




of the noun-form mimema as applied to visual art.  A chorus of satyrs is astonished by a 
set of lifelike votive images of themselves; they refer to one remarkably convincing 
image as “the mimetic work [mimema] of Daedalus” and describe it as lacking only a 
voice to make the verisimilar effect complete.  The satyr chorus-leader concludes that 
even his own mother would “think it was actually me – that’s how like me it [the image] 
is” (in Halliwell 2002:19-20). 
The historian Herodotus (c. 484-425 BCE) also uses mimesis vocabulary several 
times in connection with visual representations.  Most of these instances describe 
Egyptian arts and crafts: painted memento mori of corpses; wooden embalmer’s models; 
pillars sculpted in the shape of palm trees; a stylized image of the sun (see Sörbom 
1966:63-67).   However, all of these instances in Herodotus – and, indeed, all 
applications of mimesis terminology to the visual and plastic arts before Xenophon and 
Plato – are functional descriptions of specific works rather than sweeping, ontological 
classifications.  Before the early fourth century BCE, “[w]orks of art in general are not 
called mimetic, but only particular ones in given situations” (Sörbom 1966:78). 
What does it mean to classify an artwork as a mimema – as, literally, a “mimetic 
thing?”  There are three distinct possibilities: first, the work could be deemed to be 
mimetic (an ontological classification); second, it might be seen as having been made 
through mimetic processes (a generative classification); the final option, least intuitive for 
the contemporary mind, is that the work might be considered a thing that mimics 




(an operational or functional classification).25  Who is the mimetist in the passage from 
the Theoroi?  Does mimetic agency reside in the artist or in the image itself, which can be 
thought of as mimicking the satyr?  The latter interpretation would certainly have been in 
keeping with stories of the mythical Daedalus, whose statues came to life and had to be 
restrained to prevent them from running away.  In other words, the satyr-image would 
qualify as a mimema – a “mimetic thing” – not because it was judged so by some external 
standard of classification but because it accomplished an act of mimetizing, revealing 
some mimetic animus.26  Although surviving textual evidence is too scant to make a 
forceful case, it is tempting to hypothesize that, at least in some instances, the term 
mimesis might have infiltrated the theory of the visual arts by means of the human form – 
in other words, that the representational power of plastic media was at first likened to the 
physiological capacity in the human figures (or quasi-human figures, in the case of 
Aeschylus’s satyrs) such artforms took as their primary subjects.  If, in its first 
applications to works of visual art, the term mimema did indeed designate “a thing that 
mimetizes” rather than “a thing that is mimetic,” then the history of Western aesthetic 
theory would be built upon a foundational analogy: between the “imitations” produced by 
artistic practices and the second nature brought into being by the embodied act of 
mimetizing.  In other words, mimetic aesthetics was founded upon the idea that art does 
what human beings do when they summon otherness within themselves. 
                                                        
25 Göran Sörbom argues that the word mimema was applied to works of visual art to 
denote that “they are vivid, vital, and concrete representations of the ‘models’ appearing 
directly and immediately to the beholders ‘as if they were living’” (Sörbom 1966:52). 
26 For another example of the term mimema used to describe a thing driven by a mimetic 
animus occurs, see Euripides’s Helen, wherein the doppelgänger of Helen sent by Hera to 
Troy with Paris is labeled as such.  For a provocative discussion of the figure of Helen’s 
relationship with uncanny images, see Elizabeth C. Mansfield’s Too Beautiful to Picture: 





Republic II and III: Mimesis as Self-Likening 
 
Plato probably took up mimesis as a keyword already established in fifth-century critical 
discussions of the musico-poetic and visual arts.  As we shall see, it was the incorporation 
and re-actualization of otherness traditionally associated with mimesis as a human 
operation that provoked Plato’s deepest anxieties about the place of poetry in Athenian 
cultural life.  Plato’s dialogues do not offer up a monolithic “doctrine of mimesis,” as 
some scholars have argued,27 but rather represent the varied results of a “prolonged and 
profoundly ambivalent relationship with mimesis” (Halliwell 2002:70).  The nature and 
effects of poetry are dealt with extensively in the Apology, Ion, and Euthyphro, and a 
significant treatment of mimesis appears in the dialogue Cratylus (possibly from the 
“middle” period of Plato’s career).  However, it is within the magnum opus of the 
Republic that Plato’s Socrates gives mimesis its most comprehensive and varied 
treatment.   Books II and III explore the concept from the standpoint of ethical 
transmission: they describe mimesis’s effects on the receiver/participant in poetic 
performance and discuss what role mimetic poetry ought to play in the education and 
socialization of the ideal city-state’s ruling elite.  Book X, on the other hand, attempts to 
define the very ontology of the mimetic, “what mimesis in general is” (Rep. 595c, Plato 
1968:278). 
Plato assumes in the reader of Republic a background knowledge of Athenian 
poetic performance culture, so in order to approach the treatment of mimesis in Books II 
and III, we must first come to comprehend what “poetry” – a category encompassing epic 
                                                        
27 See, for example, W.J. Verdenius’s Mimesis: Plato’s doctrine of artistic imitation and 




rhapsody, choral song, and tragic and comic drama – actually was during the Greek 
classical period.  In doing so, we must bracket off contemporary conceptions of poetic 
production and consumption, wherein poems are composed in writing by a solitary 
author, published or otherwise circulated in some textual medium, and appreciated 
privately by readers.  Within the Greek oral culture that was still dominant during Plato’s 
time, poetry was transmitted primarily through recitation,28 and the very word used by the 
Greeks to designate the plot of tragedies (mythos) implied “something spoken” (Wiles 
2000:12).  Throughout the Republic, Plato consistently refers to what poets “say” (rather 
than “write”), even in the case of Homer.  Plato’s poet always appears as a performer – 
that is, a hybrid reciter-and-actor – and never an author whose work might make its 
impact upon his audience as a literary artifact detached from his person.29  It should also 
be remembered that, until the later fifth century, it was standard practice for the tragic 
dramatist to serve as lead actor.  The poet was the “maker” (poietes) of the performance 
not only in its preparatory phases of composition and rehearsal but also in the moment of 
actual enactment. 
In classical Athens, face-to-face, body-to-body transmission between poet/teacher 
and receiver/student was central to processes of theatrical production as well as the 
instruction in paideia: the educational apparatus essential to Greek culture, seen as 
shaping its individual members toward an ideal character.30  Within this still largely oral 
                                                        
28 For a discussion of oral instruction in the transmission of poetry, see chapters 2 and 9 
of Havelock 1963, and also Halliwell 2002:52. 
29 While it is true that some of the successors of Homer composed in writing, classical 
scholars like Eric Havelock have argued that these poets still wrote solely for 
performance before a live audience (Havelock 1963:46). 
30 The classic study on the subject is Werner Jaeger’s three-volume work, Paideia: The 




culture, paideutic instruction would have involved vocal-and-physical imitation of 
teacher’s demonstration by learners.  In preparation for a tragic performance, too, 
“dramatists taught the roles to their actors face to face, with the correct intonations, 
movement and music, and there is no evidence that actors ever received a script” (Wiles 
2000:165).  The technology of writing was eventually put to widespread use in recording 
the word-content of dramatic poetry (as a stream of letters, undivided by punctuation), 
but “the totality of words, music and dance were preserved into the classical period 
through memorization and reperformance” (167). 
The Republic’s first extended discussion of mimesis bridges Books II and III, as 
Socrates and his disciples discuss the education of the guardian-class (Rep. 376c ff.).  
Mousike (poetry-song-dance) is regarded as most crucial in the formation of character, 
for it provides “models” (typoi) to which the malleable characters of the young assimilate 
themselves.  The Greek word typos can signify a “model,” “type,” “mould,” “stamp,” or 
“pattern” in both literal and metaphorical senses, and Plato uses the term to designate a 
concrete moulding of the substance of individual character.  This discussion of mousike’s 
power to shape the soul evolves into an analysis of the appropriate content of tales and 
poetry.  At the close of Book II, Socrates leads his interlocutors to the conclusion that the 
traditional poetic treatment of the gods as fickle, quarrelsome, belligerent, and cruel must 
be forbidden in their ideal polis.  Plato’s chief targets here are epic and tragic poetry, 
which, through negative depiction of the gods, promote irreverence toward the divine and 
model intemperate behavior. 
Although the language of mimesis appears only briefly in this closing section of 




that between the typoi provided by the tale or poem and their youthful receivers.  These 
models seem primarily ethical, consisting of narrative templates that describe structures 
of behavior taken as paradigmatic because of their association with the gods and heroes 
of myth.  Socrates asserts the necessity of censoring these behavioral paradigms, and he 
argues that two anti-models for poetic speech ought to be endowed with the status of laws 
in his ideal city: that the gods not be depicted as capable of either doing evil or of 
transforming themselves and indulging in deceit (Rep. 381d-383c).  The stance against 
protean changeability will resurface in Book X’s discussion of mimesis.  At the same 
time, Plato embraces what he sees as the age-old – and highly efficacious – function of 
poetic speech within classical Greek culture: to supply programmatic structures of human 
action for emulation by the young.  It is Plato and not Aristotle who first introduces the 
idea that poetry works through the mimesis of divine or human action: “Imitation 
[mimesis], we say, imitates human beings performing forced or voluntary actions, and, as 
a result of the action, supposing themselves to have done well or badly, and in all of this 
experiencing pain or enjoyment” (Plato 1968:287, Rep. 603c).  While the content of Book 
II does relate to the earlier uses of mimesis terminology to describe ethical emulation – 
found in Thucydides, Theognis, and Xenophon, for example – Plato’s concern is with the 
way poetic speech can provide models of action equivalent to the behavior of living 
human beings (like Xenophon’s Socrates, for example, whom his disciples imitate). 
Mimesis terminology truly comes to the fore in Book III’s continued discussion of 
poetic content and its extension to the topic of lexis – the “manner,” “style,” or “mode” of 
poetic speech – as Plato moves from the topic of “what must be said” in poetry to the 




depiction of mythic figures bewailing loss, fearing death, or committing acts of impiety 
or gratuitous violence, Socrates broaches the subject of lexis and poses the question, 
“But, when he [a poet] gives a speech as though he were someone else, won’t we say that 
he then likens his own style as much as possible to that of the man he has announced as 
the speaker?”  After his disciple Adeimantus readily agrees, Socrates offers the closest 
approximation of a definition of mimesis that appears in Book II, asking: “Isn’t likening 
himself to someone, either in voice or in looks, the same as imitating the man he likens 
himself to?”  Socrates concludes that this is indeed the case and that poets in general “use 
imitation in making their narrative” (Plato 1968:71, Rep. 393c).  Between Books II and 
III, then, the two poles of the mimetic relationship have been reconceived: the mimetist is 
now no longer the receiver of the poem, but the poet himself, who imitates the fictional 
“someone other than he” whose first-person speech makes up the poem (Plato 1968:71, 
Rep. 393a).  We would today call this someone the poetic or dramatic “character.”  Book 
II’s notion of the mimesis of ethical models gives way to a more concrete conception of 
vocal-and-physical “self-likening” (aphomoioun hautous) between the poetic performer 
and the fictional figures he embodies (see Halliwell 2002:75).  Both books treat mimesis 
as a “transformative capacity” (Gebauer and Wulf 1995:36), but two distinct forms of 
transformation are proposed: the behavioral emulation of ethical role-models (either 
actual or fictive), and the poetic performer’s self-assimilation to the characters of his 
fiction through vocal-and-physical expression.  
Book III also contains Plato’s famous distinction between mimesis and diegesis 
(“telling,” “report,” “narration”), a distinction that is often taken as a matter of grammar 




mix the two.  Tragedy and comedy use pure mimesis; dithyrambic poetry relies on 
diegetic telling; epic poetry employs both, as the poet narrates in the mode of reportage 
and then switches his “style” of speech (lexis) to voice the various characters of the 
fiction (Rep. 392d-394c).  Plato’s distinction between mimetic and diegetic poetry is not 
a matter of grammatical analysis, but rather with the way in which a first-person versus 
third-person mode of speech invites a particular subjective relationship to the verbal 
content being delivered, in both the reciter and the listener.  For example, when a 
rhapsode – a solo performer of epic poetry like the eponymous Ion of Plato’s dialogue – 
slips from diegesis into mimesis, he becomes a different kind of subjective object for the 
spectator-listener.  By speaking poetic lines driven by an “I,” rather than a “he” or “she,” 
the rhapsode’s gestures, facial expressions, and intonations will instinctively adapt 
themselves to the first-person mode of delivery.  His emotional life will also become 
differently implicated when required to speak I-sentences: rather than a narrator who 
speaks feelingly about the characters of his story, he becomes a speaking, acting, 
emotionally activated human subject, who speaks feelingly as the characters of his 
fiction.  An instinctive ability to assimilate oneself to the “I” of the dramatic sentence – a 
capacity to speak first-person speech as if it were emerging organically from oneself – is 
perhaps the most basic gift of the dramatic actor.  The shift from diegesis and mimesis in 
epic poetry, the moment when the performer adapted himself in order to give voice to the 
“I” of his characters as if he meant and felt what they said, can therefore be seen as the 
birth – or, at least, one of the multiple births – of acting in the European tradition. 
According to Plato, then, the most pernicious characteristic of mimetic poetry is 




entity, to assimilate an alien, unconsidered attitude toward existence – and invites the 
listener to take up this attitude as well.  Understood in this way, poetic mimesis cannot be 
separated from the basic human capacity known to present-day philosophers as 
“simulation:” the ability to try-on or feel-through the experiences of others from a “first-
person” perspective.  The reciter of poetry does not project a formal “representation” of 
the wrath of Achilles or the madness of Ajax, but rather allows the dense verbal texture 
of poetic speech to catalyze these states of subjectivity.  The mimetic capacity allows the 
voice of the other to flow through the self – far more than a ventriloquist’s act.  In the 
process, the self’s habitual modes of being are shifted onto unfamiliar psychological 
terrain, as are those of the listener-spectator.  The shift from diegesis to mimesis also 
transforms the human dynamic between performer and spectator-listener: it enhances the 
possibility of intersubjective attunement – that is, it invites the spectator to identify his 
receiving “I” with the speaking “I” of the poetic performer. 
Plato returns to Book II’s model of the mimetic relation at Republic 395, when the 
receiver/learner of poetic speech (rather than the poet) again becomes the mimetist, the 
one who mimetizes.  Plato proposes that if the guardians are to be the “craftsmen of the 
city’s freedom and practice nothing other than what tends to it” then they necessarily 
mustn’t do or imitate anything else.  And if they do imitate, they must imitate 
what’s appropriate to them from childhood: men who are courageous, moderate, 
holy, free, and everything of the sort; and what is slavish, or anything else 
shameful, they must neither do nor be clever at imitating, so that they won’t get a 
taste for the being from its imitation.  Or haven’t you observed that imitations, if 
they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits 
and nature, in body and sounds and in thought?  (Plato1968:73, Rep. 395c-d) 
 
Plato’s concern in the above passage is not with the harmful effects of “passive” 




guardians’ memorizing and embodying the words, rhythms, and movements of musico-
poetic performance taught to them by poet-teachers.  Plato seeks to protect his guardians 
against habituation through what Joseph Roach calls “surrogation” (Roach 1996:2): the 
endless process of transformative substitution that enables cultural transmission.  
However, the poet (rather than the receiver/surrogate) becomes the mimetist once again 
at Republic 398a, the famous passage in which the poet as masterful mimetes – able “to 
become every sort of thing and to imitate all things” (Plato 1968:76) – is anointed with 
myrrh, crowned with wool in recognition of his virtuosity, but ultimately exiled from the 
ideal city.  What at first might appear as a slippage back and forth between conflicting 
perspectives on mimesis across Books II and III of the Republic in fact reveals Plato’s 
informing assumptions about the worrisome exchangeability of subjective positions that 
mimesis enables. 
 Some evidence that has often been taken as an extension of the mimesis concept 
to cover the process of identification-in-reception comes in Book X.  Here Plato offers an 
account of the spectator’s experience of an epic or tragic performance: 
When even the best of us hear Homer or any other of the tragic poets imitating 
one of the heroes in mourning and making quite an extended speech with 
lamentation, or, if you like, singing and beating his breast, you know that we 
enjoy it and that we give ourselves over to following the imitation; suffering along 
with the hero in all seriousness, we praise as a good poet the man who most puts 
us in this state.  [emphasis added] (Plato 1968:289, Rep. 605c-d) 
 
Plato’s term for “suffering-along-with” in the passage above is sumpaschein, 
etymologically related to our word “sympathy,” though the sense of emotional 
parallelism that the word carried in eighteenth-century philosophy would be a better gloss 




for.31  Plato’s account of the spectator’s sympathetic surrender to the poet’s mimetic 
performance offers no direct support, however, for the common extrapolation by 
commentators of the Republic that the experience of audience members can also be 
classified as a kind of mimesis – in other words, that spectators at a tragic performance 
“imitate privately” the onstage suffering (Potolsky 2006:28).  A reading that synthesizes 
Books II and III with Book X makes such an interpretation tempting, but nowhere in the 
Republic does Plato apply mimesis terminology to the theatrical spectator’s experience of 
the live performance event: “following the imitation” is not necessarily equivalent to 
mimetizing.32 
 Eric Havelock, however, extrapolating from a synthetic reading of Books II, III, 
and X, offers just such a theory of the listener/learner as a “quasiparticipant” – first 
within a context of paideutic instruction, then within the reception dynamics of a choral 
or tragic performance.  We ought to consider Havelock’s hypothesis not for its 
faithfulness to Plato, but for its provocative attempt to reconstruct the human dynamics 
that sustained Athenian performance culture.  Havelock begins by describing the 
experience of the listener/learner being taught a poem:  
If he listened silently, only the ears were fully engaged; but the ears transmitted 
messages to the nervous system as a whole, and thus limbs, lips, and throat might 
perform slightly, and the nervous system in general would be sympathetically 
engaged with what he was hearing.  When he in turn repeated what had been 
sung, the vocal chords and perhaps the limbs were fully activated to go through 
and perform in identical sequence what they had already sympathetically 
performed for themselves, as it were, when he had listened. [emphasis added] 
(Havelock 1963:152) 
                                                        
31 The term “sympathy” is prominent in the discussions of social behavior in David 
Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759). 
32 As Stephen Halliwell comments, “Audiences of tragedy, at any rate, are thus conceived 





Havelock extends the above process of motor attunement to the audience member at a 
tragic performance, for he understands poetic recitation, reception, and repetition as 
forms of rhythmic doing, all of them synchronized by the power of the mimetic faculty.  
Audience members at a dithyrambic or tragic performance engaged, along with the 
performers, argues Havelock, “in a re-enactment of the [poetic] tradition with lips, 
larynx, and limbs, and with the whole apparatus of their unconscious nervous system” 
(160).  Havelock therefore approaches the mimesis concept as “the one most adequate to 
describe both re-enactment and identification” – that is, “the one most applicable to the 
common psychology shared by both artist and by audience” (160).  Under Havelock’s 
account, the performer of Greek epic or drama would have learned the poem from a 
teacher through body-to-body, voice-to-voice transmission, and, later, in the moment of 
re-performance, the same intersubjective mechanism (mimesis) that enabled him to 
absorb song and movement in the first place would have made possible both their re-
actualization and his communion with the spectator. 
 Earlier conceptions of mimesis as an embodied summoning surface even more 
prominently in the Republic when Socrates turns to the various harmonic modes and 
rhythms available to the arts of mousike during his day.  Music and song were not 
“accompaniments” to epic and tragic performance, but essential dimensions of the 
various related performing art forms within the “song culture” of ancient Athens 
(Herington 1985:3-10).  The tragoidos, the performer of ancient tragedies, was, in 
contemporary terms, just as much a “singer” as an “actor.”33  In a section of the Republic 
                                                        
33 See Edith Hall, “The Singing Actors of Antiquity,” in Greek and Roman Actors: 




indebted to the music theory of Damon, who held that the various musical modes were 
associated with certain kinds of character (ethos),34 the various musical modes are each 
presented as the mimema of a “sort of life” or “disposition of the soul”: for example, the 
“mixed” and “tight” Lydian modes promote wailing and lamentation, and certain Ionian 
and Lydian modes deemed “slack” are suitable for celebration and debauchery (Plato 
1968:77-9, Rep. 398e-400d).  Plato proscribes all rhythms and harmonies except those 
appropriate to “an orderly and courageous life” – that is, endurance in times of war and 
moderation in times of peace (Plato 1968:78, Rep. 399e). 
The extension of mimesis terminology to the realm of melody, harmony, and 
rhythm might be taken as a movement into abstraction and analogy.  However, the central 
operative dynamic – the assimilation of the self to an external mode of psychological and 
physical subjectivity – carries over from Plato’s preceding discussion of lexis.  Plato 
shares with his collocutors the conviction that “the rearing in music” has always been – 
and, in his ideal polis, should remain – the “most sovereign” form of education because 
“rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul 
and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them” (Plato 1968:80, Rep. 
401d).  In other words, harmonic modes and rhythms promote specific states of body and 
soul, again with lasting effects. 
For Plato, the prime virtue of “the musical man” is euschemosyne (often 
translated as “grace”), a conjunction of the prefix eu- (“good”) and the noun scheme 
(“outward appearance,” “posture, ” “attitude”) (Plato 1968:81, Rep. 402d).  For Plato, 
euschemosyne is an attribute of the organically unified body-and-mind – or, more in 
                                                        




keeping with the classical Greek context, we might say the body-and-soul – and carries 
connotations of “bearing” in terms of both physique and character.35  The various 
choreographic postures and attitudes (schemata) comprising classical Greek dance forms 
were thus seen as literally capable of shaping an individual’s habitual stance toward 
existence.  The musical mimemata of Republic III, then, “imitate” particular corporeal 
stances toward existence by encapsulating-and-generating them. 
 As has been shown, mimetic terminology is applied to several processes in 
Republic II and III: the emulation of ethical models; the shifting relations between poet 
and receiver, poet and fictional other, and receiver and fictional other; and the musical 
encapsulation of various modes of being.  However, these usages are unified by an 
understanding of mimesis as the mechanism for the psycho-physical assimilation to a 
mode of being initially encountered “outside” the self.  The mimetic faculty therefore 
poses a dire threat to the Platonic ideals of fixity and integrity, of simplicity and oneness, 
of which the “Forms” or “Ideas” – as “permanent shapes imposed upon the flux of 
action” (Havelock 1963:263) – are the primary conceptual manifestation.  Republic II and 
III house a deep anxiety over the unregulated relationships between self and other 
enabled by mimesis.  According to Plato, “things that are in the best condition” are “least 
altered and moved by something else” (Plato 1968:58, Rep. 380d) and the “most 
courageous and most prudent” soul is least moved by “external affection” (Plato 1968:58, 
Rep. 381a).  Socrates pronounces in the opening moments of Book II: “Moreover, we 
also say that such a man [the “decent man,” or epiekes] is most of all sufficient unto 
                                                        
35 Plato’s scheme functions as a nexus for the psychological, the physical, and the 
sociological, much like Brecht’s Haltung (“attitude,” “bearing,” “stance”), which will 




himself for living well and, in contrast to others, has least need of another” (Plato 
1968:65, Rep. 387d).36   The idea that individual character might be formed within the 
vicissitudinal flux of social interaction was a source of profound anxiety for Plato.  As the 
process through which human beings assimilate themselves to otherness, mimesis 
threatens radical self-sufficiency, but its very power to shape subjectivity can also serve 
as a powerful tool for social regulation within Plato’s utopia.  After all, the central project 
of the Republic is not the construction of an actual city but a theoretical remaking of 
human nature itself.  The mimetic theory of Books II and III, then, is actually a highly 
“pragmatic”37 account of how musico-poetic performance shapes the bodies, souls, and 
characters of its performers, receivers, and participants. 
 
Mimesis, Paideia, Performance Culture 
 
Plato’s anxieties about mimesis cannot be properly appreciated without a clear 
conception of mimesis terminology’s early meanings, which I hope I have now 
established.  But these anxieties also need to be understood against the background of 
Athenian performance culture as it evolved from orality toward literacy in the fifth 
century BCE.  Casting the “poetic” or “oral state of mind” as the “arch-enemy” of 
                                                        
36 In the Laws, Plato writes: “Change […] is much the most dangerous thing […] in the 
winds, in bodily habits, and in the characters of souls” (Plato 1980:185, Laws 797d). 
37 In The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition, Abrams lays 
out a quadripartite schema for aesthetic theories: 1) mimetic theories, which take as 
primary an artwork’s external relations with the universe; 2) pragmatic theories, which 
approach a work of as “a means toward an end, an instrument for getting something 
done” (Abrams 1953:15) and thus privilege the artwork-audience relationship; 3) 
expressive theories, which see the artwork as a product of the outpouring of an artist’s 
individual creative energies; and 4) objective theories, which analyze an artwork as a 




Platonic rationalism (Havelock 1963: 47), the pioneering classicist Eric Havelock, in his 
Preface to Plato (1963), argues that the anti-mimetic thrust of the Republic can only be 
fathomed in light of an understanding of poetic performance as a live and embodied 
process that facilitated the “indoctrination” (30) of young Athenians into the communal 
consciousness and collective memory of their society.  If we conceptualize poetry as a 
pattern of marks inscribed upon a page (or wax tablet) and “music” (mousike) as an 
intangible stream of sound, it is almost impossible to comprehend Plato’s concerns over 
the power of poetry and music to shape subjectivity.  But if we instead conceive of 
musico-poetic performance as an embodied act driven by rhythmic speech, patterned 
body-movement, and mental-emotional associations, the mimetic potency with which 
Plato endows the poetic art form begins to make sense. 
Havelock argues that Plato’s anxieties over the transformative potency of the 
mimetic relation in the shaping of the personality cannot be made sense of without an 
understanding of the traditional role of performance practice in the education of Greek 
youth.  For the Greeks, choral dance and song were “sociopoetic” practices (Martin 
2007:45): they expressed, communicated, and re-confirmed the core values and 
institutions of Greek culture.  The performance of specifically dramatic poetry – which 
drew upon the movements and rhythms of choral performance in ritual and festival 
contexts – also played a crucial role for the assimilation of many young Greeks into the 
Athenian social polity, in both its ideological and affective dimensions.  For the male 
youth of Athens, representing one’s tribe within the dithyrambic competition that 
preceded the presentations of tragic plays at the City Dionysia or membership in a tragic 




theatre historian David Wiles emphasizes, “the ritual and educational dimensions of 
choral dance” could not be separated, and training in the techniques of vocal and physical 
synchronization necessary for choral performance would have served a powerful function 
in “teaching individuals to subordinate self to the collective” (Wiles 2000:131). 
Regarded as a repository of cultural wisdom, the works of the epic poets – 
particularly Homer – played an essential role in the Greek system of paideia, the 
educational process intrinsic and essential to Greek culture.  As already stated, these 
poetic works did not circulate in written form but were learned through recitation – that 
is, transmitted and absorbed through the act of performance.  At the beginning of the 
fourth century, then, when Plato wrote the Republic, poetic treatments of myth from 
Homer to Aeschylus served simultaneously as a “social encyclopedia” and a “system of 
indoctrination” (Havelock 1963:30-1) into a cultural complex of beliefs, values, and ways 
of behaving.  The physical dimension of this “indoctrination” process should not be 
overlooked.  Paideutic transmission, like Joseph Roach’s influential notion of 
“genealogies of performance,” relied upon 
expressive movements as mnemonic reserves, including patterned movements 
made and remembered by bodies, residual movements retained implicitly in 
images or words […] and imaginary movements dreamed in minds, not prior to 
language but constitutive of it, a psychic rehearsal for physical actions drawn 
from a repertoire that culture provides.  (Roach 1996:26) 
 
This kind of thinking about embodied processes of cultural transmission, so current 
within the field of theatre and performance studies today, would have hardly been alien to 
Plato, who famously defined “the uneducated man” as “the one untrained in choral 
performances” and “the educated” as “the one sufficiently trained” in choral song and 




Gymnastike (physical training) and mousike (poetry-song-dance) were the two 
basic components of a young Athenian male’s traditional education.  As customs thought 
to form and regulate moral character (ethos), gymnastike shaped the body and mousike 
conditioned the soul.38  But the line between these two forms of physical practice was a 
hazy one.  For example, the dance-form gymnopaidike drew upon and transformed 
movements from wrestling and boxing, and the pyrrikhe incorporated dodges and strikes 
from armed combat.  These dances could, from one perspective, be seen as stylized 
“representations” of belligerent activities, but they also served as what Pierre Bourdieu 
would call “structural exercises,” which evolve as means of transmitting forms of 
“practical mastery” within a culture (Bourdieu 1977:88).  In the Laws, Plato writes that 
the pyrrikhe “consists in imitating, on the one hand, movements that evade all kinds of 
blows and missiles […] and then again striving to imitate the opposites to these, 
aggressive postures involved in striking with missiles – arrows and javelins – and with all 
sorts of blows” (Plato 1980:206, Laws 815a).  In other words, the dancer mimetizes the 
movements of armed warfare.  Furthermore, habituation of soul and body occurs through 
participation in “choral imitations” (184) – that is, the mimemata that comprise the 
movements and postures (schemata) of choral dance.39 
                                                        
38 See Laws 795d. 
39 In the Laws, Plato also argues that the armed dances honoring the Kuretes and Dioscuri 
are “entirely fitting for the boys and also the girls [of the hypothetical ideal city] to 
imitate” (Plato 1980:184, Laws 796c).   John J. Winkler has argued for a close connection 
between military training and tragic performance in his influential essay “The Ephebes’ 
Song” (1990).  Winkler hypothesizes that tragic choruses were made up of eighteen- to 
twenty-year-old Athenian males in the process of undergoing hoplite military training, 
and that performance in the amphitheatre of Dionysus was a rite of passage into 
manhood, demonstrating discipline in the “exacting demands of unison movement” and 
willing subordination to the more prominent tragic actors (Winkler 1990:57).  Winkler 




The “structural exercises” of Greek poetic performance would have involved the 
handling of rhythmic language and the execution of choreographic schemata, and the oral 
transmission of poetic speech and patterned movement would have relied upon the 
human capacity for mimesis.  Indeed, Havelock, referring to the mimetic transmission of 
practical musical knowledge, calls the capacity for mimicry “the foundation of one of the 
technae of civilisation” (Havelock 1963:60), a psychic-and-physiological mechanism for 
education and socialization.  In his classic essay, “Psychology of the Poetic 
Performance,” Havelock presents a speculative but compelling account of Greek poetry 
as an embodied mnemonic technology of exceptional economy, one thoroughly 
successful in effecting the work of cultural transmission with a maximum of conformity 
across generations.  The key to the efficiency of this technology, in Havelock’s view, was 
the strict rhythmic patterning embedded in the metrical structure of poetic speech itself 
but also in the regulated physicality of dance movements and the musical accompaniment 
of lyre (for epic) or aulos flute (for drama).  All of these processes are intensely 
corporeal: dance and the playing of instruments engage the limbs and trunk; speech 
engages the muscularity of all the elements of the vocal apparatus (articulators, soft 
palate, diaphragm).  Havelock calls the “reflexes” that produce poetic speech and 
enactment “bodily actions”: “they are a form of doing, but a special form, in which doing 
is repetitive, but in a specially complicated way we call rhythmic” (149). Havelock 
envisions Greek poetic performance as a kind of bio-mechanical process involving the 
                                                        
elevated version of close-order drill” (22), gesturing to a social function closely 




doing and redoing of a complex vocal-physical score,40 and these acts of rhythmic doing 
and re-doing make up the chain of transmission – or genealogy of performance – that 
sustains Greek musico-poetic culture. 
Let me be clear: we have no text or fragment from classical Greece in which 
mimesis terminology is used to specify the process of transmission between teacher and 
student within musico-poetic performance practice.  Placed against background of 
Athens’s song-and-dance culture, Socrates’s stipulation that his guardians not be mimetai 
(“imitators) (at Rep. 395c-d) implies a concern over processes of body-to-body, voice-to-
voice transmission, but Havelock’s conception of mimesis, however illuminating, is an 
extrapolation beyond Plato.  We do, however, have an example of mimesis used to 
describe the act of transmitting embodied performance knowledge from late antiquity.  
The instance arises in the Speech on Behalf of the Dancers by Libanios (314-393 CE), an 
orator and teacher of rhetoric who lived in the ancient city of Antioch (near Antakya in 
present-day Turkey).  Libanios describes a teacher (didaskalos) modeling the 
choreographic positions of the dance (schemata) for a student, who absorbs these by 
imitating them – that is, through mimesis (see Webb 2008:91).41  This latter mode of 
                                                        
40 Havelock’s vocabulary of “bodily reflexes” and “automatic behaviour” at times sounds 
positively Meyerholdian and almost certainly owes to a debt to the emotional theory of 
William James and the Russian “Objective Psychologists” Pavlov, Bekhterev, and 
Sechenov.  For Havelock, writing in the 1960s, such thinking was probably filtered 
through the behaviorism of John B. Watson and B.F. Skinner, encountered either directly 
or through its dissemination in a wider intellectual milieu. 
41 Passages like this, along with attempt to imagine the practical dynamics of 
transmission and performance such passages describe, prompt Ruth Webb to locate “two 
different senses of mimesis” – as representation and reenactment – in her survey of 
discussions of dance, pantomime, and theatre in late antiquity, Demons and Dancers 
(2008).  Webb asks her reader to be attentive both to “mimesis as copy and mimesis as 




mimesis sustains the transmissions of culture-as-performance through cycles of 
predecession and surrogation: a teacher demonstrates a vocal-and-physical score; a pupil 
imitates and reperforms it while the teacher watches with a critical eye; the teacher 
demonstrates again; the pupil imitates again, and better this time.  At some future point, 
the pupil will become a teacher – a predecessor – and will pass on the store of embodied 
knowledge to a new pupil as surrogate – or mimetes. 
 As we have already seen, Plato draws upon Damon’s “ethos theory” of mousike, 
which holds that each musical mode essentializes, captures, and produces a particular 
form of “character” (ethos) – in Republic III (398e-400d).  Classical performance scholar 
Mark Griffith notes the close association in Greek thought between musical modes and 
“social-political-physiological institutions and modes of behavior” and points out that 
several terms could be used to denote both: nomos could mean “law, custom, norm” as 
well as “melody”; harmonia could both “arrangement” and “tuning, harmony”; and tonos 
was a term for physical-and-moral training as well as musical pitch (Griffiths 2007:17-
18).  Republic II and III ought to be read in conjunction Plato’s discussion of nomos and 
paideia in Laws II and VII.  Here Plato also discusses the formation of character through 
education in mousike and gives a bald equation: “choral art as a whole is for us the same 
as education as a whole” (Plato 1980:55, Laws 672e).  He also provides a blunt summary 
of the theory of poetry-song-dance as the mimesis of ethos: 
Choral performances are imitations of characters, in all sorts of action and 
fortune, and each [participant] brings to bear both his habitual dispositions and his 
capacity to imitate.  (Plato 1980:35, Laws 655d). 
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“[T]he things we call songs,” writes Plato, “are really incantations for souls” (Plato 
1980:40, Laws 659e), and the soul acquires virtue by means of “the imitation in songs 
that makes the soul feel passions” (Plato 1980:203, Laws 812c).  Ethos is shaped through 
musical habituation in posture (movement in the body), melody (movement in the voice), 
and rhythm (a form of movement that runs through both body and voice).42  Greek 
musical education, for Plato, relies heavily upon what contemporary biomusicology calls 
rhythmic “entrainment” – the adaptation and synchronization of the individual subject’s 
bodily rhythms to those of some external source. 
 Eric Havelock argues that Greek paideia involved not only a habituation of body 
and voice, but a habituation of an emotional attitude toward the verbal content of the 
poetic material being transmitted – and, by extension, the habituation of a more general 
worldview or orientation toward existence.  Havelock therefore glosses the mimesis of 
Republic II and III as a “psychological mechanism” of “total personal involvement and 
therefore emotional identification with the substance of the poeticised statement that you 
are required to retain” (Havelock 1963:44).  The “substance” of the poem as oral entity 
would have included metrically regulated verbal content, melodic structure, and dance 
movements patterned in synchrony with meter and melody.  As the concrete vehicle for 
cultural transmission, the poem as oral entity is not a “thing” in the way a text is: as a 
“strip of behavior” (Schechner 1985:35), it exists nowhere except in the mind and body 
of its human carrier, as a potential to be actualized or as a current of expression running 
through the body and voice in the moment of performance.  For a young Athenian 
citizen, undergoing cultural habituation would have meant giving over to being spoken 
                                                        




through by the voice of tradition and being danced by the body of tradition.  This voice-
and-body of tradition, passed down from “Homer” to the rhapsodes of Plato’s day, told 
tales of violence, pride, ambition, betrayal, lust, and sorrow.  At times, this traditional 
voice-and-body slipped into the first-person mode of mimesis, voicing and embodying 
the excessive emotional states just mentioned – states that Plato deemed destructive to the 
health of the soul.  These states would not only be associated with the “characters” – in a 
contemporary sense, as fictional beings – of the poetic material, but also with the 
structures of speech, dance, and song through which these figures were described, voiced, 
and embodied – structures thought by the Greeks to shape the “character” (ethos) of the 
performer.  
Greek poetry-dance-music (mousike), then, promoted ways of thinking-and-
feeling about the world that were also ways of moving and giving voice within it.  
Viewed in this light, paideutic transmission should be seen not only as a form of 
“indoctrination” but one of corporeal and affective integration into a set of culturally 
embedded beliefs and moral values.  The mimetic faculty, as the physiological 
mechanism exploited in service of this socialization process, was the nature classical 
Greek culture used to make second nature.43  It is precisely in order to short-circuit this 
uncritical absorption of societal values – values that had evolved over generations rather 
than being proposed, debated, and instituted by a philosophical coterie – that Plato’s 
Socrates insists that his guardians not be mimetists (Rep. 394e), or, if they are, that the 
poetic material they are to incorporate into their bodies and minds be rigorously regulated 
by the Republic’s conceivers. 
                                                        
43 Here I again reference Michael Taussig’s description of the mimetic faculty as “the 





Mimesis, Collectivity, Ecstasy 
 
If choral dance sustained the socio-political collectivity of classical Athens, the Greek 
chorus – as it appeared in tragic performance – has also served as the paradigm for a 
collectively bonded performance ensemble for theorists of the theatre as disparate as 
Hegel, Nietzsche, W.B. Yeats, and Jacques Lecoq.  As John Gould writes, the orchestra 
of the Greek amphitheater was never empty, but always “inhabited by collectivity” in the 
shape of the ever present choral mass (Gould 1996:232).  David Wiles sees the 
collectivity of the chorus as only a single manifestation of a “collective ideal” – an ideal 
that subsumed personal identity before group aims – prevailing across many forms of 
Greek social practice:  
For the Athenians dancing in a tragic chorus involved the same discipline as 
dancing a war dance, a form of military parade.  The pipes which controlled the 
rhythm of the tragic chorus would control the same men as they rowed their 
warship fast enough to ram a Spartan.  The survival of the city relied upon the 
collective solidarity engendered by tragedy.  (Wiles 2000:52) 
 
The stamp of feet on the earth of the orchestra and the chanting and singing of metrical 
speech would have regulated and harmonized the psycho-physiologies of chorus 
members.  As a technology of synchronization, Greek poetic performance practice 
exploited the capacities of the mimetic faculty to an exceptional degree, transforming the 
fifteen individual choric performers into “a single organism, projecting a single emotion” 




physiology – a vocal current to which one contributes but which one cannot call “one’s 
own” – can catalyze emotional states of extraordinary power.44 
 Perhaps we ought to include the audience in the “single organism” being born 
through tragic performance.  Because of their passage through the system of paideutic 
instruction, almost all among the mass of fifteen- to twenty-thousand closely packed 
spectating bodies in the amphitheater of Dionysos would have possessed some embodied 
experience in poetic performance.  David Wiles writes:  “Since 1,000 citizens competed 
in this festival [the City Dionysia] alone, and choruses performed in many others 
contexts, most of the men who watched tragedy did so not as passive consumers but as 
sometime performers with experience in singing and dancing before a huge audience” 
(Wiles 2000:32).  The spectators at a Greek poetic performance possessed a technical 
expertise of their own that enabled them not only to “appreciate” (in the sense of 
rendering an aesthetic judgment) but also to physically and emotionally attune to the 
human events taking place before them.  During a tragic performance, the amphitheater 
of Dionysos would have been filled with closely packed bodies in psycho-physical 
synchronicity because of their shared training in the techne of poetic delivery. 
 Is there any evidence of the above vision of synchronized collectivity in Plato?  
We have already seen that Plato imagines that the audience members at an epic or tragic 
performance give themselves over to “following the imitation” and “suffering along with 
the hero” (Plato 1968:289, Rep. 605c-d).  More relevant, however, is a consideration of 
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experiments with choral synchronization and “group voice” based on a reconstructive 
understanding of Greek tragedy (see Lecoq 2000:126-43), often discussed “the 
unaccustomed sense of transpersonal linkage experienced by an actor in a chorus who 




the account of emotional contagion provided by Plato’s “Ion,” the European tradition’s 
first text of acting theory proper, if by this we mean a treatise that takes as its main theme 
the art of the performer.  “Ion” is thought to be one of Plato’s earliest works, and mimesis 
terminology does not surface within the dialogue.  However, there is a strand of one-to-
one thinking within Socrates’s analogy between the contagiousness of enthusiasmos 
(ecstasy, or the state of having “the god within” oneself) and the way in which a magnetic 
stone imparts the power of attraction to metal rings.  Socrates likens the Muse to a 
magnet and the epic or tragic poet as the first magnetized ring; the rhapsode and tragic 
actor are the “intermediate links,” along with “a vast chain of dancers and masters and 
under-masters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from the stone, at the side of the 
rings which hang down from the Muse” (Plato 1953:110; Ion 535e-536a).  The “last of 
the rings” is the spectator, who receives “the power of the original magnet” through the 
preceding rings.  Over the course of this study, we will find the one-to-one(-to-one) 
conceptual structure of Plato’s hanging chain in other accounts of emotional contagion, 
which often cannot be extricated from theories of theatrical “truth” or “verisimilitude,” 
and which are often broached under the rubric of “imitation.” 
Looking back over the Republic, the starting point for this account of the psycho-
physiology of mimesis, two overall aspects of Plato’s treatment of mimesis leap out: the 
acuity of Plato’s insights into human processes of embodied synchronization and the 
vehemence of his protest against the performing artforms that fostered such 
sychronization during his day.  Indeed, Plato seems to protest too much, making us 
suspect a hidden personal stake in his outcry.  One cannot help but wonder about the 




Plato was an Athenian and grew up within the performance culture of the classical 
period, so it was natural that he should think of tragedy as a social practice.  In the 
course of his youth, like other Athenians, he would have seen new plays, 
memorized some of the songs, dances and aphorisms, and absorbed theatrical 
performance as part of an Athenian way of life.  (Wiles 2000:168) 
 
We also hear in the (admittedly unreliable) Lives of Eminent Philosophers of Diogenes 
Laertius that as a youth Plato “applied himself to painting and wrote poems, first 
dithyrambs, afterwards lyric poems and tragedies” (Diogenes 1959:281).45  The educative 
process of affective integration into Athenian performance culture and perhaps his own 
attempts at artistic creation – both forms of practice, of doing – would have established 
practical expertise in Plato, with lasting effects upon his psycho-physical receptivity to 
the mimetic impact of live performance.  In other words, the tendency to “give over” to 
following the mimesis of the violent madness of Ajax or the intemperate grief of 
Achilles, or to the pull of collective ekstasis, may have been particularly strong for the 
poet-turned-philosopher. 
 Across the long history of the philosophy of performance, there appear several 
theorists who analyze with great incisiveness a trait they suffer as a perceived personal 
weakness: Diderot’s discussion of the overwhelming effects of sensibilité in his 
Paradoxe sur le Comédian and Kleist’s insights into the phenomenon of incapacitating 
self-consciousness in his essay “On the Marionette Theatre” are just two examples.  It is 
tempting to see in Plato’s anti-mimetism the human tendency to lash out against 
manifestations in the external world of those parts of the self that we attempt to deny, 
repress, or excise.  Indeed, Stephen Halliwell characterizes Plato as a “romantic puritan” 
who “does not simply stigmatize certain kinds of art as dangerous or corrupting but who 
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claims to appreciate, to know from the inside, just how seductive the transformative 
experience of art can be” (Halliwell 2002:74).  When Plato’s Socrates likens his band of 
repudiators of mimetic poetry to “men who have once fallen in love with someone, and 
don’t believe the love is beneficial,” and who “keep away from it even if they have to do 
violence to themselves” (Plato 1968:291, Rep. 607e), we can interpret this statement as a 
confession of the powerful role that engagement with poetry had had in shaping Plato’s 
personal sensibility. 
 We can even allow ourselves to imagine the young Plato in the amphitheater of 
Dionysos, his body and soul being moved in synchrony with the powerful expressive 
score being enacted by the tragic performers.  As he surfs the waves of ecstasy unifying 
the mass of closely packed spectators, he allows himself to be overcome by the irrational 
expressive currents surging through him.  We can also imagine him at some point in his 
life – perhaps upon becoming part of Socrates’s philosophic circle – becoming alarmed 
by this susceptibility and making the difficult decision to cut himself off from this 
experience.  Diogenes Laertius renders this resolution by the young Plato resolution in a 
vividly symbolic episode: Plato, after listening to Socrates speaking outside the 
amphitheater of Dionysos, burns a newly composed tragedy and becomes a permanent 
member of the philosopher’s circle.46  
Diogenes, however, does not tell us that Plato never returned to the amphitheater 
of Dionysos.  Indeed, it would be surprising it he did not do so upon some occasion, 
considering the theatre’s important place in the life of the Athenian citizenry as a forum 
for political debate and societal self-examination as well as a cauldron of affective 
                                                        




currents.  Let us imagine then, the philosophically reformed Plato returning to the theatre 
as a spectator after the apocryphal tragedy-burning incident, once again feeling the 
currents of ekstasis beginning to stir in his body.  Now, however, instead of allowing 
himself to “follow the mimesis,” the young Plato carries out a psychically agonized act of 
mental discipline, cutting off this process of giving over even as it begins to draw him in.  
Or we can imagine him, somewhat less dramatically, having erected such a sturdy 
cognitive block against poetic performance – that is, having adopted such a severely 
judgmental attitude against poetic performance – that he is left untouched, unmoved.  In 
either case, to become a philosopher and to found his philosophical enterprise, our 
imagined Plato renounces a part of himself he deemed dangerously “other” to a Socratic 
subjectivity of disinterestedness, rationality, and detachment from worldly affections – a 
personal renunciation that foreshadows his banishment of the virtuosic mimetic poet at 
Republic 398a: 
[I]f a man who is able by wisdom to become every sort of thing and to imitate all 
things should come to our city, wishing to make a display of himself and his 
poems, we would fall on our knees before him as a man sacred, wonderful, and 
pleasing; but we […] would send him to another city, with myrrh poured over his 
head and crowned with wool, while we ourselves would use a more austere and 
less pleasing poet and teller of tales for the sake of benefit, one who would imitate 
the style of the decent man […].  (Plato 1968:76, Rep. 398ab) 
 
 
Plato’s Mirror: Mimesis as Image-Making in Republic X 
 
 
As many commentators have noted, there is a “break in the concept of mimesis” between 
Plato’s discussion of poetry in Books II and III of the Republic and his return to the topic 
in Book X (Gebauer and Wulf 1995:31).  Seeming to leave behind his concern with the 




mischievous disingenuousness – the ontological question: “Could you tell me just what 
mimesis as a whole is; as I myself don’t even have much idea what it is supposed to be?” 
(Plato 1988:35).  The Republic may have been composed over a number of years in the 
380s and/or 370s BCE, and the conceptual break between the early and tenth books of the 
work can be interpreted as evidence of an “increasing preoccupation” with mimesis 
during Plato’s “middle period” and a widening philosophical application of the concept to 
artistic representation.47  At this crucial turning point in the intellectual history of 
mimesis, the concept is expanded and abstracted so that, as a theoretical schema, it can 
encompass the visual, poetic, and performing arts in general. 
 Key to Book X’s transformation of mimesis is Socrates’s analogy between poetry 
and painting.  This analogy is introduced through the famous example of the painter who 
depicts a couch: there exists a form (eidos) or idea (idea) of the couch, created in the 
ideal realm by a god; a craftsman (demiourgos) “look[s] to the idea” in order to make a 
material couch (Plato 1968:278, Rep. 596a); a painter imitates the appearance of the 
craftsman’s work, thereby producing the “phantom” or “simulacrum” (phantasma) of a 
couch.  The imitator (mimetes) therefore operates at a double remove from the ideal 
reality of the form, and mimesis in general is said to be “concerned with something that is 
third from the truth” (Plato 1968:285, Rep. 602c).  Here Plato assimilates mimesis to the 
hierarchical structure of his broader metaphysics, in which material reality corresponds to 
a higher “intelligible” or “intellectual” realm of ideas.  The mimesis concept adapts itself 
to a characteristic cognitive schema of Platonic thought: a static hierarchy of structural 
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Republic X indeed proves typical of Plato’s later dialogues: Cratylus, Phaedrus, Timaeus, 




levels that bear a relation of correspondence despite an effect of ontological degradation 
in each move from a higher level to a lower.  Plato remakes mimesis itself, imprinting it 
with the stamp of Platonic thought. 
It is within the context of the discussion of painterly imitation that Socrates 
proposes the other famous simile of Book X: the artist is likened to the wielder of a 
mirror, who by turning it in various directions can be said in some sense to “produce” or 
“fabricate” the celestial and earthly objects it reflects (Rep. 596d-e).  The painter, like the 
mirror-wielder, has no direct access to the forms themselves but only to their particular 
material manifestations.  He is therefore incapable of “producing the real” and can at best 
make “something that is like the real, though not real itself” (Plato 1988:39, Rep. 597a).  
Nowhere in Book X does Plato use the standard term eikon for a painted image; instead 
these are always referred to as phantasmata (“appearances,” “simulacra”), a word usually 
reserved for optical illusions, reflections in water, dream visions, ghosts, and conjuring 
tricks – that is, images with an inherently deceptive dimension.48  Artistic mimesis, like 
the turning of the mirror to and fro, becomes a “demiurgy of images” (eidolon 
demiourgia).49  
Having redefined mimesis as ontologically debased image-making, Plato makes 
the argumentative move we have long been awaiting: poetry is classed with painting as a 
form of mimesis and the poet supplants the painter as the paradigmatic mimetist: “those 
who take up tragic poetry in iambics and in epics are all imitators in the highest possible 
                                                        
48 See Halliwell’s commentary in Plato 1988:118. 
49 At Republic 599a7, translated in Vernant 1991:165.  The phrase resonates with Plato’s 
gloss of mimesis as eidolopoeisis (“image-making”) in the Sophist: “Mimesis is 
something like a fabrication, a fabrication of images, to be sure, and not of realities” (also 




degree” (Plato 1968:285, Rep. 602b).  This sudden and definitive turn in the argument of 
Book X has been long expected, for Plato’s real concern is with poetry and its deleterious 
effects, not with painting’s imagistic deficiencies.  Mimesis and understanding are set at 
odds with one another as Plato sets out to strip the epic and tragic poets of any claim they 
might make to a deep wisdom regarding human behavior: “[t]he maker of the phantom, 
the imitator, we say, understands nothing of what is but rather of what looks like it is” 
(Plato 1968:284, Rep. 601b); “the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about what 
he imitates” (Plato 1968:285, Rep. 602b). 
 It now becomes clear that, despite his excursion into the ontology of mimesis, 
Plato’s main concerns are still pragmatic and ethical (as in Books II and III): the real 
problem with epic and tragic poetry is not that they are mimetic per se, but that they 
imitate reckless, self-destructive models for behavior.  Mimetic poetry appeals to the 
“foolish,” “mournful,” “pitying” part of the soul, which indulges in suffering, complaint, 
and lamentation.  Plato even suggests that the “irritable and various disposition” (ethos) 
lends itself to mimetic treatment, unlike the “prudent and quiet character” of the 
deliberate man, which, even if effectively “imitated,” is not “easily understood” by the 
kind of assembly that gathers to view a tragic performance, “for the imitation is of a 
condition that is surely alien to them” (Plato 1968:288, Rep. 604e-605a).  The 
philosophical ethos is here conceived as radically other to the “tragic sense of life” 
(Halliwell 2002:114) promoted by the mimetic performance genres of his day.  Plato 
holds that the “enjoyment of other people’s sufferings [at a tragic performance] has a 
necessary effect on one’s own,” because the “pitying part [of the soul], fed strongly on 




606b).  In other words, giving over to suffering along with a protagonist who gives over 
to suffering increases one’s tendency to give over to suffering in one’s own life.  Plato’s 
most damning statement about the epic and tragic poets is that they are “imitators of 
phantoms of virtue” (Plato 1968:283, Rep. 600e) – that is, that poets provide their 
audiences with garbled conceptions of how one ought to live a happy, prosperous, and 
virtuous life.50 
For Plato, then, the stakes of the “old quarrel between poetry and philosophy” are 
not primarily intellectual or theoretical, for this longstanding debate is but a particular 
skirmish within a much broader field of conflict: the agonistic struggle with the self that, 
for Plato, is life itself.  This ongoing internal battle is an ethical one, a “contest that 
concerns becoming good or bad” (Plato 1968:291, Rep. 608b), marked by the conflict of 
contradictory psychic impulses of willed suppression and emotional eruption – of the 
“holding down” and “release” of the drives toward desire, pleasure, and pain (Rep. 606c-
d).  Within this struggle to life the good life, engagement with mimetic poetry entrains us 
for suffering, while the discipline, detachment, and self-regulation required by the 
examined life of the philosopher offers an avenue toward liberation from the shocks of 
existence.  For this reason, Plato’s Socrates rehearses a stern reply to the tragic poets who 
will ask for admission into the ideal city being hypothesized in the Laws: 
[W]e ourselves are poets [or “makers”], who have to the best of our ability 
created a tragedy that is the most beautiful and the best; at any rate, our whole 
                                                        
50 Jean-Pierre Vernant writes that Plato allies mimetic poetry with “the polymorphic and 
gaudy world of becoming and with the inferior part of the soul that is always unstable and 
in flux and is the seat in use of the desires and passions” (Vernant 1991:175).  Plato’s 
commitment to an ethical ideal of total, unshakeable integrity means that the protean 
poetic imitator, “skilled at taking all forms and imitating all things” (Rep. 398a, in 





political regime is constructed on the imitation of the most beautiful and best way 
of life, which we at least assert to be really the truest tragedy.  (Plato 1980:209, 
Laws 817b) 
 
Let us read the above passage in light of the meaning of mimesis I have been calling 
attention to throughout this chapter: the political regime outlined in the Laws will embody 
and actualize – that is, make present in the bodies of its citizens – the virtuous, 
prosperous, and temperate style of living that Socratic philosophy pursues.  The mimesis 
of the poets, which actualizes distressing and destructive impulses in the bodies and 
minds of its performers as well as its audience members, must therefore give way to 
philosophy’s mimesis of the best life. 
 
Acting as Imitation 
 
Regardless of Plato’s pragmatic, ethical agenda, Republic X’s redefinition of mimesis as 
image-making – along with the painting-poetry analogy – has had longstanding 
consequences for aesthetic theory.  The effect of Plato’s intervention was to open up an 
ontological gap in the mimesis concept, a divide between ideal model and imagistic copy.  
Mimesis comes to define a static structure of “secondary representation” (Halliwell 
2002:24-5) rather the processual embodiment of otherness, which can be viewed as a 
primary act of summoning rather than a secondary process of “imitation.”  In the words 
of Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Plato founds the first general theory of imitation and 
simultaneously cuts the image off from the real and from knowledge” (Vernant 
1991:180).51  Plato endows the mimetic image with a unique ontology of unreality: “If it 
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termed eidolon (“image”) extended far beyond the domain of artistic representations, 




is understood as the outcome of imitation, the image consists of a pure ‘semblance’; it has 
no other reality than this similitude in relation to what is not, to that other, real thing 
whose illusory replica it is, both its double and its phantom” (Vernant 1991:166).  The 
mimesis concept comes to house a new paradox: not how otherness can be embodied in 
the self, but how reality can be depicted in unreal appearance. 
Eric Havelock calls Plato’s intervention an “abstract reduction of [the mimetic] 
process to a relationship between original and copy” (Havelock 1963:58), and Republic 
X inaugurates what Havelock calls the “era of the abstract and the conceptual” (188).  
Mimesis now takes on a new conceptual existence within this era as it breaks free of its 
grounding in the body and ascends into ideality to become a kind of theoretical “form” or 
“idea.”  Mimesis now becomes a conceptual “meme,”52 a template for one-to-one 
thinking that takes its hierarchical structure from Plato’s metaphysics and replicates itself 
over and over again across aesthetic theory’s history of ideas. 
According to Plutarch, the poet Simonides, toward the end of the sixth century 
BCE, described poetry as “speaking painting” or “painting with a voice,” and, 
                                                        
argues that the “archaic” Greek understanding of the function of images was one of 
“presentification” rather than representation: images were thought to “establish real 
contact with the world beyond, to actualize it, to make it present” (Vernant 1991:153).  
However, a radical shift in the ancient Greek discourse of imagery occurs, at the turn of 
the fifth into the fourth centuries BCE, as the understood function of the image moves 
from the “‘presentification,’ the making present, of the invisible” to the “imitation of 
appearance”; the image is no longer taken as an actualization of a divine or supernatural 
essence but as “an imitative artifice reproducing in the form of a counterfeit the external 
appearance of real things” (152).  This transformation of understanding may have been 
based in broad cultural shifts within the Greek world during the period, but Greek 
philosophy’s theorization of visual art as imagistic mimesis – in Plato, Xenophon, and 
perhaps in the lost works of other authors – surely advanced this transformed conception 
of the image. 
52 The term “meme” – used to signify a self-replicating unit of culture – was coined by 





conversely, called painting a form of “silent poetry” (in Halliwell 2002:118).  M.H. 
Abrams has shown how this apocryphal statement by Simonides, popularized by 
Plutarch, would join with Horace’s famous ut pictura poesis analogy to become “axioms 
in popular aesthetic wisdom” from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the 
eighteenth centuries (Abrams 1953:33).  Abrams also demonstrates how the “archetypal 
analogy” (31) between the mirror-image/reflected object relationship and the 
artwork/model relationship provides a foundation for mimetic theories of art from the 
Renaissance onward.  It was during this period the vocabulary of “imitation” came to be 
used synonymously with that of “representation” in various European languages. 
Stephen Halliwell argues that the view of art as the “imitation of nature” that held 
sway during these years was never a unitary doctrine, but rather an umbrella formula 
under which divergent conceptions were articulated, and that Romantic and post-
Romantic theorists have taken up a complex and ambivalent view of mimesis rather than 
rejecting it entirely.53  Though Halliwell convincingly shows that there is 
underappreciated complexity in Renaissance and post-Renaissance mimetic theories, 
these are nevertheless built upon a shared conceptual foundation: that of one-to-one 
thinking, which locates the meaning and affective impact of art in some form of 
correspondence.  And as painterly techniques developed from the High Renaissance to 
the Baroque and Neoclassical periods, allowing the depiction of emotion, dynamism, and 
atmosphere unlike anything the visual arts of antiquity had attempted or achieved, 
painting’s position as the exemplary “art of imitation” was consolidated even as the 
meaning of ut pictura poesis was transformed. 
                                                        




As we shall see in the next chapter of this study, when modern acting theory 
emerges out of oratorical discourse in eighteenth-century France, constant reference to 
painting as the explanatory paradigm for art-as-imitation gives rise to a doctrine that we 
might call ut pictura hypokrisis: the idea that the art of the actor is a kind of “visible 
painting.”54  Ironically, what I have called Western aesthetics’ “foundational analogy” – 
the comparison between the “second nature” brought into bodily being by the mimetic 
faculty and the “imitations” produced by the arts in general – now reverses itself, so that 
the performing body is now seen as a medium or canvas upon which mimetic images of 
human action are represented.  If Plato’s mirror has “haunted” the philosophy of the 
visual arts (Gombrich 1977:83), the abstracted, imagistic mimesis of Republic X has 
dogged the figure of the actor.  Across the following chapters of this study, the actor will 
be “ghosted”55 by an unshakeable image of an absent other, often conceived as a vague 
entity called the “character,” whom the actor is said to “represent,” “depict,” or “portray” 
(all terms used in the visual arts).  Imagine one of the prisoners of Plato’s cave emerging 
into the light of the world above and finding himself confronted by a doppelgänger – but 
his original, rather than his double – a being somehow more perfect, more ideal, more 
real than himself.  The phantasmic character shadows the actor through acting theory’s 
history of ideas, leading philosophers of the theatre to see the actor’s art as one of 
secondary representation rather than primary actualization. 
Perhaps if Aristotle had given more consideration to the art of actors, charged 
with embodying the “agents” (prattontes) who drive forward tragic action (praxis), 
                                                        
54 This characterization of the art of the actor is from Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 
Hamburg Dramaturgy of 1767 (in Roach 1993:73). 




European theatrical thought might have developed a conception of acting-as-action (a 
primary process) rather than acting-as-imitation (a secondary one) before the Romantic 
era.  But for Aristotle, tragedy’s “mimesis of praxis” is effected by mythos (“story,” 
“plot”)56, and not by the masked beings who spoke, sung, and danced in the amphitheater 
of Dionysos.  The actor is at best an inconspicuous presence in the Poetics, lurking 
behind the analytic categories of ethos (“character”), lexis (“speech”), melos (“song”), 
and opsis (“spectacle”).  Aristotle was born in Stageira and did not grow up within 
Athens’s musico-poetic performance culture, and David Wiles argues that it was his 
outsider status that led Aristotle to prejudice the textual over the performative in his 
analysis of Athenian tragedy.57 
And yet, even while imitation as the abstract relationship between model and 
copy holds sway over European aesthetics, the early meanings of mimesis as the 
embodiment of otherness surface again and again across acting theory’s history of ideas.  
This is not because these meanings survive intact, transmitted across the centuries via an 
intellectual genealogy that bypasses Plato’s redefinition of mimesis as image-making.  
Rather, it is because mimesis, as understood above, is a “conditio humana” (Gebauer and 
Wulf 1995:1) – a fact of the human condition, a basic human capacity that philosophers 
of art and theorists of performance will always need to address.  As we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, the early meanings of mimesis reassert themselves under different 
vocabularies across the history of theatrical thought: “contagion,” “infection,” 
“communion,” “identification,” “empathy,” “intersubjectivity,” and other terms.  They 
                                                        
56 See Poetics 50a. 
57 “When Aristotle came to Athens as a foreigner, it was […] inevitable that he should 




also arise within aesthetic vocabularies in various European languages that explicitly 
evoke the Greek mimesis: imitatio in Latin, imitation in French, and Nachahmung in 
German, for example.  At times, the meanings of mimesis that point toward phenomena 
of embodiment and intersubjectivity will assimilate themselves – uneasily, 
problematically – with an assumed governing ontology of “imitation” or 
“representation.”  In theatrical theory, at least, it is virtually impossible to consider the 
one-to-one dimension of representation without the one-to-one of identification or the 
one-to-one of vicarious experience pressing itself to the fore. 
 
Coda: Mimesis as Summoning 
 
Before moving on to acting theory’s modern rebirth in the eighteenth century, I will stay 
in the classical world for a moment longer, in order to explore one more modality of the 
embodied attunement with otherness that is mimesis.  This modality stands behind 
Plato’s concerns about the mimetic shaping of character by poetry, song, and dance in 
Books II and III of the Republic, but is never explicated or analyzed for its own sake in 
philosophy of the period.  The topic I am interested in broaching is how a performer – or 
a human subject more generally – summons qualities of otherness in him- or herself when 
the other in question is present only a memory in the mind or in the body.  This process 
does involve attunement in the here-and-now; the attunement, however, is not between 
co-present beings, but between the one who summons and the other manifested in the 




 Let us take the example of the rhapsode: the singer of epic poetry to the 
accompaniment of a lyre; the proto-actor who negotiated the shift of subjectivity between 
diegesis and mimesis over and over again within a given performance.  Shaped by a 
lifetime of exposure to and participation in oral poetry and choral dance, the bodies and 
minds of rhapsodes would have been repositories of rhythmic patterns, metrical 
structures, formulaic word-sequences, and choreographic movements.  In the moment of 
performance, the rhapsode would have allowed these incorporated resources to surge up 
in him, providing formal channels for creative impulses.  “Rhapsode” derives from the 
verb rhapsoidein, which means “to stitch together,” and the name probably signals 
rhapsody’s hybrid mode of improvisatory re-performance: immersed in a process of 
delivery-cum-composition, the rhapsode would have relied upon kinesthetic memory to 
call up and suture together bursts of dynamic movement and rhythmic speech.  This 
process of continual, improvisatory “stitching together” should be seen not as 
“improvisation” in the sense of total spontaneity, but as a kind of in-the-moment mimetic 
sampling of fixed patterns thoroughly ingrained in the body and mind, a process 
governed by a productive tension between the principles of structure and impulse.  The 
rhapsode would have given himself over to mimetizing in order to activate a practical 
performance-knowledge – and to allow codified details of movement and voice to 
unleash themselves opportunistically, surging up out of the “the great underground of 
knowledges” in his embodied being (Taussig 1993:26). 
It is this mode of mimetic attunement – a summoning of embodied resources that 
can be prompted but not entirely controlled by the conscious mind – that Gunter Gebauer 




knowledge, a sens pratique; it makes available models of behavior that are seemingly 
immediate and require no consideration” (Gebauer and Wulf 1995:316).  Benjamin’s “On 
the Mimetic Faculty” also touches upon the unconsciously informed, solo mimetic 
modality in question: Benjamin’s essay does not examine mimesis as inter-relational 
synchronization but rather the individual acts of summoning or recognition that may 
inform an author’s creative or a reader’s receptive processes.  Key to Benjamin’s 
theorization of this writerly and readerly mimesis is the notion of the “flash”: the 
production or recognition of similarity “is in many cases, and particularly the most 
important, limited to flashes.  It flits past.”  Benjamin goes on to propose that “[i]t is not 
improbable that the rapidity of writing and reading heightens the fusion of the semiotic 
and the mimetic in the sphere of language” (Benjamin 1978:335-36).  In other words, 
Benjamin suggests that a form of automatic writing (or reading) – or, at least, an 
unusually rapid and relatively unregulated mode of composition (or consumption) – 
might provide more favorable conditions for the mimetic faculty to surge into fullest 
operation.  As writing becomes an uncontrolled falling-forward of the author into 
language, Benjamin implies, its mimetic aspect gains power. 
Benjamin’s notion of the “flash” can be usefully applied to performative acts of 
impersonation, in which the recognition of rightness – the insight that otherness has been 
accurately captured – comes to both performer and spectator in a sudden burst.  This 
mimetized otherness may involve human characteristics encountered in the social world, 
genre-specific skills or modes of expressivity, or vocal-and-physical “entities” (like 
songs, dances, and routines) transmitted across generations within a performance culture.  




qualities of otherness made self through long and dedicated practice.  It should be 
emphasized that the precursor doing or the other-as-predecessor made present through 
this summoning resides in the bodies and minds of performers, and not in some ideal 
realm that must be access through the rational faculty or the compositional ability of the 
visual imagination.  These ingrained doings and incorporated others press themselves up 
to and beyond the threshold of manifestation in the act of performance.  “Copying” or 





2.  The Felt Truth of Mimetic Experience: 




In the year 1717 the actor Jean Poisson became the first professional stage performer in 
the French tradition to offer a full-length manual on matters of technique when his 
Réflexions sur l’art de parler en public appeared on the shelves of Parisian bookstalls.58 
This relatively unknown treatise by a now-obscure actor on acting, which rehashes 
established orthodoxies on stage declamation and which has never earned a place within 
the canon of acting theory’s historical texts, now derives some interest from its very 
typicality, its thorough steeping in the assumptions of its cultural moment.  The 
Réflexions conclude with a piece of “Avis General” that restates classical emotional 
doctrine in early eighteenth-century terms: 
All the Rules of Cicero, of Quintilian, and of the Illustrious Moderns who have 
been able to write on Declamation are useless to the Orator if he does not follow 
the first, which is to understand thoroughly what he is saying and to feel it 
strongly himself, in order to render it feelingly [sensible] to the Listener.  When 
one is touched [touché] in one’s speech, Face, Voice and Gesture lend assistance 
and conform to one’s interior movements [mouvemens interieurs] [sic], and if one 
has any natural graces at all, through this alone, without much study, one can 
please and persuade, which is the sole aim of Eloquence.  (Poisson 1717:34) 
 
The notion of being “touched” still circulates within our twenty-first century vocabulary 
of emotion, but the phrase “interior movements” strikes us with the force of the alien.  
                                                        
58 Poisson was the younger son of Raymond Poisson and Victoire Guérin, celebrated 
actors at the Hôtel de Bourgogne during the latter decades of the seventeenth century.  
Less renowned than his brother Paul (known as Poisson fils), Jean Poisson made his 
debut at the Comédie-Française in 1694 and retired from the stage in 1710.  Allison Grear 
has called Poisson’s Réflexions “the first study of the psychology of acting” in Europe 
and Sabine Chaouche has emphasized the treatise’s significance in accelerating acting 
theory’s break from oratorical theory.  See Allison Grear, “A Background to Diderot’s 
Paradoxe sur le comédien,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 21, no. 3 (1985): 225-
238, 232; Sabine Chaouche, ed., Sept traits sur le jeu du comédien et autres texts: De 




What could Poisson mean here?  The answer lies in Poisson’s footnote to the above 
passage, a quotation from Cicero’s rhetorical treatise De Oratore (55 BCE): “Omnis 
motus animi suum quemdam a natura habet vultum & sonum & gestum” [“Each 
movement of the soul has from nature a certain facial expression, sound, and gesture of 
its own”] (34).  This brief citation hurtles us back across almost two millennia and into 
sudden reckoning with the classical understanding of emotion as motus animi: a literal 
“motion of the soul,” a perturbation of the psychic substance propagating through the 
body and producing physiological changes in the organs, muscles, and other inner 
systems.  This psycho-kinetic understanding of affect continued to carry authority 
throughout the medieval and into the early modern periods, when classical emotional 
theory was assimilated to Christian doctrine by Scholastic philosophers of the passions.  
As late as the end of the eighteenth century, the French word émotion still carried a 
heavily kinetic import, signifying “agitation, movement either in the body or in the soul” 
[agitation, moûvement ou dans le corps ou dans l'âme].59 
However, by the first decades of the eighteenth century, the time of Poisson’s 
writing, the philosophy of the passions had undergone a sea-change, transformed by 
accounts of soul-body interaction supplied by a new intellectual movement: mechanism.  
At the center of the mechanistic view of the human world stood a body highly sensitized 
to the motive forces acting upon it from without and highly attuned to the inner 
movements coursing through it – a psychically and physiologically activated body, bound 
by sense and affect into a network of relations with the world of objects and others.  Less 
                                                        
59 In Féraud, Jean-François, Dictionaire critique de la langue française (1787-88).  
Accessed through ARTFL-FRANTEXT, Department of Romance Languages and 





than half a century after the appearance of Poisson’s treatise, the vision of an 
impassioned body, subject to the impressions of both external objects and inner events 
and capable of provoking affective experience in others through sudden, direct, and 
irresistible processes of contagion, had been thoroughly assimilated by both champions 
and critics of the eighteenth-century theatre’s “unashamedly affective mission” (Worthen 
1984:73). 
Eighteenth-century theories of acting translate a mechanistic epistemology of 
affect into a kinetic model of the interpersonal dynamics of the theatre event.  By first 
engaging with the fictional circumstances of his role – perhaps by summoning images 
“impressed” (imprimé) within his memory or imagination – the actor “animates” 
(s’anime) or “impassions” (se passione) himself.  In other words, he generates in himself 
those motions of the soul-body composite that are the passions themselves, sometimes 
also referred to as “affections” (affections) or “sentiments” (sentimens).  These “interior 
movements” (mouvemens intérieurs), which now “agitate” (agite) the actor’s physical 
frame, spread through space and “excite” (excite) corresponding corporeal sensations 
within the assembled audience members.  The organic interactivity of the soul-body 
composite means that these sensations are also immediately felt as passions in the 
spectators’ souls.  It is taken as natural and inevitable that when the actor genuinely 
“abandons himself” (s’abandonner) to the sequence of passions appropriate to his 
character, the assembled spectators will surrender themselves to a corresponding series of 
internal movements.  As a result, the audience is literally – that is, kinetically and 





Joseph Roach has demonstrated the influence of Cartesian physiology and the 
“doctrine of sensibility” upon eighteenth-century theatrical theory; Angelica Goodden, 
Erec R. Koch, and Paul Goring have examined the “bodily transmission of sentiment, or 
the physiology of persuasion” (Goodden 1986:33) in oratorical treatises of the period; 
Shearer West has highlighted the connections between passion theory, acting practice, 
and the visual arts in the age of Garrick and Kemble; William B. Worthen has explored 
the role of the impassioned actor’s gestural expressivity in catalyzing the sympathetic 
outbursts of emotion so characteristic of the eighteenth century’s “sentimental theater”; 
and Sabine Chaouche has recently traced the dialectic between interior experience and 
exterior presentation across eighteenth-century French acting theory’s most significant 
texts.60  However, contemporary scholarship has yet to recognize fully the debt of 
eighteenth-century theatrical theory to the classical and Scholastic philosophy of the 
passions.  Such scholarship often relies upon a crude dichotomy between “emotionalist” 
and “anti-emotionalist”61 positions for its interpretative framework, rather than examining 
                                                        
60 See Joseph Roach, The Player’s Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting (Ann Arbor, 
1996); Goodden, 1986; Erec R. Koch, The Aesthetic Body: Passion, Sensibility, and 
Corporeality in Seventeenth-Century France (Newark, 2008); Paul Goring, The Rhetoric 
of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture (Cambridge, UK, 2005); Shearer West, The 
Image of the Actor: Verbal and Visual Representation in the Age of Garrick and Kemble 
(New York, 1991); Worthen, 1984; Sabine Chaouche, La philosophie de l’acteur: la 
dialectique de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur dans les écrits sur l’art théâtral français, 1738-
1801 (Paris, 2007). 
61 These terms belong to the English critic and dramatist William Archer, whose 
retrospective analysis of eighteenth-century acting treatises in Masks or Faces? (1888) 
still exerts a considerable influence over theatre scholarship’s consensus knowledge of 
this body of theory.  The intertextual spine of the “emotionalist”/“anti-emotionalist” 
debate is capably traced by Allison Grear.  See Grear 1985:225-238.  See also Edward 





how a culturally particular epistemology of emotion-as-motion informs theorizations of 
the actor’s art and of the actor-spectator relationship during the period. 
The first concern of this chapter will be to sketch a brief history of the kinetic 
dimension of passion theory from classical Greece and Rome through early modern 
Scholasticism and into Cartesian and post-Cartesian mechanism.  My second objective 
will be to show how the model of a body kinetically activated by sensation and affect 
impacts eighteenth-century theories of theatrical experience.  In this connection, I 
examine two key texts that exerted a powerful influence over eighteenth-century 
aesthetics: first, Nicolas Malebranche’s De la recherche de la vérité (1675), which 
refines, extends, and revises Descartes’s treatment of the passions, and, second, the abbé 
Jean-Baptiste Dubos’s Réflexions critiques sur la poesie et la peinture (1719), which 
applies a mix of Scholastic and Cartesian passion theory to the production and reception 
of artworks.  I then shift focus to Pierre Rémond de Sainte-Albine’s Le Comédien (1747), 
the first practical-theoretical treatise in the French language devoted entirely to the art of 
the theatrical performer.  Le Comédien represents the apex of influence of the model of a 
kinetically affected-and-affecting body on eighteenth-century discussions of acting 
practice.  Finally, and perhaps most controversially, I will propose that eighteenth-
century perspectives on the body in performance, carefully refreshed, might still hold 
value for contemporary theatrical aesthetics. 
French philosophy and aesthetics of the period may have its own vocabulary for 
affective experience – a vocabulary of émotion, mouvement intérieur, sentiment, and 
sensibilité – but these terms are used to examine processes of affective transmission that 




However, unlike the Greeks, eighteenth-century French aestheticians and theorists of the 
theatre articulated their views on emotion within an established ontology of l’imitation de 
la nature, laid down by Boileau in his L’Art Poétique (1674) and renewed by Batteux in 
his Traité des Beaux Arts en Général ou Tous les Arts réduits à un seul Principe (1746).62  
It is the interplay between mimesis as embodied attunement and mimesis as an assumed 
imitative ontology that this chapter will explore within acting theory’s history of ideas 
during the period of its modern rebirth.   
Though eighteenth-century theatrical theorists never question the classically 
derived doctrine that art’s essential ontology and ultimate objective ought to be the 
“imitation of nature,” reading their works within the framework of then-current models of 
psycho-physiology reveals another kind of mimesis at the heart of the theatre event: the 
physiological symmetry between performing and spectating bodies, affectively 
synchronized by precisely corresponding flows of interior motive force.  In other words, 
for many eighteenth-century theorists, the truth of theatrical performance depended not 
upon a criterion of verisimilitude, but upon the mimetic experience of passion, modeled 
by the actor and undergone vicariously by the spectator.  An attentive reading of 
eighteenth-century theories of theatrical experience (and their influences in classical and 
early modern philosophy) reveals that contemporary terms like “kinesthetic empathy”63 
                                                        
62 As Stephen Halliwell emphasizes, the neoclassical conception of the imitation of 
nature “was never a unitary principle but a formula interpreted in various, and sometimes 
incompatible, ways” (Halliwell 2002:352).  In other words, critics like Boileau and 
Batteux might agree that art’s essential operation was the “imitation of nature” without 
agreeing on what “imitation” meant or what “nature” ought to be imitated. 
63 The term “kinesthetic empathy,” promoted by dance theorist Susan Leigh Foster, now 
circulates widely as a keyword within performance scholarship.  See Susan Leigh Foster, 
“Movement’s Contagion: The Kinesthetic Impact of Performance,” in The Cambridge 




and “embodied intersubjectivity” represent only the most recent articulations of a very 
ancient and powerful idea.   
It must be acknowledged that eighteenth-century acting theory’s focus on the 
affective and the corporeal over the contextual and the interpretative is often 
unsatisfyingly limited.  We need not subscribe wholesale to every aspect of the period’s 
theatrical aesthetics, however, to appreciate the continuing relevance of the central 
conviction of this corpus of intensely kinetic mimetic theory: that the movement of affect 
through the performing body, which sets spectating bodies into synchronous or reactive 
movement, ought to be recognized as a primary animator of theatrical experience. 
 
The Psycho-Kinetics of Passion from Aristotle to Descartes64 
 
Even the briefest sketch of the philosophy of the passions’ long history must begin with a 
return to the classical world.  Ancient Greek thought understood the soul (psuchê) to be 
the vital principle of living creatures, that which animates or moves their material bodies.  
In the dialogue Phaedrus, for example, Plato describes the soul as the immortal, self-
moving “fountain and beginning of motion” for the human being (Plato 1937:250).  
Greek philosophy held the soul responsible for movement, thought, emotion, judgment, 
desire, perception, imagination, and even the basic processes of nutrition and digestion.  
Indeed, Aristotle’s On the Soul, passion theory’s foundational text, treats each of the 
                                                        
Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in Performance (2011).  Foster references 
cognitive scientific studies of mirror neuron functioning, as does Bruce McConachie, in 
his recent Engaging Audiences: A Cognitive Approach to Spectating in the Theatre 
(2008). 
64 In tracing the philosophical history of the passions, I have relied heavily upon Simo 
Knuuttila’s Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (2004), Anthony Levi’s 
French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions, 1585-1649 (1964), and Susan James’s 




soul’s powers – nutrition, desire, sensation, locomotion, and thinking – as species of 
psychic motion (kinêsis), also manifested as movements of specific parts of the body 
(such as the heart, the brain, or the eye).65  Within the hylomorphic framework of 
Aristotelian thought, the soul’s movements are the formal aspect of physiological 
changes in the corporeal substance.  In some cases, the soul initiates its motions; in 
others, external objects in the surrounding world impress themselves upon the sensory 
organs, generating motions that find their way through the bodily medium to terminate at 
the soul.66 
The Greek word that most closely corresponds to our present-day “emotion” in 
terms of its general applicability was pathos (“passion”), from the verb paskhô, “to 
suffer,” “to experience,” or “to undergo.”  Aristotle states that the soul experiences the 
pathê not in itself but through the internal motions and disturbances of the bodily 
medium.67  For example, anger’s physiological component is marked by the heating of 
blood around the heart.68  In the Problems, Aristotle69 postulates that the language used to 
describe the physiological operations of the passions is not simply metaphorical: when 
we describe anger “boiling up,” “rising,” or “being stirred up,” we are describing the 
feeling of blood and heat surging upward toward the cardiac region.70  Under this 
account, the sensation of inner movement makes up an integral part of emotional 
experience. 
                                                        
65 See Aristotle’s On the Soul (De Anima), trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa, 
1981), sections 428b, 432b, 433a. 
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Stoic philosophy and Galenic physiology would deeply influence the 
development of passion theory over the ensuing centuries, and both schools of thought 
relied upon the psycho-kinetic understanding of emotion as motus animi.71  The 
Aristotelian paradigm reasserted itself in the medieval period when On the Soul was 
translated into Latin around the midpoint of the twelfth century, eventually becoming the 
“dominant text in medieval philosophy of mind” (Knuuttila 2004:178).  Thomas 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologica (c. 1225-1274) followed Aristotle’s view in defining 
passion as a motion of the soul’s sensitive appetite.  Aquinas also bolstered the literalness 
of passion theory’s motive terminology by applying Aristotle’s natural philosophy – in 
particular, his three-phase analysis of the kinêsis of natural phenomena in the Physics – to 
psychic processes (see Knuuttila 2004:243).  Aquinas’ twenty-seven quaestiones on the 
passions (Summa Theologica II.1, 22-48), eventually known as De passionibus animae, 
became the model for the vernacular traité des passions of sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Scholastic philosophy.72 
The philosophy of the passions was reshaped by the swelling current of 
mechanistic thinking in the early to mid-seventeenth century.  The key figure responsible 
for this transformation was, of course, René Descartes.  Though Descartes presented his 
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own account of the psycho-physiology of the passions as an utter break from all previous 
accounts,73 he retained the essentials of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, for he still 
regarded the passions as arising from inclinational and aversive movements of the soul.74  
Descartes’s innovation, however, was to provide a minutely detailed, phase-by-phase 
account of the physiological production of passion, as well as to situate his understanding 
of the internal dynamics of affect within a mechanistic universe governed by fixed laws 
of motion. 
For Descartes, the universe is a plenum, full of homogenous matter, out of which 
various substances differentiate themselves on the basis of the size, shape, and – most 
crucially – the motion of their particles.  “All the variety in matter, all the diversity of its 
forms, depends on motion,” Descartes argued in the Principia Philosophiae (Descartes 
1985:232).  Within the Cartesian universe, the vast distances between the stars, the 
expanses of the terrestrial world, and the physical spaces between human bodies are 
teeming with invisible particles (corpuscles) in constant collisional movement.  The 
motion of any body within such a universe requires the displacement of the bodies 
surrounding it, generating waves of propagative influence.  For Descartes, the human 
organism was only one mechanical sub-system within a universe whose operations are 
sustained by the force of material bodies acting upon one another.75  Descartes’s 
mechanistic account of bodily functioning was the most prominent model within the 
seventeenth century’s “proliferation of physiologies” (Koch 2008:3) marked by an 
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iatromechanist tendency – that is, by the attempt to apply models drawn from physics and 
mathematics to corporeal processes.  The central principle of the iatromechanist position 
held that “life is movement and the living being – even the human being – is a machine” 
(Moravia 1978:47). 
Descartes’s account of passion is explicitly mechano-physiological: in Les 
passions de l’âme (1649), Descartes states that he will approach the soul-body 
interactions that produce passion as a physicien – that is, as a mechanist physicist.  He 
defines passions as “perceptions, sentiments, or motions of the soul” [perceptions, ou des 
sentiments, ou des émotions de l’âme], which are “caused, maintained, and strengthened 
by certain movements of the [animal] spirits.”76  The notion of “animal spirits” – pneuma 
psychikon in Greek, spiritus anima in Latin, esprits animaux in French – goes back as far 
as Greek Stoicism, Hellenistic medecine, and Galenic physiology.  Stoic philosophy 
attributed the mental and physical experience of passion to the flows of pneuma, a life-
giving, breath-like substance within the body.  The Roman physician and anatomist 
Galen (c.130-c.200 BCE) postulated that the vaporous pneuma flowed through the nerves 
(which he imagined to be hollow) from the cavities of the brain to the muscles, or, in the 
other direction, from the sensory organs to the brain, serving as “the primary instrument 
of the soul,” the “medium for the transmission of sensation and other psychological 
faculties” (Debru 2008:272).  Descartes, however, abolishes all historical vagueness from 
this physiological hypothesis by definitively materializing the animal spirits: he 
conceives them as “the most agitated [agitées] and the most subtle” particles of the blood, 
                                                        




heated to a state of high excitation by the heart.77  The volatile animal spirits reside in the 
cavities of the brain and course through the body’s system of nerves, serving as the 
medium of interaction between the brain’s pineal gland, primary functional seat of the 
soul, and the sensory organs and muscles. 
Reviewing the vocabulary of passion handed down to him through Scholastic 
philosophy, Descartes suggests that passions can indeed be accurately termed sentiments 
“because they are received in the same way as the objects of the exterior senses, and they 
are not known by it [the soul] in any other way.”78  For Descartes, as for his Aristotelian-
Thomistic predecessors, the term sentiment encompasses both sensation and affect.  
Passion is understood as a mode of sensation, and passions impinge upon the soul in the 
same way that external objects impress themselves upon the senses by mechanical action.  
Descartes goes on to argue, however, that the best term for passion is in fact émotion:  
But we can still better name them the motions of the soul [émotions de l’âme], not 
only because this name can be applied to all the changes that occur within it, that 
is, to all the diverse thoughts that come to it, but particularly because, of all the 
kinds of thoughts that it can have, there are no others that agitate it [l’agitent] and 
shake it [l’ébranlent] so strongly as do these passions.79 
 
Descartes’s passions are literally kinetic and physiologically intense events in the inner 
life of the human subject. 
According to Descartes, passions may be excited in a variety of ways.  First, 
passions may be aroused by external objects, which strike the senses, generating 
movements in the sensory organs.  These movements travel via the animal spirits in the 
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nerves and represent the objects of perception to the soul on the surface of the brain’s 
pineal gland.80  If the soul holds a disposition toward a particular object, one of the six 
principle passions – wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness – or some combination 
or variant thereof is excited.  These excitations of the soul act reciprocally on the body: 
the animal spirits convey impulses to the muscles and internal systems, setting the body 
into interior and exterior movement.81  Passions are thus perceived or sensed in the soul 
but also experienced in the body as movements of the animal sprits and the physiological 
alterations they produce.  Passions can also be aroused by undirected imaginings, by 
willful thought-processes of the soul, or even through purely corporeal dispositions, when 
the body functions as an affective automaton, without regulation by the intellect.82 
Regardless of its source, however, Cartesian passion always involves the transmission of 
motive impulses across material substrates within the corporeal machine. 
Descartes thus presents a mechanistic account of the total integration of emotion 
and sensation – of pathos and aesthesis, in the terminology of Greek philosophy.  Indeed, 
literary historian Erec R. Koch locates in Descartes’s writings on physiology the 
emergence of a new model of the body as an “aesthetic machine” (Koch 2008:24).  
Within the Cartesian physiological system, writes Koch, 
Sensibility and passion are stirred in the psyche by a force, matter in motion, that 
impresses itself on the body and initiates a chain of causal physiological action 
and reaction. […] The body here is aesthetic, in its etymological sense, since its 
physiological functioning is directed toward the production of sensibility, that is, 
to sensation and passion or affect.  (12) 
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Moreover, the impassioned, aesthetically activated body that Descartes depicts in Les 
passions de l’âme grounds the human subject in the truth of experience.  Descartes writes 
that we may confuse imaginations with perceptions, but “one cannot be [deceived] in the 
same way when it comes to the passions, in that they are so close and so interior to our 
soul that it is impossible that it should feel them without their being truly such as it feels 
them.”83  Within Cartesian psycho-physiology, there can be no such thing as a false 
passion, and the soul’s experience of affective movements becomes a mode of self-
knowing through the resources of the body.  Or, as Koch puts it, the sensory, kinesthetic, 
and affective capacities of the Cartesian machine allow access to a “truth of the body and 
sensation” (Koch 2008:55).  If this kind of thinking seem strangely at odds with that of 
the Descartes who proclaimed “cogito ergo sum” in the Principia philosophiae (1644), 
this is largely the result of superficial and reductive summaries of Cartesian thought.  
Though Descartes did indeed argue that the essence of the soul was to be found in its 
capacity for rational thought, he regards sense and affect as totally integrated with the 
functioning of the body.  And if, as this unfamiliar Descartes contends, it is indeed 
through the aesthesis of the body that we apprehend human action, this capacity is also 
the means by which we apprehend theatrical performance.  As we shall see, it is the 
“truth of the body and sensation” that serves as the measure of theatrical mimesis in the 
eighteenth-century theatre of passionate experience. 
 








The most important figure in the defense, extension, and revision of Cartesian philosophy 
in the latter half of the seventeenth century was the Oratorian Nicolas Malebranche 
(1638-1715), who corresponded with Leibniz, quarreled bitterly with Arnauld, and 
influenced Berkeley, Hume, and Locke.  De la recherche de la vérité [“On the search for 
truth”] (1675), Malebranche’s most influential work, lays out the most famous – and 
controversial – aspects of his philosophy: his theory of “occasionalism” and his “doctrine 
of the vision in God”84  Malebranche also devotes the entirety of one of De la 
recherche’s six books to the subject of the passions and, in several scattered but 
provocative passages, provides a mechanistic model of passionate contagion (contagion) 
– a theme that Descartes himself never developed at length.  It is to these passages I now 
turn. 
Having presented a thoroughly Cartesian view of sense and imagination in the 
opening books of De la recherche, Malebranche begins Book V with an equally 
Cartesian definition of passion: “I here call passions all the motions [émotions] that the 
soul feels naturally on occasion of the extraordinary movements of the animal spirits and 
of the blood” (Malebranche 1958:127).  As Book V continues, émotion sensible 
(“sensible motion,” or “sensed motion”) becomes a central term for Malebranche, 
referring to the sensation of reciprocal interaction between body and soul, when the soul 
feels itself moved by the physiological alterations accompanying passion.  Another of 
Malebranche’s keywords is sentiment, which would best be translated by some synthesis 
of the English terms “sense,” “sensation,” and “sentiment.”  There are two species of 
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sentiment: the first involves purely “intellectual” (intellectuelle) perceptions of passion, 
while the second includes the physiologically vivid experience of the different 
ébranlements (“disturbances”; literally, “shakings”) that the animal spirits cause in the 
brain and body (155).  Within Malebranchian thought, sentiment functions as a 
“mechanism of natural judgment” that “endow[s] sensation with epistemic value,”85 a 
corporeally grounded mode of self-knowing.86 
 Malebranche asserts, following Descartes (and Cicero), that each passion 
naturally manifests itself in a specific physical posture and facial expression.87  A greater 
concern for Malebranche than the production of passion in the individual, however, is the 
role of affective contagion in society.  For Malebranche, the divine creator has chosen to 
“to link all His creatures with one another” by endowing human beings with a 
“disposition to imitate others in all things” (Malebranche 1958:118, 161).  For 
Malebranche, like Aristotle, imitative processes sustain the life of society.  However, 
Malebranche goes further than Aristotle when he argues that instinctive compassion, 
conscious emulation, and emotional contagion all find their source in the imitative-
affective disposition.  When an individual lacks this inclination, states Malebranche, “he 
is by his nature incapable of binding himself to us, and of making up the same body with 
us” [emphasis added] (162).  Malebranche thus provides an early version of one of the 
central tenets of the eighteenth-century doctrine of sensibilité: that the physiological 
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propensity for empathic excitation is essentially connected to the social virtues of self-
sacrifice and compassion. 
The capacity for passionate contagion depends both upon imitative “mechanisms” 
(ressorts) in the brain (236) as well as the “mutual correspondence” (mutuelle 
correspondance) between human bodies (321) – in particular, the way in which the 
movement of animal spirits through the bodies of others inevitably provokes a 
corresponding flow in our own.  Malebranche writes that 
not only do the animal spirits propagate naturally into the parts of our bodies in 
order to carry out the same actions and the same movements that we see carried 
out by others, but also to undergo in some way their injuries and to take part in 
their miseries. […]  This transport of spirits into the parts of our bodies that 
correspond to those we see injured in others makes itself felt particularly in 
delicate persons, who have a vivid imagination and very tender and soft flesh. 
(236-37) 
 
For Malebranche as for Descartes, the imagination is a physical faculty; the intentional-
and-affective synchrony he here describes is also profoundly kinesthetic and corporeal, 
depending on the structural symmetry of human bodies.  Malebranche’s account of how 
the “compassion in bodies produces a compassion in minds” (237) sounds remarkably 
like early twenty-first century “mirror neuron” theory, though Malebranche’s 
understanding of kinesthetic empathy relies upon a mechanism specific to the physiology 
of his period: the spontaneously coordinated movements of animal spirits through the 
body’s internal pathways (rather than mirror-matched neural activation-patterns and 
submotor impulses).88 
As the magnitude of an individual’s passionate experience increases, so does its 
tendency toward propagation.  Malebranche states that emotional contagion “is even 
                                                        




greater and more remarkable when the passions are more violent, because then the animal 
spirits are agitated [agités] with more force” (Malebranche 1958:191).  What is more, 
those individuals possessing a “strong imagination,” which Malebranche defines as “a 
disposition of the brain for receiving very deep traces [traces] from the weakest and least 
active objects” (163) tend to “dominate” the imaginations of others and “impress” upon 
them their own sensory traces (161-62).  This endows the possessors of vivid 
imaginations with a persuasive capacity that is essentially physiological rather than 
rhetorical: 
Those who imagine things strongly express them with great force, and persuade 
all those who are convinced by them by their air [i.e., facial and postural 
expression] and by sensible impression [impression sensible] rather than by the 
force of their arguments.  For the brain of those who have a strong imagination, 
receives, as has been said, these deep traces [traces] of the subjects that they 
imagine, and these traces are naturally followed by a great motion [émotion] of 
the spirits, which in a manner prompt and lively disposes their entire body to 
express their thoughts.  Thus the air of their face, the tone of their voice, and their 
mode of speech, animating [animant] their expressions, prepares those listening 
and watching to come to attention, and to receive mechanically the impression of 
the image which agitates them [recevoir machinalement l’impression de l’image 
qui les agite].  For, in short, a man who is penetrated [pénétré] by that which he 
speaks usually penetrates others with it; an impassioned [passionné] man always 
moves [émeut] others, and though his rhetoric be irregular, it never ceases to be 
very persuasive, because his air and his manner make themselves felt, and thus 
agitate [agissent] the imagination of men more vividly than the strongest speeches 
pronounced in cold blood, because these speeches do not flatter their senses and 
do not strike [frappent] their imagination.  (328-29) 
 
The mechanism for contagion that Malebranche here describes can be clarified by 
drawing upon his overall physiology: 1) in the process of imagining, physical traces in 
the surface of the brain matter originally imprinted by external objects are re-opened; 2) 
animal spirits flow through these traces, manifesting mental images to the imagination; 3) 
these images stir passions and the corresponding movements of the animal spirits, which 




the speakers’s body and voice propagate through space and impress themselves upon the 
sensory organs of the listener-spectator; 5) these impressions agitate the animal spirits in 
the beholder’s nerves, which rush to the brain, there imprinting imagery corresponding to 
that in the mind of the speaker; 6) this imagery provokes a corresponding passion in the 
listener-spectator’s soul, which manifests itself physiologically through the flow of 
animal spirits away from the brain and toward the muscles and circulatory system. 
In sum, Malebranche’s describes a psycho-physiological duplication of passion 
that proceeds via a mechanical chain of action and reaction.  Motive flows of affect 
produce waves of expression and impression, linking individual bodies into the social 
corpus.  As we shall see, Malebranche’s portrait of the preternaturally imaginative and 
expressively animated individual foreshadows depictions of the ideal stage performer in 
the acting theory of the following century. 
 
The Aesthetics of Passion: Dubos’s Réflexions 
 
 
Neither Descartes nor Malebranche showed anything more than a passing interest in 
artistic phenomena, but the Cartesian physiology of passion was to make a rapid 
incursion into the proto-aesthetic theory of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries.  Perhaps the most influential site of impact was the abbé Jean-Baptiste Dubos’s 
Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture (1719).  The ambitious, sprawling 
Réflexions treat a number of subjects over the course of their three-hundred pages: poetry, 
painting, sculpture, music, drama, acting, dance, and the nature of genius. The scope, 
complexity, and detail of the Réflexions would earn Dubos an esteem that lasted well into 




in 1738 as “the most useful book on these matters which has ever been written in any one 
of the European nations” (in Saisselin 1966:193) and the scores of passages from the 
Réflexions excerpted in the Encyclopédie testify to the work’s continued status among 
Diderot and his collaborators.89 
Most relevant to the concerns of this study is Dubos’s theorization of the role of 
affect within aesthetic experience and appraisal.  In this connection, Dubos’s debt to 
Descartes, whom he hails as “the father of the new philosophy” (Dubos 1733:461) is 
abundantly clear throughout the treatise.  Dubos also seems to have been directly 
influenced by Malebranche’s theory of sentiment,90 and possibly by the sensationism of 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), whose translation into French 
Dubos facilitated.  Whatever exact constellation of influences lies behind Dubos’s 
thinking, the Réflexions usher the “aesthetic body” of seventeenth-century mechanical 
physiology – a body impassioned by sensory experience – into the realm of artistic 
production and reception. 
 The Réflexions open by arguing that human beings are drawn toward the 
performing and plastic arts primarily for their physiologically enlivening effects.  
Engagement with artworks “sets in movement the [animal] spirits, which tend to become 
sluggish” (Dubos 1733:9), thereby re-invigorating the imagination.  For Dubos, the 
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appeal held by aesthetic experience is a sub-species of the more general “attraction that 
the movements of the passions have for men” (5).  Dubos argues that humankind is so 
addicted to the enlivening effects of passionate movement that we prefer a tumultuous 
life of agitation (agitation) to a tranquil one: “men in general suffer even more from 
living without passions than the passions can make them suffer” (11).  For this reason, all 
objects of artistic imitation are not equal: the subjects best suited to arousing passion are 
the most vivacious, energetic, and affectively charged aspects of human experience.91 
Dubos’s anti-Stoic – and, for that matter, anti-Platonic – position on the salutary 
effects of aesthetic invigoration points toward a conviction underlying the Réflexions: 
that aesthetic experience exists on an absolute continuum with lived experience.  This 
position coexists – unproblematically for Dubos, but uneasily for a contemporary reader 
– with the then-prevailing artistic doctrine of the “imitation of nature.”  Dubos reconciles 
his mimetic assumptions with the affective thrust of his aesthetics through his theory of 
“artificial passions” (passions artificielles).  According to Dubos, an artistic imitation 
“must excite in our soul a passion that resembles that which the imitated object would 
have been able to excite.  The copy [copie] of the object must, in other words, excite in us 
a copy of the passion that the object would have excited” (26).  Here a mimetic 
relationship between the “real and true passions” [passions réelles et veritables] (24) 
experienced in life and the “artificial” passions experienced under aesthetically produced 
conditions takes theoretical precedence over the verisimilar correspondence between the 
artistically rendered object and its real-world counterpart.  In other words, the imitation 
                                                        




of worldly phenomena serves primarily as a means toward the aesthetic production of 
passion, which the receiver undergoes as a kind of mimetic experience. 
Dubos goes on to state that the “impression” of an imitated object – that is, the 
forceful action of an aesthetic object upon the material organs of sense and subsequently 
upon the tissue of the brain via the animal spirits – is less “deep” (profonde), or more 
“superficial” (superficielle), than the impressions of actual objects.  Moreover, since the 
aesthetic impression “affects only the sensitive soul [i.e., leaving the rational soul 
unaffected], it dissipates without lasting consequences,” unattended by the 
“unpleasantnesses” associated with the “serious motions” (émotions serieuses) evoked by 
actual objects (27-28).  Note that there is no concept of “fiction” here, and Dubos 
dispenses quickly with the idea that aesthetic experience involves some kind of “illusion” 
(illusion) (27).  It is only the relative superficiality of physiological impressure that 
permits the pleasure we take in artworks whose human content would otherwise disturb 
us greatly.  Noting that the death of a young princess amid “horrible convulsions” would 
be “an object to flee,” but that Racine’s Phédre “moves us and touches us [nous émeut et 
nous touché] without leaving in us the seed of a lasting sadness,” Dubos explains: “We 
joy in our emotion [émotion] without being alarmed by the fear that it will endure too 
long.  Racine’s play makes tears flow from our eyes without making us really sad 
[attrister réellement]” (29). The unreality of theatrical emotion, then, is not a matter of its 
not actually happening or its not corresponding to the sensation of affect in life, but of its 
having inlaid within it a sensation of pleasure enabled by the knowledge that it will have 




free from the impact of striking aesthetic objects – objects that would, in the case 
mentioned above, be the tragic actors themselves.92 
Dubos continues his analysis of “the power that imitations have over us” when 
takes up the theme of “the natural sensibility [sensibilité] of the human heart” (34) and its 
“disposition to be easily moved [ému]” (38).  Following Malebranche, Dubos asserts that 
human beings have been formed with an instinctive capacity to share in the “agitation” 
(agitation) of all those we encounter: “The tears of a stranger move [émeuvent] us even 
before we know the cause of his weeping. […] He who approaches us with joy painted 
upon his face excites [excite] in us a sentiment [sentiment] of joy before we know its 
cause” (39).  Dubos’s position on the direct, non-deliberative nature of empathic 
connection is an extreme one: no context of understanding or previous relationship is 
necessary for a human subject to be moved by another.  Rather, the exterior symptoms of 
impassioned individuals act directly upon the sensibly receptive bodies of those they 
approach, producing sentimental contagion. 
Dubos turns immediately to acting to illustrate how his theory of contagion might 
apply to aesthetic phenomena.  According to Dubos, the very same instinct that would 
make us weep at a mother grieving over her dead son elicits our emotional response to 
                                                        
92 Though Dubos’s resuscitation of the Scholastic distinction between the sensitive and 
rational faculties of the soul in his account of “artificial passion” breaks with Cartesian 
physiology, his position on the relative depth of theatrical emotion does align somewhat 
with Descartes’ fragmentary thoughts on the same issue.  Descartes agrees that theatrical 
emotions “penetrate” less deeply into our souls than do those felt in life (see Descartes 
1991:283).  However, as he makes clear in a letter to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia of 6 
October 1645, he believes that the pleasure we derive from theatrical performances lies 
not in the secure knowledge of the ephemerality of our emotion, as it does for Dubos, but 
in the soul’s “impression that it is performing a virtuous action in having compassion for 






the theatrical presentation of a similar scene (240).  Dubos, simultaneously invoking the 
classical orthodoxy of Quintilian and Horace and the Cartesian physiology of emotion, 
states that “actors who truly impassion themselves” never fail to move their audiences, 
for “men who are themselves touched touch us without difficulty” (39-40).  For Dubos, 
“it is the agitation of an actor that causes us to take pleasure in listening to him speak” 
(44), and the very same physiological mechanism that affectively binds together human 
beings within the world of lived experience also connects them with one another in the 
theatre. 
Dubos, however, refutes the wide commonplace notion that emotional contagion 
in the theatre leads inevitably to delusion, and dismisses outright the idea that theatrical 
pleasure depends upon deceptive appearance.  Acting and spectacle never make us 
believe that “we really see the action and not an imitation” (429), for, “though it is true 
that all that we see at the theatre conspires to move us, nothing there deceives our senses, 
for everything there shows itself as imitation” (429-30).  Just as Dubos’s individual at 
large in society is directly moved by the passion of strangers without any knowledge of 
their situation, his spectator’s affective experience depends neither upon entering into the 
interpretive-imaginative matrix provided by narrative context or the other given 
circumstances of the theatre event.  Instead, Dubos’s spectator receives a direct, 





 Dubos’s convictions about direct impressibility also inform his discussions of 
artistic genius.93  For Dubos, the physiological capacity for artistic creation arises from 
the same source as the propensity to be moved by artworks – in other words, the artist’s 
capacity to conceive and execute “ideas and images capable of moving us” is the inverse 
side of a capacity for impressibility by such ideas and images (3-4), which itself depends 
upon “vivacity and delicacy of sentiment [la vivacité et la délicatesse de sentiment] (53).  
The power to infuse artworks with soul and motion as well as the facility to assimilate the 
technical devices of other artists are born from the same source as the propensity to be 
struck (frappé) by the excellence of others’ works (50). 
 Dubos also applies his doctrine of the proportional relationship between 
impressibility and expressivity to the production and reception of gesture.  Onstage as 
well as in society at large, “the same vivacity of spirit [esprit], the same fire in the 
imagination, that gives rise by a natural movement [mouvement naturel] to gestures 
animated, varied, expressive, and characterized also allows one to comprehend easily the 
meaning [signification] when one attends to the sense [sens] of others’ gestures” (285).  
For Dubos, the formal, semiotic, affective, and kinesthetic dimensions of gesture are 
inseparable.  Comprehension of gestural meaning is based not in interpretive “decoding” 
but in the impressibility of the receiver’s mind and body – an impressibility that is 
essentially linked to an embodied, expressive impulse. 
                                                        
93 For Dubos, genius is a naturally endowed physiological capacity, which consists “in a 
happy arrangement of the organs of the brain” and a “quality of blood which disposes it 
to effervesce [fermenter] during work [i.e., artistic creation], so as to supply an 
abundance of spirits to the mechanisms [ressorts] that serve the functions of the 




The dynamism of theatrical gesture – in addition to the passionate agitation that 
drives it – therefore supplies a key source of theatrical attraction.  Most of Dubos’s 
thoughts on gesture come in part three of the Réflexions, which is largely taken up with a 
speculative reconstruction of ancient Greek and Roman performance (which Dubos tends 
to conflate).  Dubos imagines a highly physical mode of classical performance in which 
the art of gesture was reduced to a science with its own system of notation, and which 
involved one actor reciting while the other enacted a gestural score.  For Dubos, the 
infectious corporeal dynamism of these mute performers explains the “disorders” and 
“tumults” provoked by the Roman pantomimes in the accounts of Tacitus (224).  
Extending the theme of pantomimic action’s potential to catalyze emotion among 
performers as well as to incite it in the audience, Dubos applauds a mute performance of 
a scene from Corneille’s Horatii, in which two performers “animated each other 
[s’animerent] so well by means of their reciprocal gestures and movements [démarches]” 
that they wept, with corresponding effects upon the audience (290).  The common 
etymological root of animer (“animate”) and âme (“soul”) in the Latin anima cannot be 
too much emphasized here: to “animate” something – or someone – is to infuse it with 
soul.  Under Dubos’s account, histrionic expressivity, itself driven by the motions of the 
soul, here provokes reciprocal movements in the soul of the acting partner as well as in 
the spectators. 
 Dubos’s passion theory lays the basis for the most well-known and historically 
influential idea put forward by the Réflexions: that aesthetic appraisal consists in direct, 




Dubos argues that we judge the artistic imitations of “touching objects” (objects 
touchans) by means of what we might today call an aesthetic sense:  
When it comes to knowing if the imitation that we are presented with in a poem or 
in the composition of a painting is capable of exciting compassion or of touching 
[attendrir] us, the sense designed for judging is the same sense that would have 
been touched [attendri] if we would have judged the imitated object [itself].  It is 
this sixth sense that lies within us, without our seeing its organs.  It is the part of 
ourselves that judges based on the impression that it feels [qui juge sur 
l’impression qu’elle ressent]. […]  It is, in sum, that which we generally call 
sentiment [sentiment].  The heart is agitated in itself and by a movement that 
precedes all deliberation [un mouvement qui precede toute deliberation] when the 
object presented is really a touching object [object touchant], whether this object 
has received its being from nature or whether it holds its existence as an imitation 
that art has made.  (326-27) 
 
For Dubos, a sense of artistic truthfulness comes upon an artwork’s beholder as a sudden 
“apprehension” (apprehension), which involves attending to the impact of artistic objects 
on one’s corporeal being by means of the sensitivity supplied by inner sentiment.  Dubos 
argues that reason (raison) should not intervene at all in the process of aesthetic 
apperception, unless retrospectively, to clarify the causes of our appreciation or antipathy.   
The Réflexions thus transform Malebranche’s sentiment intérieur into a mode of 
embodied cognition – one equally reliable when attuned to the affective responses 
produced by artworks or to those provoked by the contingencies of daily life. 
Theatre and performance theorist Erika Fischer-Lichte has argued that an 
“aesthetics of effect” governed seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinking about 
performance, only to recede when the “postulate of the autonomy of art” rose to 
precedence at the turn of nineteenth century.94  We might just as easily call the eighteenth 
century’s “aesthetics of effect” an affective aesthetics, for the excitation of passionate 
movements was regarded as the prime means by which the performing, visual, and 
                                                        




musical arts could transform the bodies and minds of their receivers.  Dubos’s Réflexions 
were a major force – perhaps the major force – in setting this affective and effective 
proto-aesthetics on its future course.  Although the overwhelming emphasis on emotion 
over interpretation in Dubos’s philosophy of art may leave the contemporary theorist of 
performance with grave reservations, the central principles of his aesthetics hold 
continued suggestiveness.  While regarding artworks as “imitations” of natural objects, 
Dubos suggests that their verisimilar significance is not what strikes us most powerfully.  
Rather, it is the enlivening aspect of aesthetic experience, the aspect that feels – not 
“looks” – like life, that draws us to engage again and again with performances and plastic 
works.  Applied to the art of the theatre, this view would suggest that the “truth” or 
“naturalness” of theatrical performance derives not from a conscious comparison of copy 
with original, but upon whether or not an actor’s onstage doings – and the affective 
currents that animate them – move through us, as audience members, in a way that feels 
truthful.  Under this view, aesthetic apprehension, even when it veers toward conscious 
assessment, cannot be disentangled from the kinesthetic and affective dimensions of 
spectatorship. 
 
Affective Efficacy and Mimetic Perfection: 
Acting in the Theatre of Sentiment 
 
I now shift focus away from philosophy and proto-aesthetics toward texts of acting 
theory proper, in which the aesthetically activated, affectively effective body of the 
performer takes center stage.  Acting theory as a modern conversation is born out of the 
spirit of rhetoric in mid-eighteenth century France.  Since the classical period, the 




the actor had been twinned in discussions of performance practice.  The arousal of the 
passions is one of the great themes of classical rhetorical theory.  During the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries, Quintilian’s precept that “the prime essential for stirring 
the emotions of others is […] first to feel those emotions oneself” (Quintilian 1920:432-
33), bolstered by Horace’s famous credo from the Ars Poetica, “If you would have me 
weep, you yourself must first feel grief” [Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi], 
acquired the force of orthodoxy for Scholastic rhetoricians and their successors.  
However, Quintilian, the main source of pragmatic performance advice for early modern 
theorists of declamation, offered no explanatory mechanism for the propagation of 
passion between speaker and listener; the direct and instantaneous transfer of affect from 
orator to auditor simply remained a foundational assumption of rhetorical theory.  During 
the seventeenth century, this consensus position on the inevitability of affective transfer 
was first rearticulated within a post-Thomistic psycho-physiology of passion.  Under the 
resulting view, the interior movements of genuine passion agitating a speaker’s soul and 
body would naturally propagate across the materially suffused space between pulpit, bar, 
or stage and audience, inciting the very same motions in the bodies and souls of those 
listening.  Thus arose what Joseph Roach has called “the rhetoric of the passions” (Roach 
1993:26), a theory of performative persuasion that valorized above all the speaker’s 
ability to deploy the emotionally driven resources of actio (vocal and physical 
expressivity) in fulfilling the rhetorical objective of movere: to move the auditor in mind, 
body, and soul.  In short, mechanistic thought endowed the orator with the power to act 




Between the middle of the seventeenth century and the end of the eighteenth 
century, French treatises on the subject of preacherly eloquence proliferated.95  The 
theory of psychic movement seems have been transmitted to the discussion of secular 
declamatory practice in the Huguenot minister Michel le Faucheur’s influential Traitté de 
l’action de l’orateur, ou de la prononciation et du geste (1657).96  Le Faucheur wrote the 
posthumously published Traitté in the 1630s, while Descartes was still articulating his 
system of natural philosophy in L’Homme and Le Monde (published posthumously in 
1662 and 1664) and before the impact of Descartes’s major publications of the late 1630s 
and early 1640s.  Though the Traitté still relies upon an Aristotelian-Thomist definition 
of passion as a movement of the soul’s sensitive appetite, Le Faucheur’s elevation of 
vocal and physical expressivity to prime place among the orator’s resources clearly draws 
force from the early seventeenth-century’s building current of mechanistic thought. 
Le Faucheur notes that rhetoricians have traditionally placed invention, 
arrangement, and elocution as the first three parts of oratory, but that “because the 
sensitive appetite [of the soul] and the affections have a wondrous power over the 
understanding and over the will, and because these said affections are moved by things 
present, which strike our senses” (Le Faucheur 1657:2-3).  Action, “which consists in 
                                                        
95 These include René Bary’s Nouveau Journal de conversations sur toutes les actions 
des prédicateurs (1675) and Méthode pour bien prononcer un discours et pour le bien 
animer (1679), Bernard Lamy’s L’art de parler (1675), Antoine Arnauld’s Réflexions sur 
l’eloquence des prédicateurs (1694 or 1695), the anonymous Règles de la bonne et solide 
predication (1701), Dinouart’s L’Éloquence du corps, ou l’action du prédicateur (1751), 
and Trublet’s Panégyriques des saints, suivis de Réflexions sur l’éloquence en général et 
sur celle de la chaire en particulier (1764). 
96 Le Faucheur’s treatise exerted a powerful and lasting influence on French rhetorical 
theory.  It would exert an indirect influence on English acting theory after being 
plagiarized by Charles Gildon, author of The Life of Mr. Thomas Betterton, The late 




Pronunciation and in Gesture,” outweighs the orator’s other resources when it comes to 
the performative dimension of persuasion: “when it comes to speaking in public, and of 
effectively touching the souls of those who listen to him, they [the orator’s words] remain 
as if dead and without effect if [action] does not vivify them, and if it does not give to the 
discourse its final attraction” (3).  The vocal-and-physical action of Le Faucheur’s orator 
strikes the senses of his listener-spectators, vivifying their bodies and touching their souls 
with persuasive force. 
 According to Le Faucheur, the orator’s voice must communicate “the diversity of 
movements that we feel inside us [en nostre intérieur], in order to excite [exciter] the 
same [movements] in those who listen to us” (90).  This excitation is not to be achieved 
through artificial modulation of the voice, but through imaginative engagement with the 
fortunate and unfortunate happenstances of human life, the good and evil deeds of men.  
Le Faucheur advises the orator to “meditate” on these events and deeds and “impress” 
(imprimez) them in his imagination until they are “engraved” (gravée) in his soul, “in 
order to be most vividly touched” (touché) by their content.”  Thus moved (émeu), the 
orator will be able to “persuade the judges, and to cause to pass through their souls the 
same passions that he feels in his own” (111-12).  When truly moved, the orator’s voice 
will naturally and necessarily express the passion he feels: “Being so touched he will 
make appear easily the interior motion of his soul [l’émotion intérieur de son ame] [sic] 
through his Pronunciation, accommodating himself to each of these passions” (113).  




common with Quintilian’s theory of visiones in the Institutio Oratoria,97 his vocabulary 
of émotion is unmistakably moored in the mid-seventeenth century. 
 The post-Scholastic rhetoric of the passions moves into the early eighteenth 
century with Jean-Léonor Le Gallois Grimarest’s Traité du récitatif: dans la lecture, dans 
l’action publique, dans la declamation et dans le chant (1708) and the actor Jean 
Poisson’s already discussed Réflexions sur l’art de parler en public (1717).  Grimarest’s 
Traité is the first work in French to include an extended discussion of acting in 
connection with the various genres of public speaking.  According to Grimarest, the 
actor’s two necessary attributes are esprit (“intellect”), necessary to put across the 
meaning of a dramatic text and to appreciate the author’s poetic devices, and sentiment, 
the capacity for passion, seated in the entrails (entrailles), necessary to communicate the 
passionate movements (mouvements) Grimarest regards as embedded in the dramatic text 
(Grimarest 1708:190-91).  As we shall see, the tension between esprit and sentiment 
becomes a dominant theme within eighteenth-century acting theory.   Although some 
commentators have argued for a Cartesian influence on the Traité du récitatif, there is no 
evidence for this claim: Grimarest seems instead to be working with a loose terminology 
of passion-as-movement and a taxonomical approach available to anyone vaguely 
familiar with Scholastic thought. 
Though European acting theory in its modern form emerges gradually from 
oratorical theory in the texts discussed above, as an ongoing conversation among 
practitioners and theorists with a shared set of interests it is inaugurated by Luigi 
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Riccoboni’s short treatise, Pensées sur la Déclamation (1738).98  If Diderot’s Paradoxe 
sur le comédian (written c. 1773, published 1830) would transform acting theory’s 
possible concerns and positions for the nineteenth century, as Joseph Roach has argued,99 
Riccoboni’s Pensées supplied a proto-paradigm – or, at least, the initial cluster of 
provisional proposals necessary to launch a theoretical conversation.  Contemporary 
scholarship, however, has tended to pass over Riccoboni as little more than the first 
“emotionalist” theorist of acting, later refuted by his “anti-emotionalist” son Antoine-
François Riccoboni in the latter’s L’Art du théâtre (1750).  In fact, Riccoboni’s 
contribution was far more complex: using the oratorical theorists of antiquity as his 
primary interlocutors, Riccoboni brought the precepts of classical rhetoric into 
combination with a post-Scholastic understanding of the passions in discussing a 
specifically theatrical collection of concerns.  More crucially, Riccoboni articulated what 
is perhaps eighteenth-century acting theory’s most extreme position on truthfulness of 
emotionality and total spontaneity of expression – a highly provocative stance that invited 
extension, qualification, and dissent from subsequent theorists. 
Though Riccoboni strikes a pose of extreme deference to classical authority, 
invoking Cicero and Quintilian as the “great Masters of antiquity,” (Riccoboni 1738:4), 
the Pensées actually present an idiosyncratic post-Scholastic understanding of 
imagination, emotion, and physicality.  For Riccoboni, the main objective of both the 
actor and orator is to “animate himself” (s’animer) in order to “declaim with the tones of 
the soul” (les tons de l’ame) (17).  However, this aim runs up against a major obstacle: 
                                                        
98 Riccoboni headed the eighteenth-century Comédie Italienne, the troupe invited by 
Philippe, duke of Orleans and regent to Louis XV, to relocate from Venice to Paris in 
1716. 




the imprisonment of the soul within corporeal matter.100  Riccoboni’s technical solution 
to this dilemma is to “liberate our mind [esprit] from the slavery of our senses” (13) 
through immersion in what Riccoboni terms a state of enthousiasme: 
The enthusiasm of Poets and the profound reflections of Sages in the moment of 
composing are nothing other than the effect of a great gathering of their mind 
[esprit], which examines the source of their interior sentiments and their passions 
of the soul [des sentimens interieurs & des passions de l’ame]; this is when they 
survey within themselves choler, compassion, vengeance, tenderness, and the rest 
of the passions […].  (13) 
 
The rhetorician or actor, Riccoboni argues, must develop a similar capacity for 
imaginative withdrawal: in his view, the greatest orators begin each speech with a 
moment of recüeillement (“contemplation,” “meditation”), briefly closing their eyes in 
order to immerse themselves within imaginative reveries.  This preparatory moment 
allows their entrance into the state of enthousiasme necessary “to animate themselves 
[s’animer], that is to say, to speak or to write following the sentiments of their soul 
entirely pure and detached, so to say, from matter” (16-17).  As in Dubos, to “animate 
oneself” here means to infuse one’s expression with soulful feeling. 
 When the soul drives the performer’s doings, voice, gesture, and facial expression 
manifest themselves spontaneously, without the need for conscious direction: 
He who will enter deeply into the necessary enthusiasm, and who will declaim in 
the tones of the soul, will bring it about that his face responds and accompanies 
the expressions of his speech with changes of color that the blood lends to him 
and with a range of movements that the muscles supply to him.  (23) 
 
Riccoboni’s language lacks the physiological precision of a Cartesian physicist – there is 
no talk of the movement of animal spirits, for example – but some mechanistic influence 
on his doctrine of actorly spontaneism seems more than likely.  Riccoboni goes so far as 
                                                        




to assert that “even thought is forbidden” within the declaimer’s state of total, 
enthusiastic spontaneity, which approaches automatism: “What can we conclude, except 
that this Art that enchains (so to say) all our senses is an Art almost divine: that our soul 
is its only Artisan, and that our limbs and organs are only its Ministers” (28-9).  
Riccoboni, then, re-articulates the classical notion of enthusiasmos, the divinely inspired 
state of ecstatic self-abandonment, within an eighteenth-century theoretical framework.  
In the process, he posits the first modern acting theory centered on the principle of an 
ideal state of the performer’s body and mind.  
In the wake of Riccoboni’s Pensées came the second canonical text of eighteenth-
century acting theory in France, and the first to treat the actor’s art as distinct from 
oratorical practice: Pierre Rémond de Sainte-Albine’s Le Comédian.  The treatise met 
with immediate success (including approval from the celebrated actress Dumesnil) upon 
its appearance in 1747, and a second edition was issued in 1749.  Sainte-Albine, a 
sometime dramatist, contributor to the Gazette de France, and editor-in-chief of the 
Mercure de France, is best known to posterity through his brief appearance in Diderot’s 
Paradoxe sur le comédien.  Diderot dismisses him as the “middling man of letters” who 
sparked a debate over the authenticity of actorly emotion by wading out of his depth into 
unfamiliar theoretical waters.101  However, Sainte-Albine’s contribution deserves 
reappraisal: influenced by the proto-aesthetics of Dubos and the sensationisme of 
Condillac, Le Comédien moves acting theory beyond the declamatory paradigm and 
                                                        




harmonizes it with the developing eighteenth-century discourse of corporeal 
sentimentalism.102 
 For Sainte-Albine, the actor holds a twofold responsibility: to deceive (tromper) 
the minds and to move (émouvoir) the hearts of audience members.  For Sainte-Albine, 
the actor’s art of impassioning himself (se passioner) demands “the gift of bending his 
soul to contrary impressions [impressions contraires]” in order to generate contrasting 
passions in the sequence required by the dramatist.  Sainte-Albine declares the “necessity 
of sentiment” in the actor and forwards the classical principle that “on the stage one only 
expresses a passion imperfectly if one does not feel it effectively” (Sainte-Albine 
1971:33-39).  Effective feeling necessitates that actors “abandon themselves to the 
movements [s’abandonner aux mouvemens] that their [fictional] situations require” (99).  
The actor’s self-surrender to impassioned movement catalyzes a reciprocal, irresistible, 
and unreflective process in the spectator: at a tragic performance, writes Sainte-Albine, 
“we abandon ourselves to the movements which the actor excites [On s’abandonne aux 
mouvemens que le Comédien excite]” (30). 
 Sainte-Albine defines sentiment, in actors, as the “facility of having the diverse 
passions to which man is susceptible succeed [one other] within their souls” (32).  For 
Sainte-Albine, sentiment is the most crucial attribute in the actor’s makeup, one for which 
intellect or study cannot compensate.  He endows sentiment with a physiological basis, 
stating that the capacity is “generally designated under the name of Entrails 
                                                        
102 Sainte-Albine references both Dubos and Condillac, though only in connection with 
the question of whether the actor ought to recite in keeping with a harmonically precise 
score.  See Sainte-Albine 1971: 158-59.  Condillac’s Essai sur l’origine des 
connaissances humaines (1746) was published one year prior to Le Comédien’s 




[Entrailles].”103 Moved by passion, Sainte-Albine’s actor employs “agitation of the 
expression” to broadcast sentiment throughout the audience.  Actors who possess 
sentiment are “Sovereigns, who rule in total mastery over our souls”; they are 
“enchanters, who know how to lend sensibility [sensibilité] to the most insensible beings” 
(49).  In other words, such performers are capable of activating within others, at least 
momentarily, a physiological capacity for heightened affective experience similar to their 
own. 
 Though an argument for the necessity of genuine histrionic emotion occupies a 
central place in Le Comédien, Sainte-Albine also supplies a complementary theory of 
theatrical representation that assaults Plato’s longstanding ontological argument against 
poetic performance.  Sainte-Albine argues that painting brings before our eyes “only 
simple appearances” and “phantoms [phantômes] instead of real objects,” while theatrical 
playing lends “speech and action” to “the beings it births. […]  Painting can only 
represent events,” Sainte-Albine states; “The Actor, in a way, reproduces them” (14-15).  
Phantôme, or, more usually, fantôme, was the standard French translation of the period 
for the Greek phantasma, which designates an unreal or illusory appearance within 
Plato’s ontological hierarchy.  Sainte-Albine directly refutes the account of imagistic 
mimesis provided in Republic X by arguing that dramatic poets are not in fact the 
paradigmatic producers of unreal objects, but rather the reproductive engenderers of 
                                                        
103 Saint-Albine 1971:91.  Throughout the eighteenth century, entrailles could signify, 
literally, the organs of the abdomen and thorax as well as, figuratively, a capacity for 
affection (affection), or a “very tender and sensible heart” [un coeur très-tendre & très-
sensible] (Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, 4th Edition, [Paris, 1762]). Accessed 
through ARTFL-FRANTEXT, Department of Romance Languages and Literatures, 





actual beings.  Furthermore, the theatre is the most potent of all imitative arts, because the 
live presence of the actor “requires of us no [imaginative] supplement” (15).  Dramatists 
and actors are indeed imitators of the highest order within Sainte-Albine’s aesthetic 
framework, but this assessment comes as commendation rather than criticism.  Saint-
Albine celebrates the theatre’s imitative reality. 
 Continuing in an anti-Platonic vein, Saint-Albine presents the totality of theatrical 
illusion as something to be celebrated and pursued rather than rejected.  Prefacing himself 
by reminding his reader that theatrical “Spectacle draws all of its charms from imitation,” 
Sainte-Albine exhorts actors aspire to make their “Representation” a “total truth,” for “it 
is not sufficient that its fictions appear to us to resemble the events of which they are the 
image, […] we want to be able to persuade ourselves that the events themselves, and the 
principal actors in these events, are present to our eyes” (195).  At first, Sainte-Albine 
seems to champion a verisimilar ideal when he defines theatrical “Truth” as “the 
concurrence of appearances, which can serve to deceive [tromper] the Spectators” (135).  
However, it soon becomes clear that, for Sainte-Albine, the “truth of Representation” 
depends entirely upon the actors’ emotional engagement. 
In order to present a true “image” of the character with which he has been 
charged, Sainte-Albine’s actor must “faithfully paint” the passion appropriate to the 
character “of whom he undertakes to be the copy [être la copie]” (137).  Sainte-Albine 
warns that “when one does not feel [éprouver] the movements that one intends to make 
appear, one presents to us only an imperfect image of them, and art can never substitute 
for Sentiment.  As soon as an Actor lacks this quality […] He is as far from his character 




are inextricably entangled: from the audience’s perspective, actors “create illusion” by 
making us feel “those movements that must agitate [agiter] us” (36).  Sainte-Albine’s 
ideals of total illusion and mimetic perfection depend less on verisimilitude than on the 
affective efficacy of the performer.  The actor’s true feeling automatically and inevitably 
gives rise to mimetic precision, equated with total deception.104 
How is the actor’s self-impassioning to be achieved?  Through an act of self-
delusion, Sainte-Albine proposes, analogous to the actor’s deceiving of the audience: 
Do Tragic Actors want us to partake in illusion?  They must partake in it 
themselves.  They must imagine themselves to be, so that they effectively are 
what they represent and a happy delirium [heureux délire] persuades them that 
they are those who are betrayed, persecuted.  This mistaking [erreur] must pass 
through their minds and their hearts, and on several occasions a feigned 
misfortune must extract from them true tears.  (91-2) 
 
Once the “happy delirium” has been achieved and the actor is “inflamed” (irrité) and 
“touched” (attendri) by the impressions (impressions) made upon him by the imaginative 
situation of the character, passion “will paint itself without effort in [the actor’s] eyes,” 
manifesting itself without conscious control.  The actor who attempts to simulate 
passionate experience through calculated means, however, will immediately betray “the 
forced state of [his] interior” and “will sooner resemble an invalid wracked by some 
strange fever than a man agitated [agité] by an ordinary passion” (149).  The paradox of 
Sainte-Albine’s actor, then, is that in order to present a perfect mimetic image – to “be 
the copy” of the character he is charged with embodying – he must forswear the 
conscious, artful construction of stage-images.  Instead, like Luigi Riccoboni’s 
                                                        
104 As Marian Hobson has noted, for Sainte-Albine and other theatrical theorists of his 
time the term illusion did not always categorize an ontological state but rather could 
designate a “mode of communication” between “actor’s and audience’s activity at a 
play,” enabled by the “transmission of states of soul from identifying actor to identifying 




enthousiaste, he must enter into an ideal state of impassioned immersion in the situation 
of his character.  The resultant embodied feeling will produce theatrical truth with an 
irresistible mimetic necessity. 
A rebuttal of Sainte-Albine’s position would come just three years later.  L’Art du 
théâtre, à Madame *** (1750) by Antoine-François Riccoboni, actor at Paris’ Théâtre-
Italien and son of Luigi Riccoboni, voiced a dissenting view on histrionic emotion, 
though one articulated within the same psycho-physiological framework employed by 
Sainte-Albine.  Riccoboni fils defines sentimens as “the movements that are born in the 
soul with the greatest suddenness, without the assistance of reflection, and which from 
the first instant dispose us almost despite ourselves” (Riccoboni 1750:45).105  At first, 
Riccoboni tentatively counters his father’s doctrine of enthousiasme by positing 
intelligence – rather than the capacity for genuine emotion or imaginative immersion – as 
“the highest talent in the Theatre” (31).  The actor’s main objective is still to move the 
audience, to generate a “perfect illusion” that will “carry away” (entraine) the spectators 
“in spite of themselves” by properly representing the “movements of nature” [mouvemens 
de la nature] (41).  However, Riccoboni presents a radical and provocative account of 
how this feat is to be accomplished without the actor’s genuine feeling: 
We call expression the skill by which one makes the Spectator feel all the 
movements by which one wishes to appear penetrated [penetré].  I say that one 
wishes to appear so, and not that one is truly penetrated. […] When an Actor 
renders with the necessary force the sentiments of his role, the Spectator sees in 
him the most perfect image of truth. […] Amazed by so perfect an imitation of 
truth, some have taken it for truth itself, and have believed the Actor affected by 
the sentiment that he represented.  (36) 
 
                                                        
105 Riccoboni rehearses the Platonic and Scholastic distinction between concupiscible and 
irascible passions when he states that all sentiments arise out of two primary ones: love 




Riccoboni refutes the longstanding idea, going back to Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria 
and upheld in his father’s Pensées as well as Sainte-Albine’s Le Comédian, that the only 
route toward truth in performance is the true experience of passion, and the only route 
toward the experience of passion is immersion within imaginative circumstances.  
Invoking the language of imitation, Riccoboni brings his argument that the actor must 
present “the most perfect image of truth” into line with the aesthetic orthodoxy of his age.  
However, as was the case under the declamatory paradigm (and within Sainte-Albine’s 
Le Comédian), the imitative illusionism of Riccoboni’s actor is functional or instrumental 
– that is, aimed toward provoking affect in the audience.  It is not an aesthetic end in and 
of itself. 
 Although Riccoboni states that genuine immersion in the emotions of the 
character will disrupt the actor’s control of his body and voice, he does not argue the 
position, oft attributed to him, that the actor is entirely affectless while dispatching his 
role.  He instead asserts that the genuinely felt emotions of the actor are not those of the 
character but his own: 
I do not say that in playing these pieces of great passion the Actor does not feel an 
extremely lively emotion [une émotion très-vive]  […]. But this agitation 
[agitation] comes of the efforts that one is obliged to make in order to paint a 
passion that one does not feel, which gives the blood an extraordinary movement, 
by which the Actor himself can be deceived [trompé] if he has not examined with 
attention the true cause from whence it originates.  (41) 
 
The above passage contains a breakthrough notion in the intellectual conversation that is 
modern acting theory.  For the first time, a theorist of acting proposes that the 
performer’s emotional states arise primarily from the set of histrionic tasks that he must 
execute within the actual theatrical situation, not from imaginative immersion in the 




appropriate to the dramatic action.  The actor’s misattribution of the arousal he feels 
represents a new, heretofore untheorized form of theatrical delusion.106 
Riccoboni’s position that emotions sparked by the act of performing are entirely 
distinguishable in both theory and practice from the subjunctive emotions inspired by 
fictional circumstance is an extreme one, and we need not subscribe to this extremity in 
order to appreciate the basic insight.  We should also keep in mind the bodily dimension 
of the histrionic effort Riccoboni describes.  Every theatrical genre has its own modes of 
corporeal dynamism, through which performers seize hold of the attention of spectators 
by means of their physical expressivity.  Acting in eighteenth-century France and 
England was marked by a dialectical tension between a mode of “formal, oratoric acting” 
employing a style of vocal delivery and gesture that was conventional, stylized, and 
consciously composed and a more spontaneous, “natural,” and kinetically active style 
ushered in by the likes of Garrick, Lekain, and, later, Siddons.107  Whether capturing 
interest by means of the sweeping arcs and codified hand movements of declamatory 
delivery or by the violent gestures and sudden suspensions that made Garrick a sensation, 
there is no question that eighteenth-century acting was more expressively “dilated”108 
than the various theatres of twentieth- and twenty-first-century naturalism.  The histrionic 
exertion that agitated the blood of the actor of Riccoboni’s day would therefore have 
                                                        
106 Riccoboni fils’ insight that an actor’s emotional arousal can arise from histrionic effort 
anticipates the conceptual nuance of William Archer’s distinction, made over a century 
later, between “mimetic emotion” and “personal emotion” (Archer 1888:131).  It also 
foreshadows Elly Konijn’s recent Acting Emotions: Shaping Emotions Onstage (2000), 
which argues that the centrality of “task-emotions” – “the emotions actors experience as a 
result of performing their acting tasks in front of a critical audience, or with the demands 
arising from the theatre situation” – has been seriously neglected both by historical acting 
theories as well as contemporary scholarship (see Konijn 2000:17). 
107 See Duerr 1962:179. 




derived from at least two sources: first, the physical effort required to throw the body into 
movement, to arrest its gestural action,109 and to project the voice; and, second, the basic 
excitation of the body and mind that arises from the psychic pressures of the theatrical 
situation – what we might call, quite simply, and invoking the phrase’s popular 
connotations, “performance energy.”  The sweeping gestures of acting in the oratorical 
mode, the statuesque poses of tragic declamation, and the play between kinesis and stasis 
that developed as acting become more physically dynamic over the course of the century 
would have all held their own aesthetic efficacy – that is, their own way of striking the 
senses and engaging the attention of audiences.  The infectious muscularity of histrionic 
gestures, animated by performance energy, surely drove many of the phenomena of 
passionate contagion described by eighteenth-century theatrical theorists. 
 
Beyond the Impassioned Body: Diderot’s Modèle Idéal 
 
 
As had already been stated, Sainte-Albine’s Le Comédien represents the mechanistically 
impassioned body’s site of deepest impact upon the theory of the theatrical performer.  
The latter half of the eighteenth century brought a transition away from mechanistic 
thinking toward the theory of sensibility in scientific and aesthetic thought, with the 
physiological model of homme machine gradually giving way to that of homme 
sensible.110  Joseph Roach has demonstrated how late eighteenth-century acting theory 
                                                        
109 The potential energy of a suspended gesture carries an inherent suspense for the 
spectator.  For an analysis of the interplay between dynamic movement, “starts,” and held 
attitudes in Garrick’s personal performance style, see Todd Andrew Borlik, “ ‘Painting of 
a Sorrow’: Visual Culture and the Performance of Stasis in David Garrick’s Hamlet,” 
Shakespeare Bulletin 25.1 (2007): 3-29. 
110 See Sergio Moravia, “From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible: Changing 




absorbs the “doctrine of sensibility” as a new principle of vitality derived from the 
internal organization of the human nervous system.111  The “shift from mechanism to 
sensibility” (Roach 1996:96) was a gradual development rather than a sudden rupture: the 
concept of sensibility is indisputably post-Cartesian, in the sense that its emergence 
would have been inconceivable without the mechanistic model of the body that preceded 
it.  Both mechanism and sensibility place the sensitized human body within a field of 
affecting stimuli, and the emotional volatility of the homme sensible shows considerable 
continuity with the Cartesian subject’s propensity for internal excitation by external 
objects acting upon the senses.  However, sensibility emphasizes the sympathetic 
capacity of the body’s nervous system, which extends itself out toward other human 
subjects, rather than the forceful interaction of corporeal and extra-corporeal matter.  
Despite this distinction, French aestheticians often used the term sentiment, which holds a 
prime place in Scholastic as well as mechanistic psycho-physiologies, interchangeably 
with the newly endowed sensibilité during the latter half of the eighteenth century.  The 
Encyclopédiste Louis de Jaucourt’s definition of sensibilité as the “delicate and tender 
disposition of the soul that makes it easily moved, touched” (Jaucourt 2004), for example, 
still owes much to the long-prevailing understanding of affective and sensory experience 
as belonging the soul’s sensitive faculty.112 
                                                        
(1978): 45-60. 
111 See Roach 1996:94-98. 
112 Henri Fouquet’s Encycopédie article on “Sentiment, Sensibilité (Médecine)” speaks to 
the considerable overlap between these two terms.  Fouquet defines sensibilité as the 
living body’s capacity “to perceive the impressions of external objects, and, 
consequently, to produce movements in proportion to the degree of intensity of these 
perceptions” (Fouquet ARTFL).  Diderot’s definition of affection as the “lively sentiment 




The doctrine of sensibility’s enduring connection to earlier psycho-physiological 
frameworks can be traced in the two texts that directly provoked Diderot’s refutation of 
emotionalism in his Paradoxe: the practicing doctor and sometime theatrical theorist 
John Hill’s The Actor (written 1750, revised 1755) and the actor Antonio Fabio Sticotti’s 
Garrick, ou les acteurs anglois (1769).  Joseph Roach has shown how Hill’s The Actor, a 
translation and vigorous remaking of Sainte-Albine’s Le Comédian, is the main impact-
point for sensibility’s physiological discourse upon theatrical theory.113  Sainte-Albine’s 
affective keyword is sentiment, designating both an inner sensation and the general 
capacity for affective experience, and the term sensibilité crops up only occasionally in 
Le Comédian; in Hill’s The Actor, however, “sensibility” becomes the standard term for 
the affective capacity. 
Hill defines sensibility very simply as “the disposition to receive those 
impressions by which our own passions are affected” (Hill 1755:49).  Unlike Sainte-
Albine, Hill stresses over and over again the dangers of indulging in excessive passion, of 
being drawn into “the Charybdis of extravagant emotion” (80).  He even goes so far as to 
invert Sainte-Albine’s implicit hierarchy, elevating “understanding” or “judgment” over 
sensibility to the highest rank within the actor’s set of natural gifts.  Sharing with the 
physicians and novelists of his time a concern with the dangers of excessive sensibility, 
Hill has assigned the actor a twofold task: to stir up the sensible impression of passions in 
his audience but also to manage strictly the manifestation of passion within himself.  At 
                                                        
beings and dependent upon “the mechanism of the body” (Diderot ARTFL) points back 
to Scholastic and mechanistic vocabularies of emotion. 
113 Roach has suggested that Hill’s medical background led him to assimilate principles 





times, however, the emotionalist enthusiasm of Sainte-Albine remains vestigially present 
in The Actor (especially in those places where direct translation of Le Comédian is 
preserved), and the treatise veers schizophrenically between the unqualified celebration 
of passion in the French original and Hill’s own, more temperate stance. 
Conspicuously lacking from Hill’s treatise are any remnants of Scholastic or 
Cartesian psycho-physiology: there is no talk of actor or spectator “abandoning” himself 
to mouvemens intérieurs, and whenever Hill uses the word “soul,” he does so 
metonymically, to refer to the capacity for affect (and, occasionally, for noble thoughts 
and feelings).  Nowhere in The Actor is the soul an entity with a motive function; 
nowhere is the precise nature of its relation to the body ever specified.  The treatise as a 
whole seems to be informed by a particularly English version of the doctrine of 
sensibility, arising from the medical tradition founded by the doctor and anatomist 
Thomas Willis, which increasingly defined affective and sensory experience in terms of 
the operations of the brain and nerves (as opposed to perturbations in the psychic 
substance).114 
As is now well known to scholarship, Antonio Fabio Sticotti’s Garrick, ou les 
acteurs anglois (1769), a free translation of John Hill’s The Actor into French, was the 
text that drew Diderot’s attention and prompted a commentary in Grimm’s 
Correspondance littéraire.  This commentary, after revision and development during the 
1770s, was to be published posthumously in 1830 as the Paradoxe sur le comédian.  
Sticotti, who was a member of the Comédiens du Roi de la Troupe Italienne and a 
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popular figure in elevated social circles, clearly viewed himself as intervening in two 
ongoing intellectual conversations: first, the theoretical elucidation of the principles of 
the actor’s art, and, second, the d’Alembert-Rousseau-Diderot debate over the 
establishment of a theatre in Geneva.  Sticotti cites Luigi Riccoboni’s Réflexions on the 
first subject and aligns himself with Diderot’s position in the latter controversy.115   
In Garrick, Sticotti preserves Hill’s elevation of judgment – translated as 
intelligence – over feeling, but undoes his standardization of the term “sensibility” by 
using sentiment and sensibilité interchangeably throughout Garrick.  He also sporadically 
re-introduces the familiar vocabulary of passion that marked earlier treatises on 
declamation.  For example, he argues that the best actors will not find it difficult “to 
capture our imagination, to take hold of our soul, to move it [l’émouvoir] according to his 
will, to agitate it [l’agiter], to carry it into transports of joy, to afflict it and to pierce it to 
the quick” (Sticotti 1769:7).  A long-established understanding of soul-body 
interactionism also resurfaces in Sticotti’s phrase “organs of the soul” (organes de l’âme) 
(36), which he uses to describe the bodily basis of the affective capacity.  As a result, 
when Diderot gave Sticotti’s treatise a cursory reading, it would have seemed much more 
a rehashing of established orthodoxies than a more faithful translation of Hill would have 
done. 
The radical impact of the Paradoxe sur le comédian on modern acting theory’s 
development has been exhaustively treated by scholarship.116  With iconoclastic 
                                                        
115 See Sticotti 1769:83, 3-4. 
116 For recent scholarly treatments of the Paradoxe, see Roach 1996: 116-59, Worthen 
1984: 88-93; see also Graham Ley, From Mimesis to Interculturalism: Readings of 





jubilance, Diderot’s dialogue overturns the orthodoxy that the actor must possess 
heightened sensibilité – nervous susceptibility to emotional excitation – in order to move 
his audience.  Diderot argues the very opposite: that sensibilité incapacitates the actor, 
robbing him of his ability to deliver a controlled and composed performance.  Diderot’s 
consummate performer is an unmoved mover, capable of provoking waves of affective 
response in his audience while remaining unshaken by the perturbations of passion. 
The above is the Paradoxe’s primary argument.  However, in dismissing the 
consensus view on the actor’s genuine feeling, Diderot also dissolves the affective basis 
of preceding theories of theatrical imitation.  He must therefore redefine the nature of the 
actor’s mimesis and does so with his notion of the modèle idéal (“ideal model”): a fully 
rendered conception of the role fabricated in the actor’s imagination in advance of its 
embodied actualization.  The actor of genius develops his individual performance through 
“constant imitation” of this modèle idéal, so that when he arrives onstage, “faithfully 
copying of himself and the effects he has arrived at” during his period of study (Diderot 
1957:15), he can turn out a performance with unfailing mimetic perfection. The Paradoxe 
seizes upon the actress Clairon as exemplifying this technique of “pure imitation” or 
“sublime aping” [singerie sublime ] (Diderot 1959:312) and describes her pursuit of 
fidelity to her imaginative model: 
When by force of work she has approached this idea the nearest that she can, all is 
finished; to hold firmly to it is purely a matter of exercise and memory.  If you 
were to assist at her studies [of the part], how many times you would say to her: 
you have it! [vous y êtes!] … How many times she would answer you: you are 
deceived! [vous vous trompez!]  (308) 
 
Diderot’s Clairon does not, like Riccoboni’s enthousiaste or Sainte-Albine’s comédian, 




relation to the modèle idéal.  Like Plato’s carpenter in Republic X, her eyes are fixed on 
an ideal form; she detaches her attention from her material surroundings.  At one 
moment, Diderot seems to argue that the great actor or actress “has learnt before a mirror 
every particle of his despair” (Diderot 1957:19); at another, the ideal performer is himself 
likened to a mirror: “He will be invariable; a looking-glass, as it were, ready to reflect 
realities, and to reflect them ever with the same precision, the same strength, and the 
same truth” (Diderot 1957:15). 
         Diderot’s Paradoxe is an outburst of ideas, full of “subsidiary paradoxes” (Roach 
1996:148) and bursting with internal contradictions.  As outlined above, the theory of the 
modèle idéal seems to deprives the spectator of his privilege of instantaneous aesthetic 
assessment by means of interior sentiment: the ideal model, which exists within the 
actress’ imagination, is inaccessible to him, and he can offer only naively enthusiastic 
guesses – dismissed by Clairon – about the mimetic rightness of the actress’s work.  Late 
in the Paradoxe, however, Diderot does seem to provide the spectator with access to 
some version of the modèle idéal that informs the actor’s performance – or, at least, a 
mode of aesthetic judgment shaped by the magnitude and ideality of this imaginative 
construct.  Granting himself the right to speak for self-possessed performers everywhere 
in the first-person plural, Diderot asks: 
What therefore is the true talent?  That of knowing well the exterior symptoms 
[symptôms extérieurs] of the soul we borrow, of addressing ourselves to the 
sensation [sensation] of those who listen to us and see us, and of deceiving 
[tromper] them through the imitation of these symptoms, through an imitation that 
magnifies everything in their heads and which becomes the criterion [règle] of 
their judgment; for it is otherwise impossible to appreciate that which passes 





Symptôms extérieurs have replaced mouvemens intérieurs as the defining feature of the 
actor’s art, and a phantasmic construct has entered the interrelational dynamics of 
theatrical performance: the imitation “in the heads” of the spectators, which mediates 
their appraisal of “what passes within” the actor.  The primary axis of theatrical relation, 
which once connected actor and spectator through the motive force of shared passion, has 
been split in two; there now exists a triangular relation between actor, spectator, and 
modèle idéal.  The actor’s performing and the spectator’s apprehending are now imbued 
with ideality, rather than fueled by the embodied experience of affect. 
The Paradoxe thus re-conceives the ontology of theatrical performance by 
specifying how the art of acting might be properly described as the imitation of (an 
imaginatively idealized) nature.  Diderot’s chief concern, however, is conceptual 
completeness, not phenomenological precision.  Posited as a technical device employed 
by actors, the modèle idéal is, in fact, a theoretical construct, developed at a philosophical 
remove from the actuality of performance practice and forcefully imported into the 
actor’s consciousness.  As Graham Ley has noted, Diderot developed the modèle idéal 
concept extensively – though not unproblematically – in the art criticism of his Salons 
during the 1760s and 1770s.117  Diderot provides his most explicit formulation of the 
concept in the opening address to Grimm (his editor Friedrich Melchior) preceding his 
review of the Salon of 1767.  In these passages, saturated with Platonism, Diderot 
expresses the opinion that only mediocre artists imitate the beautiful forms of nature.  
Painters of genius, on the other hand, take as their “primary model” the “true ideal model 
                                                        




of beauty” (Diderot 1995:13), following the “true line in their imagination” (14) to create 
archetypal masterpieces rather than particular portraits. 
As Phoebe von Held points out, the concept of the modèle idéal “marks a turning-
point in the history of eighteenth-century aesthetics” (von Held 2011:99), for it replaces 
the doctrine of the imitation of la belle nature laid down by Batteux with the claim that 
the painter or sculptor aims at a model in the ideal realm of the imagination.  Diderot’s 
Platonism becomes explicit when he when he condemns mere portraiture to occupying a 
“third order of reality” while allowing that masterful painting might rise to “the second 
order” (11).  However, even as he takes up Plato’s metaphysics, Diderot grants the 
masters of visual art an ability that the Greek philosopher took pains to deny them: the 
capacity to imitate directly ideal forms beyond those of the material world.  Diderot 
conceives as this capacity as a factor of the artistically refined imagination. 
In a foreshadowing of his application of the modèle idéal concept to the art of 
acting in the Paradoxe, Diderot bolsters his argument about the imaginative technique of 
the visual artist by quoting David Garrick: 
The famous Garrick said to the Chevalier de Chastelux: “However sensitive 
nature may have made you, if you perform with reference only to yourself, or to 
the most perfect subsistent nature known to you, you can only be mediocre. […]  
Because for you, for me, and for the spectator there is an ideally possible man 
who, in a given circumstance, would respond differently from yourself.  Such is 
the imaginary being you should take as your model.  The more vivid your 
conception of him, the more extraordinary, marvellous, and sublime, the grander 
you will be. […]  When I tear my guts apart, when I scream like an animal; these 
are not my own guts, nor my own cries, but rather the guts and cries of another 
I’ve imagined and who doesn’t exist.”  (Diderot 1995:15-16) 
 
Diderot’s Garrick is not limited by the sentimental capacity of his entrailles; rather, the 
affective viscerality of his performance emanates from the characteristics of an 




Garrick that defines the mode of imagination in question as being specifically scopic – 
that is, of involving an imagistic conception of the role called up before the “mind’s eye.”  
This development comes later, in the Paradoxe, after Diderot has defined the modèle 
idéal concept with respect to the art of painting.  
It is worthwhile noting that, in the Paradoxe, Diderot introduces his dramatic 
version of the modèle idéal in connection with the characters of Cornielle, Molière, and 
Racine – all playwrights whose works had been in the repertoire of the French stage for a 
hundred years or more.  At the time of the Paradoxe’s composition, these characters 
would have achieved larger-than-life dimensions in the popular imagination – dimensions 
that mere mortal actors would need to strive to embody.  Indeed, Diderot endows Cinna, 
Cleopatra, Merope, and Agrippina – characters from the plays of Corneille, Racine, and 
Voltaire – with ideal status when he calls them “phantoms fashioned from this or that 
poet’s special fantasy” (Diderot 1957:21).  The actor who plays his own character will 
fall far short of the dramatist’s ideal type: he will play “a tartufe, a miser, a misanthrope,” 
rather than “the Tartufe, the Miser, the Misanthrope” (39) conceived by Molière and now 
leading a seemingly independent, exalted existence in the popular dramatic imagination. 
It is no controversial claim to argue that the notion of “character” evolves along 
with trends in dramatic literature and traditions of performance practice.  The actor’s task 
can, it seems, more readily be conceived as a secondary process of “imitation” or 
“representation” when certain sets of characters are well established in the imagination of 
theatergoers.  This establishment occurs through the circulation of dramatic texts as well 
as their repeated re-performance as part of a given theatrical culture’s repertoire.  Marvin 




audience endows an actor with memories of past performances, and he notes that a young 
actor aspires to an iconic role like Hamlet because of “the density of its ghosting, 
culturally, theatrically, and academically” (Carlson 2001:79).  We can say that, over the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the “ghosts” of the characters of 
Molière, Corneille, and Racine achieved greater and greater phantasmic substance in the 
theatrical imagination, until they could be conceived by Diderot as pre-existing – and 
determining – an actor’s performance. 
Bodies are conspicuously absent from the Paradoxe.  At times the dialogue’s 
homme sensible is plagued by corporeal phenomena – a heaving diaphragm, trembling 
nerves, inopportune bursts of weeping – but even these appearances of the body are rare.  
The performing body thrown into expressive movement by internal flows of affect, which 
has held center stage in the Paradoxe’s precursor texts, has been disappeared.  It is 
replaced by a confusingly abstract entity, fabricated by Diderot to complete his theory of 
the actor’s mimesis: Diderot writes that the actor “shuts himself up in a great wicker 
mannequin of which he is the soul,”118 and that the actor manipulates this apparatus like 
children who imitate a frightening “phantom” (fantôme) (Diderot 1959:376).  Like a 
homunculus puppeteer, the “cold and tranquil spectator” residing within Diderot’s 
insensible actor has become the motive principle of a hollow acting machine, whose 
surface is constructed for the display of symptôms extérieurs (“exterior symptoms”).  The 
passionately moved and aesthetically striking body has been spirited out of the 
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figure made of wood or wicker, which can bend all the joints of its limbs, and which 
Painters and Sculptors position as they please […] after the various attitudes of the 




Paradoxe’s theoretical universe.  Left in its place is a wickerwork puppet fashioned after 
a phantasmic model, into which the actor must disappear in order to make an appearance. 
 
* * * 
 
The alienation of the actor from his body inaugurated by Diderot’s Paradoxe has held an 
enduring influence over acting theory.  Around the fin de siècle, the celebrated French 
actor Benoît-Constant Coquelin renewed Diderot’s forceful analogizing of the actor’s 
body with the mimetic media of the plastic arts and his notion that artistic creation 
occurred not in the act of doing but in the conception of an imaginative ideal.119  In his 
essay “Actors and Acting,”120 Coquelin divides his actor into an imaginative-cognitive 
“first self,” which “sees” the “model” or “ideal” he must represent, and an embodied 
“second self,” which gives physical form to “the being that [the first self] sees.”  Like the 
painter, the actor “seizes each salient feature [of his imagined model] and transfers it, not 
to his canvas, but to himself” (Coquelin 1887:163-64).  “Art is,” Coquelin insists, “not 
identification, but representation” (174).  Under Coquelin’s account, then, the actor’s 
mimesis becomes a three-phase process: imaginative conception, transfer onto the bodily 
medium, and, finally, execution in performance.  Even the relatively disinterested and 
entirely unpolemical William Archer, attempting to inject some empiricism into the 
controversy renewed by Coquelin, falls prey to a tendency of many would-be critics of 
the Paradoxe: to assimilate its basic conceptual schema even as they argue against its 
                                                        
119 Coquelin’s L’Art du comédien (1894) will also be discussed in the following chapter 
of this study. 
120 The essay by Coquelin was published in Harper’s Monthly in May 1887 and sparked 
the well-known debate between Coquelin, the English actor Henry Irving, and the 




anti-emotionalism.  From the actor’s perspective, writes Archer, the character is “the 
superimposed phantom of his imagination” (Archer 1888:223).121 
The phantom of an ideal other, born from a reflection in Plato’s mirror, continues 
to “ghost” the figure of the actor throughout the twentieth century.  Even a practitioner of 
the phenomenological method like Jean-Paul Sartre, engaging with Diderot, argued that 
the actor uses his own ego as an “analogon” for the manifestation of the “imago” of his 
character.  Sartre’s actor is “unrealized” as he “sacrifices himself to the existence of an 
appearance” and “becomes a medium for nonbeing” [emphasis in original] (Sartre 
1976:163-65).  Frederick Schyberg, writing in his three-part series on “The Art of 
Acting” in the Tulane Drama Review, is largely ventriloquized by Diderot and Coquelin 
when he states that the actor “stands with his person half-way between fiction and reality 
and, with the help of his person, will unite them both and incorporate them in a higher 
entirety in his person” (Schyberg 1962:111).  More recently, theatre semiotics, with its 
essentially mimetic schema of signifier, signified, and referent, has been apt to renew the 
imitative-imagistic conception of acting.  Semiotics often views the theatre as an 
“imagistic-iconic medium” in which human actors “convey images of human beings 
imprinted on human bodies” (Rozik 2002:123, 111-12).  Finally, though performance 
studies has done much to highlight the role of embodiment in performance practice, much 
of the discipline’s anti-mimetic impulse is, ironically if not paradoxically, fueled by 
mimeticist assumptions about the traditional theatre’s supposedly characteristic mode of 
representation-as-reproduction. 
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 When it comes to the art of the actor, talk of copies and originals, of mannequins 
and ideal models, and of the performing body as a medium for representation is chiefly 
metaphorical.  Mimetic theories, based as they are in rigid schemata of one-to-one 
correspondence, often mistake for realities the imagos and analogons they generate in the 
realm of theoretical discourse – the only realm in which a living, breathing, thinking, 
feeling, acting human being can become a “medium” for “nonbeing.”  For all their 
unexamined assumptions, critical blind-spots, and rhetorical indulgences, eighteenth-
century theories of the performer before Diderot’s intervention hold one great virtue: 
even when assuming an ontology of imitation, they keep the affectively charged relation 
between the performing body of the actor and the apprehending body of the spectator as 
the foundation of theatrical reality.  The basic principles of eighteenth-century thinkers 
like Dubos and Sainte-Albine accord well with contemporary critics like Michael 
Goldman who argue that the theatre’s “realism is not re-presentation of reality” but, 
rather, a form of “reality itself,” embedded in the “real life” taking place beyond the 
boundaries of the performance venue (Goldman 1975:34).  Eighteenth-century certainties 
about the radical continuity between lived experience and theatrical experience can help 
us appreciate that we go to the theatre to be enlivened – that is, to live through the 
emotions, expressive movements, and transitions of thought and intention we apprehend 
passing through performing bodies – rather than to see life “represented,” “depicted,” 
“portrayed,” or “imitated.” 
The movement-based epistemologies of affect covered in this study can also help 
to re-embody theatrical aesthetics by reminding us that we monitor our emotions, 




subjectively experienced bodily states (what psychologists sometimes call coenesthesia 
or coenaesthesis) is often dominated by a sensation of internal motion.  In other words, 
we experience emotions kinesthetically – as heavings of the diaphragm, poundings of the 
heart, contractions in the chest, roilings of the viscera, and thrills that race along the skin-
surface – and the sensation of these mouvemens intérieures comprises an essential 
dimension of our engagement with aesthetic phenomena.  If we bracket off such 
meaningfully affective experiences as unworthy of interest or impossible to describe, we 
risk contributing to an apathetic critical discourse out of touch with the “truth of the body 
and sensation.”  Such a mode of discourse, unmoored from corporeal grounding, risks 
ascension into a Platonist “Intelligible Realm” of conceptual fantasy, where models, 








3.  “I AM”; “I believe you”: 





Figure of a Monad from A Series of Lessons in Raja Yoga by Yogi Ramacharaka 




 The actor steps onto the stage.  Leaving behind the sheltering darkness of the wings, he 
is momentarily dazzled by the bright theatrical lighting.  The “black hole” of the 
auditorium yawns from beyond the proscenium arch.  Out there in the darkness, a 
collective gaze made up of hundreds of pairs of eyes weighs upon his every word, 
gesture, and expression.  Under these psychically pressurized conditions, pre-fabricated 
postures and conventional intonations seem to rise up in him unbidden, as if a part of his 
unconscious were desperately trying to meet some vague but terrible demand.  He feels 
disoriented, empty, physically and emotionally contracted.  He feels himself pulled, body 
and mind, into a “state of dislocation,” a “sense of being forced, subjected to something 
alien” (AW 611) – required, that is, to embody something outside himself and beyond his 
reach.  But this actor is no amateur, no dilettante.  He has trained in Stanislavsky’s art of 
“experiencing” (perezhivanie).  He calms himself, relaxes his muscles, and calls upon the 
“psycho-technique” (psikhotekhnika) ingrained in his mind and body through dedicated 
practical study. 
 The actor now restricts his “circle of attention” (krug vnimaniia) solely to onstage 
objects, fellow actors, and images in his imagination.  The presence of the audience 
recedes within his conscious awareness as the actor achieves a state of “public solitude” 
(publichnoe odinochestvo).  The actor enters a subjunctive mode of imagination, doing 
what he would do “as if” (“esli by”) he were required to act under the same “given 
circumstances” (predlagaemye obstoiatelstva) as the character.  As he follows his “score” 
(partitura) of physical and psychological “actions” (deistvii), maintaining a “sense of 
truth and belief” (chuvstvo pravdy i vera) in these intentional strivings, he finds that 




him.  He may even enter into the “creative mood” (tvorcheskoe nastroenie), in which 
inspiration fuels an almost effortless but emotionally full performance.  Playing freely 
with his fellow performers, theatrical truth emanates from his every action and he enters 
“that pitch of enthusiasm, those high transports of passion, in which he is able to feel that 
he and his part are inseparable and can boldly say to the spectator, ‘I am’” [emphasis in 
original] (SAS 113). 
“I am”: this declaration of oneness with oneself, which marks entrance into the 
Stanislavskian actor’s ideal creative state, is, of course, entirely metaphorical.  Within 
Stanislavsky’s practical philosophy of acting, to acknowledge directly the presence of the 
audience – let alone to rupture the dramatic fiction by addressing the assembled 
spectators – would disrupt the very mode of consciousness that allows the actor to feel so 
confident in his subjective wholeness.  The “I am” of the Stanislavskian actor designates 
feeling oneself as oneself while pursuing a sequence of actions inspired by the dramatic 
text, “as if” immersed within the life conditions of another individual.  This other 
individual, the dramatic character, does not pre-exist the actor as an ideal entity to be 
“copied” or “imitated” in rehearsal and performance.  Stanislavsky’s actor does not strain 
after the phantasmic original that mimeticist theories of acting of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries had successfully fabricated as a theoretical construct.  Rather, the 
other who is the character emerges from the sequence of “other” doings – carried out 
within imagined circumstances “other” to his own lived experiences – done by the actor 
as himself.  Otherness arises out of a state of the actor’s artistic subjectivity – a state that 
Stanislavsky conceives as both authentically actual and liberatingly subjunctive – that 




powerful challenge to mimeticist conceptions of the actor’s art, which require that the 
actor bridge some ontological gap, or drag an ideal model down from a realm of 
imagination to the material world of the stage. 
 The fact that Stanislavsky attends to the subjective experience of the actor – rather 
than simply accommodating the figure of the actor within some larger aesthetic 
framework – is due in large part to his own lived experiences as a theatre practitioner.  
Stanislavsky did not write about acting from a philosophical remove.  Stanislavsky was 
an actor before he was a director, teacher, or theorist of acting, and, when he writes, he 
writes as an actor, from the perspective of the actor’s “I.”  At roughly the same time that 
phenomenology was being developed as a rigorous philosophical methodology,122 
Stanislavsky posits the “I” of the actor as the first principle of a philosophy of theatrical 
practice, one that injects a nuanced experiential dimension into acting theory’s history of 
ideas.  It may be true that, even before Stanislavsky’s writings, the “I” of the stage 
performer had held a prominent place in the in the genre of the actor’s memoir (a là 
Garrick, Talma, and Salvini, for example), but there the “I” appeared at the center of 
anecdote or as the source of authority behind prescriptive precepts.  Stanislavsky, on the 
other hand, radically subjectivizes the theory of the actor by writing from within the first-
person consciousness of the acting subject.  
In addition to a practical system of actor training, then, Stanislavsky offers his 
reader a philosophy of acting built, in large part, out of the richly subjective insights of a 
practitioner.  However, we cannot attribute Stanislavsky’s philosophy of the acting 
subject entirely to his practical work in the theatre and the introspective delving this work 
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required.  The conditions necessary for a theory of acting that emphasized the oneness of 
the acting subject to arise were set by new accounts of subjectivity in philosophy and 
aesthetics across the span of the nineteenth century.  Russian aesthetics of this period 
were dominated by German thought, which forwarded Idealist philosophies grounded in 
the self-consciousness of the human subject and Romantic theories of art based in a 
conception of the artwork as a self-generative organism.  At the same time, European 
thought was increasingly exposed to the philosophies of South and East Asia, through 
new translations of ancient texts and the rise of modern Orientalist studies, as well as 
through syncretic religio-spiritualist movements, many of which appropriated the 
monistic metaphysics of Eastern thought-systems.  All of these factors conspired to break 
the hold of mimetic thinking – of thinking about art in terms of one-to-one 
correspondences – over European (and Russian) aesthetics. 
Mimetic thinking, though shaken by Romanticism and Idealism, was not entirely 
banished from the philosophy of art.  At times, the mimetic paradigm was displaced by 
the new emphasis on personal subjectivity, organic development, and monistic ontology.  
At others, it was transformed by them – nowhere more strikingly than in the account of 
how idea becomes image offered by Idealist aesthetics.  In the aesthetics of Schelling and 
Hegel, the artistic idea manifests itself as a material image through a process of organic 
becoming, often likened to the growth of a plant or the birth of a human being, rather 
than through the process of model-to-copy duplication so often associated with the 
mimesis concept.  In general terms, however, we can say that the conceptual schema of 
the one-to-one, which had sustained mimetic thinking about art since classical antiquity, 




born out of oneness.  Stanislavsky’s writings carry this paradigm into theatrical theory by 
repudiating imitation in both theory and practice – as a way of thinking about and a way 
of going about the art of acting – and by situating the “I” of the actor at the center of a 
subjectivized aesthetics of theatrical experience. 
 In this chapter, I will lay out the above argument in five sections.  First, I will 
situate Stanislavskian thought in the context of Romantic and Idealist aesthetics – in 
particular, in relation to the transformative explication of German thought by the prolific 
Russian literary critic Vissarion Belinsky (1811-1848), who presented a model of artistic 
creativity emphasizing spontaneity, immediacy, and organic wholeness.  These Romantic 
values clash with the imitative precision celebrated by eighteenth-century aesthetics.  I 
will also show that Stanislavsky may have taken indirect inspiration – again, via Belinsky 
– from Hegel’s conception of drama in forwarding a theory of the theatre as actualized 
action, rather than the imitation of action. 
The second and third sections of the chapter examine Stanislavsky’s complex 
engagement with mimetic thinking and imitative acting practice.  Here I discuss 
Stanislavsky’s rejection of the accounts of the actor’s creative process offered up by 
Diderot’s Paradoxe and the French actor Benoît-Constant Coquelin’s L’Art du comédien 
(1894).  I also discuss the young Stanislavsky’s struggles to overcome imitation as a basis 
for the work of the actor, director, and acting teacher.  I then draw connections between 
Stanislavskian thought and nineteenth-century Russian aesthetics by tracing two of the 
acting theorist’s key terms to specific source texts by the poet Alexander Pushkin (1799-
1837) and the novelist, essayist, and social reformer Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910).  The 




content of the source texts – in particular, Pushkin’s and Tolstoy’s questioning of the 
“imitation of nature” orthodoxy – in relation to Stanislavsky’s vision of the theatre.  I will 
show that while Stanislavsky generally forwards metaphors of genesis and synthesis 
against those of representation and reproduction he sometimes relies upon a transformed 
mimeticist vocabulary and preserves a positive role for mimicry in the actor’s creative 
process. 
In section four, I examine Stanislavsky’s borrowing of the phrase “I am” (Ia esm’) 
from a series of books on Hindu philosophy by “Yogi Ramacharaka.”  I use the key 
phrase “I am” as a marker in tracing an evolving account of subjectivity that emerged 
from Idealist philosophy’s encounter with Eastern thought-systems – an encounter that 
often took the form of chaotic synthesis within the pseudoreligious and occultist 
movements of nineteenth-century Europe and America.  Here I allow Stanislavskian 
acting theory to speak back to the philosophical systems that nourished its genesis.  I 
argue that Stanislavsky’s emphasis on the inter-subjectivity of theatrical experience – on 
how, in the theatre, “I am” can become “I am another” – challenges the monistic 
reductiveness of philosophies that seek their ultimate grounding in the ego’s experience 
of itself.  Finally, I conclude the chapter by arguing that Stanislavsky’s conception of 
“organic truth” speaks more directly to how a spectating consciousness actually engages 
with the otherness presented onstage than do the notions of “representation” and 
“verisimilitude” forwarded by mimeticist theories of the theatre. 
 To situate Stanislavskian thought in the context of philosophy and aesthetics is an 




forswears philosophy in An Actor’s Work123: “The ‘system’ is a reference book, not a 
philosophy.  Where philosophy begins the ‘system’ ends” (Stanislavski 1949:294).  
Stanislavsky thought of himself as a man of action, not of words, and he often voices a 
disdain for abstract conceptualizing and a distrust of “learned words, essays, lectures, 
elaborate, fashionable theories” (AW 157).  Stanislavsky’s alter ego in An Actor’s Work 
tells his students: “I am a practitioner and I can help you to understand, that is feel, the 
nature of artistic truth, but not in words, in action” (192).  Despite Stanislavsky’s refusal 
of philosophy, however, and despite his insistence that An Actor’s Work is first and 
foremost a practical manual, I will argue that this “Bible” of twentieth-century acting 
practice is also the magnum opus of a philosophical oeuvre.  Stanislavsky’s writings on 
acting lay out an aesthetics of theatrical subjectivity that, though at times marred by 
inconsistency, rhetorical vagueness, and speculative overreaching, is dense enough with 
introspective insight, keen observation, and provocative conceptualization to qualify 
Stanislavsky as a theorist of the theatre of the first order. 
 
The Actor as Organism, the Actor as Agent: 
Romantic and Idealist Influences on Stanislavsky 
 
 
While Stanislavsky’s possible debts to previous theatrical theory and scientific discourse 
                                                        
123 The Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood translation of An Actor Prepares was published in 
1936.  With Stanislavsky’s tacit approval, Hapgood had made extensive cuts and 
alterations to the manuscript.  Stanislavsky reworked his magnum opus and published a 
Russian version in 1938, under the title Rabota aktera nad soboi [“An Actor’s Work on 
Himself”], though this version was heavily edited by Soviet censors.  For a discussion of 
this tangled translation and publication history, see Carnicke 2009:76-109.  In this 
chapter, I will quote from Jean Benedetti’s recent translation (2008) of Stanislavsky’s 




have been extensively catalogued,124 English-language scholarship has only recently 
turned toward the task of situating Stanislavskian theory in relation to philosophy and 
aesthetics.125  Stanislavsky himself looked back on his formative years as coinciding with 
“a great upsurge in art, science, and aesthetics” made possible by the patronage of 
Moscow’s industrialist class, to which Stanislavsky, the son of a prosperous textile 
manufacturer, belonged (MLIA 21).  Though Stanislavsky received no formal education 
in philosophy or aesthetics,126 he moved within an elite circle of artists, writers, and 
connoisseurs.  Within this intellectual milieu, writes Rose Whyman, “Stanislavsky 
inherited ideas from Russian artists of the nineteenth-century golden age of Russian 
literature, such as Alexander Pushkin and Nikolai Gogol, and also the ideas of such 
thinkers as Vissarion Belinsky and Nikolai Chernyshevsky, all of whom continued to be 
acclaimed after the revolution” (Whyman 2008:2).   One chief factor behind the 
blossoming of this literary “golden age” was the transformative impact on Russian 
thought by German Romanticism and Idealism during the early to middle decades of the 
nineteenth century.  As Turgenev wrote, Russian intellectuals of the period plunged into 
the “German sea” of ideas (in Hamburg 2010:53), eagerly devouring the latest 
translations of works by Germany’s leading figures in philosophy and aesthetics. 
                                                        
124 See Roach 1996:195-217, Pitches 2006, Carnicke 2009, Whyman 2008. 
125 Comprehensive works made possible by freer access to the Stanislavsky archives in 
Moscow like Sharon Marie Carnicke’s Stanislavsky in Focus (1998, second edition 2009) 
and Rose Whyman’s The Stanislavsky System of Acting (2008) have begun this important 
scholarly endeavor. 
126 Stanislavsky was instructed by private tutors until age thirteen, when his parents 
placed him in grammar school in order to obtain a dispensation from military service (see 
MLIA 25).  Stanislavsky describes his lessons as consisting mostly of rote memorization 
of Greek and Latin grammar and summarizes his Moscow schooldays as a time of “hard 
prison labour which can only be recalled as a nightmare” (MLIA 29).  Of his period of 





Evidence of firsthand engagement by Stanislavsky with German philosophy is 
sparse.127  For the most part, German Romanticism and Idealism – filtered, from the 
1830s onward, through the works of Russian writers, thinkers, and artist whom 
Stanislavsky esteemed – seem to have exerted a contextual rather than intertextual 
influence on Stanislavsky (1863-1938) by infusing the climate of ideas within which his 
artistic sensibility was shaped.  In addition, as Russia’s “Golden Age” of arts and ideas 
turned toward silver in the 1890s, a Neo-Idealist revival in Russian philosophy rose in 
reaction against the prevailing winds of positivism and materialism.  This renewal of 
Idealist thought coincided with Stanislavsky’s period of “artistic youth” as a novice actor.  
It also overlapped with the burgeoning interest in spiritualism, Eastern philosophy, and 
the occult among the Russian cultural intelligentsia.128  Over the following pages, I will 
attempt to evoke briefly this intellectual climate.    
The acting teacher Torstov has gathered his students for a theoretical explication 
of their practical work.  He poses the question, “What is the nature of acting as we 
understand it?” and answers himself: “It is the conception and birth of a new living being, 
the human being/role. That is a natural creative act, like human birth” (AW 344).  
Torstov goes on to develop an elaborate analogy between the “organic growth of a role” 
and the sequence of insemination, pregnancy, birth, and development of a human being 
                                                        
127 While preparing the Norwegian novelist and playwright Knut Hamsun’s The Drama 
of Life for production in 1907, Stanislavsky’s interpretation of the play drew upon Idealist 
notions of artistic creation, although only in the broadest terms: “the dreamer and 
philosopher Kareno [the play’s protagonist, whom Stanislavsky played] personifies the 
transcendent dream, the idea” (MLIA 263).  In September 1919 Stanislavsky read and 
took notes on I.A. Ilin’s The Philosophy of Hegel as Doctrine of the Concrete Nature of 
God and Man while preparing the Moscow Art Theatre’s production of Byron’s closet 
drama Cain (see Benedetti 1988:240). 
128 See White 2006:76-77; see also The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, ed. Bernice 




(AW 344).  For Tortsov, “the birth of a living theatrical being (the role) is a normal act of 
the actor’s own creative nature,” and proceeds according to the same natural laws that 
determine the appearance of a “biological phenomenon” (AW 345). “The birth of a child, 
the growing of a tree are manifestations of a single order,” argues Tortsov (AW 612).  
And so is the actor’s work on a role: “The creative process of living and experiencing a 
part is an organic one, founded on the physical and spiritual laws governing the nature of 
man” (CR: 44). 
 Tortsov, of course, is Stanislavsky’s undisguised alter ego.  Over the several 
hundred pages of An Actor’s Work, Tortsov – whose name was Tvorstov (“Creator”) in 
an earlier version of Stanislavsky’s magnum opus129 – leads his charges toward an 
organicist conception of theatrical creativity.  Over and over again, the development of a 
role – or, indeed, an actor’s career-long “life in art” – is likened to the birth of a child or 
the growth of a plant, processes of gradual self-evolution driven by the immanent 
productivity of nature.  Although organicism has roots in the classical world – especially 
in Neoplatonism – the Romantic era was the “great day” of the organicist paradigm in 
European thought (Orsini 1969:28-29).  Organicist thinking was central to the aesthetics 
of the most prominent German Romantic poets and Idealist philosophers: Schiller, 
Herder, Novalis, Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.  
Stanislavsky’s thoroughgoing organicism reveals a deep source in Romantic thought.  
The Romantic overtones in Stanislavsky’s writings have often been commented upon; his 
reliance on organicist concepts has also been pointed out, but less often.130 
                                                        
129 See Whyman 2008:xvi. 
130 See, for example, Gordon 2006, Worthen 1983.  Robert Gordon notes Stanislavsky’s 




The central principle of aesthetic organicism describes the structure of a work of 
art, viewing it as a holistic totality, like a living entity, of which one part cannot be 
altered without altering the fundamental nature of the whole.131  An expanded version of 
the organic concept incorporates two additional principles defining the process of artistic 
production: 1) that the development of the artwork proceeds from within itself (like a 
plant growing from a seed); and 2) that the physiology of the artist as a biological 
creature is essential to the creative act.132  Perhaps the most influential early definition of 
aesthetic organicism came in A.W. Schlegel’s lectures On Dramatic Art and Literature 
(delivered 1808, published 1809-11), which gave the aesthetic thought of Kant, Herder, 
Friedrich Schlegel, and Schelling an accessible synthesis and became “the chief vehicle 
for acquainting Western Europe, at first hand, with the new German aesthetics” (Abrams 
1975:213): 
Form is mechanical when it is imparted to any material through an external force, 
merely as an accidental addition, without reference to its character… Organic 
form, on the contrary, is innate; it unfolds itself from within, and reaches its 
determination simultaneously with the fullest development of the seed… In the 
fine arts, just as in the province of nature – the supreme artist – all genuine forms 
are organic….  [emphasis added] (in Abrams 1975:213) 
 
The organic paradigm arose in reaction, at least in part, against the mechanistic 
worldview posited by Descartes and Newton, and Schlegel’s concise articulation of 
organicism’s seed principle and his opposition between “organic” and “mechanical” form 
                                                        
emotional identification of actor, character, and spectator in a process that conceived the 
character not as an artifact but as a living creature engendered from the artistic inspiration 
of both actor and playwright” (Gordon 2006:57-58). 
131 See Orsini 1969:3, Terras 1974:10. 
132 Literary critic M.H. Abrams has pointed out that Kant, whose own aesthetics are 
scarcely organicist, provided one of the bases of organic art theory with his conception of 
a natural organism “as immanently but unconsciously teleological, a ‘self-organising 




highlights this fact.  The shift from mechanism toward organicism around the turn of the 
nineteenth century “revers[ed] the mechanical metaphor of Cartesian physiology and 
biologiz[ed] the world picture” (Roach 1993:163).  “[A]esthetic organologists” (Abrams 
1975:206) like A.W. Schlegel and Schelling steered this biologizing impulse into the 
realm of art theory in order to secure the Romantic values of spontaneity, immediacy, and 
vivacity. 
Conceptualizing the work of art as an organism represents a significant departure 
from the long-prevailing aesthetic doctrine of the “imitation of nature.”  Pushed to its 
extreme, the organic paradigm, with its governing schema of biological integrality, 
directly opposes the mimetic schema of duplicative doubling.  Organicist creation is 
genesis, the arising of oneness out of oneness.  The organic work of art develops or 
evolves; it is not fabricated through the combination of elements or through processes of 
model-to-copy reproduction.  Within German aesthetics of the Romantic period, in 
particular, the doctrine of art as the “imitation” (Nachahmung) of nature gave way to an 
“expressive” view of artistic creation closely bound up with an organicist understanding 
of history and culture.133 
In order to understand the values of oneness, wholeness, and integral self-
evolution forwarded by Romanticism and Idealism, we need to appreciate the inspiration 
these movements found in certain mystical strands of European philosophy and theology.  
If Plato presides over mimetic theories of art from the sixteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries, the organicist and idealist aesthetics of the nineteenth century found similar 
classical patronage in the Neoplatonist philosopher and mystic Plotinus (c. 204-270 
                                                        
133 See Abrams 1975:184-225.  According to Abrams, expressive aesthetics sees the 




C.E.).  Although Plotinus’s magnum opus, the Enneads, had been available in the Latin 
translation of Marsilio Ficino since the end of the fifteenth century, it was German 
philosophy of the latter half of the eighteenth century that re-evaluated the writings of 
Plotinus and his successors Porphyry and Proclus as genuine extensions rather than 
corruptions of Platonic thought.134  In addition, the “Jena Circle” of authors, critics, and 
philosophers135 re-engaged enthusiastically with the German mystical tradition, including 
the works of Meister Eckhart (c. 1260-1327) and Jakob Böhme (c. 1575-1624), which 
show a deep Neoplatonist influence,136 and the writings of more recent figures, such as 
the Pietist theologian Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782) and the Swedish 
theologian Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772).137  Friedrich Schlegel, leader of the Jena 
Circle, speculated that a mystical philosophy whose core belief was the unity between the 
human individual and the divine absolute had been passed down across the centuries, 
traveling from ancient India to classical Greece, blossoming in Plotinus’s Neoplatonism, 
entering Christianity at the time of Augustine, and reviving in the theology of Eckhart 
and Böhme.138 
We find in Plotinus’s writings, then, one of the deep sources for Idealist 
philosophy’s basic conceptual structures: oneness, originary indifference, and the unity of 
opposites.  In the metaphysics of Plotinus, “the One,” or “the Good,” is the first principle 
                                                        
134 See Gatti 1996:23. 
135 Tieck, Novalis, Schleiermacher, and both Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel 
were based in Jena during the first decade of the nineteenth century, when Fichte, 
Schelling and, later, Hegel held appointments at the town’s university. 
136 See Mojsisch and Summerell 2011. 
137 For a discussion of the influence of Eckhart and Böhme on the German Romantics – 
particularly Schelling, Hegel, and the philosopher of religion Franz von Baader – see 
Benz 1983, Mayer 1999.  For a dicussion of Hegel’s debt to the German mystical 
tradition, see Magee 2008. 




of all ideal and material being, the source of the unity of everything in the universe.139  
The One of Plotinus exists as “free self-productive activity” (Gatti 1996:28), from which 
all modes of being emanate, including that of physical reality and the realm of immaterial 
intellect, which contains the Neoplatonist “forms” or “ideas” (eide).  In attempting to 
describe the boundless self-production whose origin is the One, Plotinus relies on three 
key analogies: the flow of water from a source, the growth of a plant from its seed or 
root, and the radiation of light from the sun.  These metaphors of radiation, flow, and 
organic growth will all be resuscitated in Romantic thought. 
The Plotinian philosopher strives to attain union with the One’s divinity.  In the 
final passages of the Enneads, Plotinus describes the mystical experience of transcendent 
oneness with the One as the “achievement of unity” between “seen and seer,” of 
“beholder” with “beheld”: 
In this seeing, we neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is no two.  The 
man is changed, no longer himself nor self-belonging; he is merged with the 
Supreme, sunken into it, one with it: centre coincides with centre […].  The man 
formed by this mingling with the Supreme […] is become the Unity.  (Plotinus 
1992:708). 
 
In this description of mystical oneness, of being-at-the-center, of the collapse of 
distinctions between the knowing-and-seeing subject and the object of knowledge or 
perception, Plotinus provides the metaphysical inspiration for German Idealist 
epistemology.  As the rest of this chapter will show, Plotinus’s description of subjective 
oneness stands behind the “I am” of Stanislavsky’s actor – although via a confused 
network of influences, of which Stanislavsky himself was only partially aware.   
                                                        
139 The underlying monism of Plotinian thought owes a great deal to the rise of 
Neopythagoreanism in the first and second centuries C.E., which identified the 




Also important to Idealist philosophy is the place Plotinus gives to the visual arts 
within his discussion of natural and man-made beauty.  Unlike Plato’s artist, who can 
only fabricate imitations of the objects of perception, the Plotinian artist has direct access 
to the ideal archetypes through the “inner form” (endon eidos)140 in his mind’s eye and 
strives, as best he can, to render this form in a material medium.  Plotinus therefore 
argues against denigrating the arts on the basis of their mimetic ontology: “the arts are 
not to be slighted on the ground that they create by imitation of natural objects; […] we 
must recognize that they give no bare reproduction of the thing seen but go back to the 
Reason-Principles [logoi] from which Nature itself derives” (Plotinus 1992:486).  For 
Plotinus, the logos (“reason-principle,” or “forming principle,” among other possible 
translations) is an ideal entity that functions as a causative principle in the world of 
physical existence, spontaneously generating the unity and organization of its natural 
products.  Plotinus, who saw himself as an explicator rather than a re-interpreter of Plato, 
still regards the images of art as imitations, but they no longer the debased reflections of 
objects in the world of sense (as in the Republic).  The images of art are now imitations 
of ideal visions in the mind of the artist, who is granted some intuitive access to the 
higher reality beyond the visible.  Furthermore, the Plotinian artist wields a productive 
power akin to that of nature itself – the power to put forms into matter – when he shapes 
the artwork in accordance with the logos.  He is not limited to the bare reproduction of 
visual appearances.  Plotinus’s more expansive conception (relative to Plato’s) of the 
artist’s imaginative powers and access to the truth of ideal forms foreshadows Romantic 
                                                        
140 Erwin Panofsky notes that Plotinus’s term eidos (“image,” “shape,” “form”) 
encompasses both “form” in Aristotle’s sense and “Idea” in Plato’s sense.  For Plotinus, 
Panofsky argues, “art has the sublime task of ‘injecting’ an eidos into resistant matter” 




theories of creativity.141 
Neoplatonist metaphysics provides Idealist philosophy with its fundamental 
conceptual structures: the unity of the subjective and the objective, a oneness that 
precedes distinctions, and the originary union of opposites.  The philosophical systems of 
Schelling and Hegel are marked by all of the above conceptual characteristics.  The first 
principle of Schelling’s “identity philosophy” (Identitätsphilosophie) is the absolute 
identity of ideality and reality, of spirit and nature, of subjectivity and objectivity, of the 
universal and the particular, of the conscious and the unconscious, of freedom and 
necessity.  In Schelling’s view, it is the task of philosophy to explicate this ultimate 
identity, which unites subject and object, knower and known, in an “indifference” 
(Indifferenz) that precedes division.  In his early works, Schelling follows Fichte in 
suggesting that the primordial self is the source of ultimate unity, but after the year 1800 
he moves closer to a Plotinian position by increasingly associating the absolute with 
God.142 Schelling’s first principle of absolute identity generates the unconscious 
creativity of nature as well as the conscious activity of mankind and prefigures Hegel’s 
Geist (“Mind,” “Spirit”): divine, self-thinking thought, which manifests itself in the 
activity of the universe and reaches its highest form in the self-conscious subjectivity of 
humankind.  In other words, for Schelling and Hegel, divine consciousness exists in and 
through humankind.  Man is not “made in God’s image”; rather, humankind itself is the 
manifestation of the divine Spirit evolving toward unity with itself out of the unconscious 
medium of nature. 
                                                        
141 For a broad discussion of the Plotinian foundation of the Idealist understanding of art, 
see John Hendrix’s Aesthetics and The Philosophy Of Spirit: From Plotinus to Schelling 
and Hegel (New York: Peter Lang, 2005). 




Both Schelling and Hegel accord art an unprecedented place in their philosophical 
systems as a medium through which subjectivity can be objectified to itself.  For 
Schelling, art can present sensuously and concretely truths that philosophy can only 
render in the abstractions of language.143  The work of art achieves a merger of the ideal 
and the real, the subjective and the objective, the universal and the particular, and the 
abstract and the concrete.  Hegel’s conception of art as “the sensuous presentation of the 
Absolute itself” (Hegel 1975:70) accords almost precisely with Schelling’s.  In art, Hegel 
argues, the Idea (Idee) is actualized, manifested, and objectified in sensuously concrete 
form, and the beautiful is therefore understood as “the pure appearance of the Idea to 
sense” (111).  In the process of artistic production, the “sensuous aspect of art is 
spiritualized” and its spiritual aspect “made sensuous” (39).  Because of this 
simultaneous and reciprocal process, art makes possible “an immediate and therefore 
sensuous knowing […] in which the Absolute is presented to contemplation and feeling” 
(101).  Hegel repudiates “the formal aim of mere imitation” in artistic practice, which 
produces coldly technical products carrying only “the pretence of life” (42).  Lacking any 
ideal content, the results of “purely mechanical imitation” can only be evaluated on the 
basis of their “correctness” – that is, their formal resemblance to the imitated object (44-
45).  Genuine artistic production, on the other hand, enacts the basic processual 
movement of Hegelian philosophy – that of teleological self-becoming – as the Idea, 
                                                        
143 In a passage that borrows from Plotinus’s conception of the logos (as what – the 
animating force behind material being), Schelling writes: “Just as reason becomes 
immediately objective only through the organism, and the eternal ideas of reason become 
objective in nature as the souls of organic bodies, so also does philosophy become 
objective through art, and the ideas of philosophy become objective through art as the 
souls of real things” (Schelling 1989:30).  Thus, Schelling famously asserts in the System 




which “carries within itself the principle of its mode of appearance” (75), expresses itself 
as objective form. 
An examination of Idealist aesthetics confirms classicist Stephen Halliwell’s 
claim that “at least some forms of romanticism and its aftermath mark a renegotiated or 
redefined mimeticism, rather than a clean break with the traditions of mimetic thought” 
(Halliwell 2002:365).  Taken together, Schelling’s frequent and varied usages of the 
German word Bild (“image,” “form,” “shape”) constitute a particularly rich field for 
examining this transformed mimeticism.  Schelling understands the imagination 
(Einbildungskraft) as “the power of mutually informing into unity [Ineinsbildung]” 
(Schelling 1989:32), so that the artist’s creative imagination is able to infuse the ideal and 
universal into the real and particular, producing a reflected image (Gegenbild) in the form 
of an artwork in the same way that God creates an archetype (Urbild).144  Moreover, 
Schelling sometimes refers to the living organism an immediate image [Abbild] of 
nature,145 revealing his view that artistic creativity and natural productivity are essentially 
one in their processual movement.  Within the Schellengian (and broader Idealist) 
conception of art, the artistic image does not exist at a “three-stage regress” (Abrams 
1971:8) from the ideal archetype, across the ontological gaps produced by a static model-
and-copy schema.  Rather, the divine idea in-forms itself into concrete manifestation in 
the artistic work.  The Idealist idea is a source or a seed, which produces its material 
manifestations through a process of emanation or becoming.  For both Schelling and 
Hegel, art dynamically expresses the ideal in the substance of the real (an impossibility in 
                                                        
144 See Douglas W. Stott’s discussion of Schelling’s use of Bild terminology in Schelling 
1989:xliii. 




Plato’s metaphysics), so that art’s productions cannot be confined within a degraded 
ontology of reflection. 
Having made a necessarily brief survey of the Idealist aesthetics of Plotinus, 
Schelling, and Hegel, we are now ready to turn to their impact on the art criticism of 
Vissarion Belinsky, whose prolific writings dominated Russian aesthetic discourse during 
the nineteenth century and continued to exert an influence even after the Revolution.  
Stanislavsky refers to Belinsky a number of times in his writings, though he never 
explicitly engages with the critic’s key positions, and Jean Benedetti and Rose Whyman 
argue that Belinsky exerted a significant influence on Stanislavsky’s aesthetic notions 
and ethical ideals.146  Belinsky was himself influenced in turn by Kant, Herder, and 
Schiller, and, during the 1830s, his literary production was fueled by successive 
enthusiasms for the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.  It was during his 
Schellingian period (the mid-1830s) and his Hegelian period (the late 1830s), however, 
that Belinsky’s aesthetic thought crystallized.  As the scholar of Slavic literature Victor 
Terras notes, Belinsky was hardly the first to introduce Idealism and organicism to 
Russian intellectual circles, but he was the primary proselytizer in spreading this complex 
of aesthetic notions to subsequent generations of writers and thinkers.147 
 “The Idea of Art” (1841), Belinsky’s most generally argued aesthetic treatise, 
develops a broad Schellingian-Hegelian framework.  Indeed, much of the essay functions 
as a primer in the basics of Idealist art theory, with lengthy sections appropriated 
wholesale from the Hegelian H.T. Rötscher’s “On the Philosophic Criticism of a Work of 
                                                        
146 See Benedetti 1988:36-37, Whyman 2008:15-16, 26, 259. 




Art.”148  The universal idea, Belinsky explains, is divine thought, which manifests itself 
within the material forms of nature.  Ideas can therefore be called the “mothers of life, its 
substantial force and essence, the inexhaustible reservoir from which the waves of life 
flow incessantly” (Belinsky 2001:185).  Divine ideas become “embodied in form” as 
their potentiality transforms into actuality (185).  The concrete form that the idea takes in 
physical matter “is not anything external to itself but the form of its development, of its 
own essence” (183).  Belinsky deploys the Idealist keyword “immanence” – along with 
the organicist seed metaphor – in order to clarify the relationship between the idea and its 
material manifestation: 
The evolution of the idea out of itself or from within itself is, in the language of 
philosophy, called immanent.  The absence of all external auxiliary modes and 
impulses that experience might provide is a condition of immanent evolution; the 
vital essence of the idea itself contains the organic power of immanent evolution – 
as the vital grain contains within itself the potentiality of its growth into a plant 
[…].  (170). 
 
“Immanent evolution” describes the emergence of oneness out of oneness, without the 
influence of external stimuli or the intervention of some orchestrating consciousness.  
Ideality becomes materiality as waves flow from a source, or as a plant grows from a 
seed. 
 “The Idea of Art” also puts forward Belinsky’s oft-repeated maxim, “Art is the 
immediate contemplation of truth, or a thinking in images” (168).  This formulation can 
be traced back to A.W. Schlegel149 and is echoed in Schelling’s and Hegel’s conception 
of art as the “sensuous appearance of the idea.”  Belinsky elaborates upon his central 
                                                        
148 Sections of Rötscher’s essay appeared in Russian translation in The Moscow Observer 
in May and June of 1838.  Victor Terras calls Rötscher a “right-wing Hegelian” with 
Neoplatonist leanings (see Terras 1974:45, 130, note 8). 




maxim as well as his understanding of the artistic image in his essay “Woe from Wit,” 
also written in 1841: 
The truth was revealed to mankind first of all in Art, which is truth made sensible 
[…], that is, truth expressed not in an abstract idea but in an image [obraz], and 
moreover, in an image which is not a conventional symbol […], but an idea-
turned-flesh, a full, organic, and immediate manifestation [of the idea] in the 
beauty of its form, with which it is fused as inseparably as the soul is with the 
body.  (in Terras 1974:80) 
 
This is Belinsky’s central conception of the work of art, derived derived from Schelling 
and Hegel: an “idea” (ideia) concretely objectified as an “artistic image” (xudozestvennii 
obraz).  The Russian word obraz functions similarly to the German Bild, carrying a 
number of overlapping meanings: “form,” “image,” “shape,” “structure,” and 
“picture.”150   Again, Belinsky’s artistic obraz is not a mimetic copy of perceptual (or 
even ideal) reality; it is an idea-turned-flesh, an ideal entity become material reality 
without losing its essential ideality.  The artistic image is a concrete “fusion of idea and 
form.”151  As in Schelling and Hegel, artistic creativity is likened to natural productivity, 
and the work of art comes into being in a fashion akin to a living entity.  Like the 
universe, the forces that move through it, and the organisms that populate it, the work of 
art is “born from within itself” (Belinsky 2001:183); it is not created at a distance from 
and in comparative relationship with an external model. 
 Belinsky’s conception of the artist’s creative process is a quintessentially 
Romantic one, emphasizing inspiration and intuition over rational design.  In this 
connection, Belinsky makes liberal use of the Schellingian and Hegelian keyword 
“immediacy” (in Russian, neprosredstvennost), which he defines in “The Idea of Art”: “It 
                                                        
150 See Terras 1974:127, 137. 





signifies both Being and action proceeding from within itself without the intervention of 
any medium” (176).  According to Belinsky, an immediate action must be prompted by 
“an inspired impulse in which all the forces of man merge into one, in which his physical 
nature permeates his spiritual essence, which, in turn, illuminates his physical nature, 
rational action becomes an instinctive movement, and vice versa, thought becomes a fact” 
(178).  Here we have a characteristically Idealist conception of a reciprocal process in 
which seemingly opposite principles suffuse one another. 
Belinsky advances his discussion of immediacy and its outcome – total, 
spontaneous organization of form – by establishing two key oppositions: organism versus 
mechanism and nature versus craft.  He writes: 
A condition of immediacy of every phenomenon is the élan of inspiration; the 
result of immediacy of every phenomenon is organization.  Only that which is 
inspired can appear immediately, only that which appears immediately can be 
organic, and only the organic can be vital.  Organism and mechanism, or nature 
and craft, are two antagonistic worlds.  (Belinsky 2001:180) 
 
Belinsky contrasts the “élan of inspiration,” which gives rise to spontaneously and 
organically organized phenomena, with the “excogitation,” “calculation,” and 
“judgment” that accompany “craft” (180).  He counterposes a human craftsman’s 
invention of a mechanical clock, which requires the copious expenditure of rational 
energy and series of refinements in its design, with the natural growth of a flower, which 
achieves perfect symmetry, proportion, and function with “no labour, excogitation, or 
calculation whatever” (182).  Elsewhere, Belinsky makes a distinction between artistic 
works that are “created” (or “born”) and those that are “made” (181), and between 
“productions creative and productions mechanical” (180).  Mechanical productions are 




spontaneously and fully organized, through a process of “revelation” (180).  Belinsky 
pushes his discourse on the “power” of nature and the “impotence” of “craft” still further, 
taking the example of a craftsman who attempts to copy the beauty of a rose by sewing 
together an artificial flower “from tissues dyed to imitate the colours of nature.”  Held up 
in comparison with an actual rose, the artificial flower appears as a “lifeless counterfeit,” 
a “cold and motionless corpse” (182).152 
At this point, a number of connections can be made between Belinsky’s aesthetics 
and Stanislavsky’s conception of theatrical art.  Like Belinsky, Stanislavsky opposes 
genuine artistic activity against emptily formalistic “craft” or “craftsmanship” (remeslo).  
In theatrical practice, “craft” consists in assembling a sequence of time-worn theatrical 
clichés – for example, “‘tearing’ at one’s heart in moments of despair, shaking one’s fists 
in fury, or wringing one’s hands in supplication” (AW 30).  The craftsperson-actor 
rationally and deliberately constructs a crudely semiotic performance, rather than 
cultivating a genuine “creative mood” (331), which would allow free, impulsive, and 
immediate playing.  Stanislavsky, like Belinsky, frequently uses the pejorative adjective 
“mechanical” – in Stanislavsky’s case, to designate the purely physical, muscularly 
habituated repetition of a sequence of movements. 
Stanislavsky presents his own version of Belinsky’s “artificial flower” example as 
he contrasts the organic creative process of his school of acting with the imitative, 
“mechanical” approach.  Stanislavsky’s alter ego Tortsov warns his students that trying to 
                                                        
152 Belinsky’s revelatory conception of the artist’s creative process is essentially 
Romantic, but it also hearkens back to that of Plotinus: the artist’s wisdom, writes 
Plotinus, like the wisdom of Nature, “is not a wisdom built up of theorems but one 
totality, not a wisdom consisting of manifold detail co-ordinated into a unity but rather a 




re-create a successful moment of emotional experiencing by aiming at the final result, by 
taking a “direct route to the feeling itself,” is “the same as trying to create a flower 
without the help of nature.  That’s impossible, and so there is nothing to do but substitute 
a prop flower” (218).  Tortsov tells his charges: “You have to be the gardener, so to 
speak, of your own heart, one who know what grows from which seeds” (226), and offers 
the advice: “[D]on’t think about the flower itself but water its roots” (218).153  The 
tending of a flower is a radically different model of the creative process from those 
presented by mimetic theories of acting.  Using Diderot’s conception of the artist’s 
process to push the analogy further, the artist as mimetic fabricator would first visualize 
the flower’s image, fully formed in the world of imagination, and then make a material 
copy of this modèle idéal.  The artist-as-gardener, on the other hand, does not attempt to 
shape the flower toward a visualized model or end-state.  She has no control over its 
precise form of manifestation; she can only create favorable conditions for its growth, 
which proceeds because of the flower’s own biological impetus.  In the same way, 
Stanislavsky’s actor does not construct a role from the perspective of external form; 
rather, she attempts to set the right psychological and physical conditions for unconscious 
creativity to arise. 
 Stanislavsky also holds a Belinskian position on the unrivalled status of natural 
creativity: he calls nature “the supreme artist” (114) and states that “[t]he most perfect 
                                                        
153 Stanislavsky uses the keyword “seed” (zerno) in a number of connections: the 
“essential meaning of a [dramatic] work” is the “seed from which it springs” (MLIA 
350); the director’s task is to “sow new seeds” in the imagination of the actor (AW 79); 
“the germ, the seeds of almost all human virtues and vices” lie within every actor” (AW 
210).  Perhaps most revealing of the significance of the seed-metaphor’s place in 
Stanislavskian thought comes in an injunction to his students at the Bolshoi Opera 





technique cannot compare with the unattainable, unachievably subtle art of nature itself” 
(201).  However, the “Nature” of Idealist philosophy is not an entity that stands outside 
the human subject; the individual is part of the ongoing movements of the divinely 
inspirited cosmos.  Within a strictly mimetic understanding of art, holding nature as 
supreme and without rival would doom the artist to the production of inferior copies, but, 
within the Idealist conception of artistic activity, natural productivity can flow through 
the organism of the artist.  When Stanislavsky demands that the actor follow the “organic 
laws” of creativity – “to study how we are consciously to arouse our unconscious, 
creative nature for superconscious, biological creation” (MLIA 348) – he means that the 
actor must train his psycho-physical organism until it becomes as immediately expressive 
as an unconstrained process of natural genesis.  Entering the “creative mood,” the 
Stanislavsky’s actor plays freely and impulsively, achieving a Belinskian immediacy of 
action, within which “his physical nature permeates his spiritual essence,” “rational 
action becomes an instinctive movement,” and “thought becomes a fact.” 
 Furthermore, the central principle of Stanislavskian thought – that acting is 
action, rather than the presentation of passion-states or the portrayal of character – may 
take inspiration from Belinksy’s writings on the theatre, which derive directly from 
Schelling’s and Hegel’s discussions of dramatic art.  Belinsky’s unfinished essay, “The 
Classification of Literature into Genera and Species” (1841), follows Schelling and Hegel 
by anointing drama as “the highest stage of development in poetry and the crowning 
glory of art” (Belinsky 1981:65), the medium in which self-conscious subjectivity most 
successfully objectifies itself to itself.  In drama, writes Belinsky, “the presence of the 




actual world […].  Drama does not admit of any lyrical effusions; the characters must 
express themselves in action” (60).  In other words, the substance of drama is objectified 
subjectivity, and the medium of that objectification is action: the self is actualized as an 
agent, whose “vital action” (70) brings it into conflict with other agents and drives the 
evolution of the drama. 
Belinsky’s emphases on drama’s generic identity (against epic and lyric), on its 
requisite teleological unity, and on pathos as the animating force of tragic character are 
all directly appropriated from Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics, which themselves expand 
upon Schelling’s analysis of drama in The Philosophy of Art (1802-03).  Hegel’s 
discussion of dramatic poetry is most remarkable in that it wholeheartedly preserves the 
Poetics’ emphasis on teleological action while stripping away entirely the vocabulary of 
imitation that had dogged theatrical theory since the Renaissance rediscovery of Aristotle.  
Hegel accords with Schelling in emphasizing the actuality of dramatic presentation, 
which “displays a complete action as actually taking place before our eyes” (Hegel 
1975:1158).154  Drama, Hegel asserts, brings before us “a happening, a deed, an action” 
(1160), which comprises the strivings and collisions of its main characters, each of whom 
embodies a different pathos (for Hegel, a driving principle of subjective freedom).  
Unlike epic, in which objective events predominate, and lyric, which dwells upon the 
inner life of the individual subject, drama deals in the externalized realization of 
subjective aims: 
[I]n drama a specific attitude of mind passes into an impulse, next into its willed 
actualization, and then into an action; it externalizes and objectifies itself […].  In 
                                                        
154 In the Philosophy of Art, Schelling describes drama as “action actually presented,” 





this way alone does the action appear an action, as the actual execution of inner 
intentions and aims.  (1161) 
 
It is clear here that Hegel uses the term action not only as a dramaturgical principle, but 
as something done (an action) by a dramatic hero.  Rather than recapitulating the 
Aristotelian (and Platonic) formula of drama as the mimesis of action, Hegel argues that 
the essence of drama lies in the actualization of subjective intention and emotion as 
action.  Within such a theory of the theatre, the actor – the one who acts, the one who 
carries out actions – can take a more central role. 
Unlike Aristotle’s Poetics, which clearly stands in the background of Hegelian 
dramatic theory, Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics emphasize the aspect of “scenic 
production,” which “give[s] real life to the whole work of art” by realizing “the action in 
the entirety of its mental and physical actuality” (1158).  The public is confronted with a 
“living actuality of situations, circumstances, characters, and actions” (1177).  This living 
actuality is, of course, embodied by human performers: 
The properly perceptible material of dramatic poetry […] is not merely the human 
voice and the spoken word but the whole man who does not merely express 
feelings, ideas, and thoughts, but is involved with his whole being in a concrete 
action […].  (1182). 
 
This “whole man,” spiritually immersed in vigorous action, is the actor-as-character.  It 
would be wrong, however, to try to extrapolate from Hegel’s rather cursory comments on 
acting a comprehensively worked out Idealist vision of the actor.  Hegel’s primary 
interest lies in drama as a poetic genre, not in the practice of acting.  However, in his 
action-based, non-mimetic account of theatrical presentation, in his understanding of 
action as teleologically intentional, and in his view that drama unifies the subjective and 




many ways prefigures Stanislavsky’s post-Romantic conception of acting, whose central 
aim is the “incarnation” or “embodiment” (voploshchenie) of the “life of the human 
spirit” (zhizn’ chelovecheskogo dukha) in physical form, and not the portrayal of 
successive passion-states or the imitation of an ideal type. 
 The claim that Stanislavsky’s paradigm of acting-as-action might derive, at least 
in part, from the enduring influence of Idealist philosophy on Russian thought is tempting 
to explore.  Doing so, however, requires some clarification of Stanislavsky’s keyword 
“action” (deistvie).  “Action” for Stanislavsky is goal-oriented intention carried out by a 
subject upon an object; it is the mental-and-physical striving to effect some change in 
another entity.  Action is “psycho-physical”: the mind, soul, and body are together 
engaged in action’s dynamically teleological striving.  As Stanislavsky writes: “In every 
physical action there’s something psychological, and there is something physical in every 
psychological action” (AW 180).  Action can manifest itself in the most “precise, 
accessible, concrete, physical actions” (512) – such as counting money, lighting a fire, or 
searching for a brooch – but also in silent, motionless, “inner action” (180), which moves 
dynamically through the actor’s psyche but reveals itself to the external eye in only the 
subtlest physical symptoms.  It is possible to specify a character’s action in a particular 
moment in a play by choosing for it a transitive verb – “I want to be near him,” “I want to 
hold her to me” (150-51) – but, ultimately, human actions possess a degree of psycho-
physiological complexity that language cannot capture.  Verbs are preferable to nouns in 
specifying a character’s tasks because “a noun is a representation, it expresses a certain 
state, an image, a simple occurrence,” and defining objectives with nouns invites an actor 




It is impossible to “imitate” genuine action in Stanislavsky’s sense; one can only 
do actions.  As soon as the actor enters a “stagey,” “representational” mode of 
consciousness – that is, when she “play[s] the image” of a character or an emotion rather 
than engaging in “genuine, productive, fit for purpose action” (149) – action ceases to be 
action and becomes activity, movement, gesture, lacking an intentional impetus within 
the dramatic situation.  The actor must not monitor the way in which the action is 
unfolding, but rather place her concentration on the object of the action – usually, another 
actor, but sometimes the self, a physical object, or an imaginary focus.  Holding the 
attention on this external object – rather than on the audience – fosters an immersive 
mode of concentration, so that the Stanislavskian actor achieves a “reality of doing”155 
within the subjunctive circumstances established by the dramatic fiction.  In other words, 
Stanislavsky’s actor-in-action is capable of bringing into the theatre the elemental units of 
social behavior – the pragmata that make up human life – without their being 
ontologically transformed into “imitations” or “representations” of themselves. 
A lengthy passage in Creating a Role provides the clearest articulation of 
Stanislavsky’s conviction that “[t]he art of the actor is the art of inner and outer action” 
(AW 582): 
Life is action; that is why our lively art, which stems from life, is 
preponderantly active. […] 
‘[A]ction’ is not the same as ‘miming,’ it is not anything that the actor is 
pretending to present, not something external, but rather something internal, 
nonphysical, a spiritual activity. […] 
Scenic action is the movement from the soul to the body, from the center 
to the periphery, from the internal to the external, from the thing an actor feels to 
its physical form.  [emphasis in original] (CR 48-49) 
                                                        
155 I borrow this apt phrase from David Z. Saltz, who borrows it from Sanford Meisner, in 
his “The Reality of Doing: Real Speech Acts in the Theatre,” in Method Acting 





For Stanislavsky, then, action is not a dramaturgical concept, but a principle of life 
imported into theatrical circumstances.  A similar, though shorter, passage defines action 
in An Actor’s Work: “Acting is action.  The basis of theatre is doing, dynamism.  The 
word ‘drama’ itself in Ancient Greek means ‘an action being performed.’ […]  So, drama 
is an action we can see being performed, and, when he comes on, the actor becomes an 
agent in that action” (AW 40).  Here Stanislavsky seems to be directly referencing 
Aristotle’s etymological speculation in the Poetics: that both tragedy and comedy 
“portray people in action,” and “it is because of this that some people derive the term 
drama from the enactive mimesis of agents [drontas]” (Aristotle 1987:32-3).  
Stanislavsky’s muted references to the Poetics in the passages cited above show that he is 
deliberately applying a fundamentally Aristotelian, teleological conception of action not 
to dramatic literature but to the actor’s art. 
Francis Fergusson astutely compares Stanislavskian action with the classicist S.H. 
Butcher’s interpretation of Aristotelian praxis: as a “psychical energy working outwards” 
(in Aristotle 1951:123), or, in Fergusson’s own rephrasing, as “the movement of the 
psyche toward the object of its desire” (Fergusson 1966:87).  Fergusson numbers among 
several scholars who have tentatively proposed an Aristotle-Stanislavsky connection,156 
and a direct influence is certainly possible.157  However, we should also consider another 
possibility: that Stanislavsky re-viewed Aristotle, at least in part, through the lens of 
                                                        
156 Stanislavsky scholars have recently suggested an affinity between Stanislavskian 
deistvie and Aristotelian praxis include Jonathan Pitches and Natalie Crohn Schmitt (see 
Crohn Schmitt 1990:95-7, Pitches 2006:11-3). 
157 A new Russian translation of the Poetics of Aristotle with commentary by B. 
Ordynsky appeared in 1854 and was prominently reviewed by Chernyshevsky in the 




Idealist dramatic theory, which strips away the mimetic aspect of Aristotle’s formula, 
“the imitation of action,” and emphasizes the actuality of scenic action.  Idealist 
philosophy transformed the action concept, rendering it subjective, teleological, and 
processual, like all productive forces within a universe evolving itself from within.  
Hegel’s contention that in drama “a specific attitude of mind passes into an impulse, next 
into its willed actualization,” so that the action of a drama manifests itself as “an action, 
as the actual execution of inner intentions and aims,” could be mistaken as being directly 
excerpted from Stanislavsky’s An Actor’s Work.  Whatever the pathway of influence, 
Stanislavsky shares with Belinsky and his German influences a conception of dramatic 
action grounded in the impulse and intention of the actor-as-agent and, as we shall see in 
the following pages, wields it against mimetic theory’s longstanding view of the actor-as-
imitator. 
 
Mimesis, Genesis, Indifference 
 
Anti-mimetic rhetoric makes up an important strand of Stanislavsky’s philosophy of 
acting.  He defines his own “art of experiencing” against two spiritually impoverished 
modes of theatrical practice: the school of “craft,” which, as already stated, constructs a 
role out of ready-made conventions, and the school of “representation” (predstavlenie) 
which sculpts emotional experience into an externally repeatable form.158  “Craft” relies 
entirely upon “mimicry, copying, imitation” (AW 25), which Stanislavsky regards as 
being aimed directly – and illegitimately – at external form.  The “mechanical” approach 
                                                        
158 Stanislavsky himself emphasized that these three “schools” of the actor’s art could be 
separated only in theory and that, within any given performance, moments of “craft” and 




of craftsperson-actors requires them to “always have to begin from the end, that is from a 
bodily imitation of the outward results of feeling” (Stanislavsky 1984:152).  Such actors 
never set the right conditions for the “seed” of the role to grow with organic 
unpredictability.  Actors working within the “art of representation,” on the other hand, 
convert once-felt emotion into a dependably repeatable, externally physical “scenic form 
of the role,” which “illustrates,” “explains,” and “demonstrates” (rather than actualizes) 
the “life of the human spirit” (161).  Stanislavsky formulates his condemnation of the “art 
of representation” in thoroughly mimeticist terms: this approach “shows the spectator not 
the original itself (created earlier in privacy), but merely a portrait of this original” (158). 
 Stanislavsky defined his “art of experiencing” against the mimeticist conceptions 
of the actor’s creative process in two precursor texts of acting theory: Diderot’s Paradoxe 
and the French actor Benoît-Constant Coquelin’s L’Art du comédien (1894).159  For the 
instigator of a grand practical-theoretical reform project like Stanislavsky’s, it can come 
as a source of tremendous exhilaration to find a set of values and practices radically 
contrary to one’s own neatly codified in a single text.  This allows the reformer to dispute 
an opposing paradigm with great rhetorical economy.  Brecht would later put 
Stanislavsky to such use, and it was to such use that Stanislavsky put “Coquelin’s little 
book” (Stanislavski 2008:25), which forcefully renewed the mimetic paradigm within 
acting theory and recapitulated Diderot’s position on the actor’s need for emotionless 
                                                        
159 Stanislavsky made a study of historical acting theory – including treatises by the 
Riccobonis, Diderot, the French actor François Talma, and the German actors August 
Wilhelm Iffland and Konrad Ekhof – during the summer of 1914, while vacationing at 





L’Art du comédian opens with an attempt to define acting through the 
longstanding analogy between the theatrical and visual arts.  Coquelin writes: “the actor’s 
medium is – himself.  His own face, his body, his life is the material of his art; the thing 
he works and moulds to draw out from it his creation” (Coquelin 1954:25).  Coquelin 
argues that the chief characteristic of the actor’s creative process is its “dualism”: the 
mental-spiritual aspect of the actor’s being fixes upon the “model” provided by the author 
(the dramatic character) and instantiates its “likeness” in his physical being. “[L]ike the 
painter,” writes Coquelin, the actor “realises every feature [of his ‘model’] and fixes the 
likeness not on canvas, but himself” (25-6).  Furthering the artist-material analogy, 
Coquelin posits that “two beings […] co-exist within the mind of the actor” (28): 
“Number One,” which is the “master,” the “soul,” the “seer,” and “Number Two,” which 
is the “slave,” the “body,” the “instrument,” the “executant” of the master’s directives 
(54).  Coquelin alienates the actor from his organism, splitting the actor’s organic unity 
into a dualistic relationship of mind-to-body, of “One”-to-“Two.”  Within Coquelin’s 
radically dualistic scheme, the conscious mind always operates with complete control 
over bodily expression.  (Indeed, Coquelin’s is one of acting theory’s fantasies of total 
control, along with that of Diderot’s Paradoxe and Edward Gordon Craig’s essay on the 
                                                        
160 Coquelin’s work was an expansion of an earlier treatise, L’Art et le comédien (1880). 
Stanislavsky’s personal notes on the later, more extensive treatise are now housed in the 
Moscow Art Theatre archives (see Whyman 2008:48).  Coquelin’s second treatise 
functioned as a position paper in a celebrated international debate on the nature of the 
actor’s emotion, re-energized by the translation into English of Diderot’s Paradoxe in 
1883. Contributions to the debate from Henry Irving and Dion Boucicault prompted 





“Über-marionette”).  Echoing Diderot, whose authority he invokes,161 Coquelin 
emphatically concludes that there is no place for powerfully genuine emotions on the 
stage: “[T]he actor must always remain master of himself […]; he must see what he is 
doing, judge himself, and retain his self-possession. […]  Art, I repeat it, is not 
identification but representation” (59).  Hence the name of Stanislavsky’s second 
“school” or “trend” of acting practice: the “art of representation.” 
Coquelin conflates of the operations of the mind with the faculty of sight – a 
hallmark of mimetic thinking since Plato.  He also defines theatrical art as the “creation 
of living types” (63) – a clear invocation of Diderot’s ideal type, and, perhaps 
unwittingly, Plato’s typos.  After this incursion into mimetic thinking, it is not surprising 
that the scenario of the actor at the mirror arises prominently within L’art du comédien’s 
early pages.  This occurs when Coquelin describes the creative process of the nineteenth-
century actor François-Louis Lesueur, his chosen exemplar of diligence and creativity in 
the art of “reproduction”: 
He retired into a kind of ‘dark-room’ with closed and curtained windows 
surrounded by his paints, his wigs, all the tools of his trade; there, along, but 
artificial light in front of his mirrors he worked at his facial make-up; making for 
himself twenty-hundred different exteriors before arriving at the real thing he 
required; the one that satisfied his own mind and convinced him of its truth.  
When finally, with a last stroke of the pencil, he completed the likeness (he would 
spend hours on a single wrinkle) the result was marvellous.  (32) 
 
While Diderot mentions only in passing that his insensible actor studies his part in front 
of a mirror, Coquelin puts the actor’s faceoff with the reflected image at the heart of his 
creative process.  The mirror allows Coquelin’s Lesueur to see himself outside himself, to 
work upon the image of the self as an object-at-a-distance.  Lesueur is for Coquelin what 
                                                        




Clairon was for Diderot: a celebrated actor whose creative process could be forcefully 
imagined in terms of the theoretical model being articulated.  The scenario of Lesueur at 
the mirror allows Coquelin to propose what Clairon in reverie, her modèle idéal hovering 
in her mind’s eye, enabled Diderot to maintain: a theory of the actor’s creation-at-a-
distance, or creation across a mimetic gap, despite the fact of being and having a body.162 
Both Coquelin and Diderot confine the actor to a relationship with some external 
model, reflected image, or imagined figure that exists outside and at a distance from his 
or her being.  Clairon and Lesueur must therefore bridge an ontological divide as they 
strive to shape themselves into increasingly perfect copies of the original types they are 
required to represent.  Diderot’s is the most conceptually perfect (though still internally 
inconsistent) mimetic theory of acting ever produced, and Coquelin achieved an 
anachronistic renewal of the one-to-one schema at its core, long after the dominance of 
the “imitation of nature” as an aesthetic doctrine had been broken by Romantic thought.  
Stanislavsky’s philosophy of acting radically undermines long-enduring mimetic theories 
of the theatre, which divide the actor against himself and situate performer and character 
at opposite poles of the one-to-one schema.  Stanislavsky, on the other hand, places the 
actor at the center – at the center of the fictional circumstances, at the center of the theatre 
event, at the center of the circulation of energies between stage and auditorium.  
However, Stanislavsky’s repudiation of the imitative techniques of “craft” and 
“representation” is not merely, or even primarily, a theoretical one.  It is thoroughly 
                                                        
162 In his earlier L’Art et le comédien (1880), Coquelin also labors to establish a 
theoretical and affective distance between actor and character: the self-composure of the 
actor allows him “to assimilate [the] character, to dissect and analyze it at will, without 
ceasing to be for an instant distinctly himself, as separate a thing as the painter and his 




practical in its intent and based in personal insights.  Stanislavsky’s understanding of – 
and antipathy for – imitative acting was shaped by his own artistic struggles.  Though 
“Tortsov” describes “craft” and “representation” as rival “schools” of theatrical practice, 
a reading of My Life in Art makes clear that Stanislavsky’s understanding of these 
approaches derives from his own youthful failures as an actor without a “system.” 
In the “Artistic Childhood” and “Artistic Adolescence” sections of My Life in Art, 
the young Stanislavsky struggles to break free of the impulse to mimic the mannerisms of 
celebrated performers, to strive to be an “exact copy” of his acting hero of the moment 
(MLIA 36).   This meant that the hero-worshipping Stanislavsky was limited to 
“repeat[ing] something that had already been done and blindly copy[ing] the original” 
(36).163  Like Lesueur in his “dark-room,” the young Stanislavsky spent days practicing 
in front of a mirror in the dim hallway of his family’s empty town house, while the rest of 
its inhabitants were away in the country for the summer of 1884.164  When actually 
performing, confesses Stanislavsky, “I did not concentrate on what was happening 
onstage at any given moment but on what was happening on stages elsewhere whence I 
took my models” (MLIA 79).  What mode of consciousness is actually being described 
here?  A kind of half-reverie, perhaps, in which schematic flashes of recalled 
performances flash up before the “mind’s eye” as the performer consciously attempts to 
direct the modulations of his voice, the movements of his body, and the expressions of 
his face into approximate correspondence with his absent model.  Stanislavsky was not 
referencing a modèle idéal in the way that Diderot describes in the Paradoxe, but he was 
                                                        
163 As Stanislavsky’s theatrical taste advances, he shifts his identificatory allegiances 
from the comedian Nikolai Musil, who played simpletons, to the famous Imperial theatre 
actor Sadovsky (MLIA 44), and later to the visiting Italian star Ernesto Rossi (54).  




summoning the habitual expressions of other actors though some mode of imaginative 
summoning.  
A turning point in the young Stanislavsky’s career came during his work on 
Pushkin’s The Miserly Knight with the Society of Art and Literature, under the direction 
of Aleksandr Fedotov.  Fedotov demonstrated his conception of the ageing knight for 
Stanislavsky to imitate, a directorial methodology typical of the period.165  But 
Stanislavsky, then a self-titled “tasteless copycat,” was drawn away from Fedotov’s 
artistically rich conception and instead towards the narcissistic image of himself as an 
operatic baritone in tights and a swordbelt.  “An agonizing split occurred,” writes 
Stanislavsky. “I could not decide which of the two models it would be better for me to 
copy” (MLIA 92).  While working on the role, Stanislavsky actually carried a photograph 
of a glamorous baritone hidden in his pocket, but made the mistake of showing the 
photograph to Fedotov and was viciously mocked for his “vulgar,” “polluted” artistic 
sensibility (92-3).  In a symbolically charged act of renunciation not unlike Plato’s 
tragedy-burning in Diogenes Laertius,166 the shamed Stanislavsky symbolically shuts the 
photograph of the baritone away in his desk and enters upon an unfamiliar pathway: the 
process of role-creation without a pre-existing, external model.  This process will lead to 
the conviction of his mature theory: “The actor creates the life of the human spirit of the 
role from his own living soul and incarnates it in his own living body.  There is no other 
material for the creation of a role” (in Carnicke 2009:133). 
                                                        
165 “Of course it is not good to teach by demonstrating because it leads to copying” 
(MLIA 98).  Stanislavsky excuses Fedotov for his demonstrative approach, because the 
latter often had to work with amateurs under conditions of extremely limited rehearsal 
time. 




It was not until Stanislavsky’s work on the role of Ananias in the realist 
playwright Aleksey Pisemsky’s Bitter Fate, however, that Stanislavsky began to practice 
the “art of representation” proper: “Having recognized the character and begun to live it 
[that is, having achieved some moments of “experiencing” in rehearsals], nonetheless I 
started to copy it out of habit.  Nonetheless I was copying a character I had created on my 
own rather than someone else’s mannerisms or tricks” (MLIA 103).  Despite sporadic 
breakthroughs, in the years that followed Stanislavsky repeatedly fell back on his habits 
of copying and external imitation, often falling into “mechanical outer acting” and the 
strained expressivity that often accompanies it (110).  Major breakthroughs came in a 
dramatic adaption of Dostoyevsky’s The Village of Stepanchikovo and Its Inhabitants and 
in Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People.  In these productions, Stanislavsky “became” the 
roles of Rostanev and Stockmann – rather than “playing at” them by “mimicking” other 
actors’ performances.  However, lacking a firm basis in technique, the intuitive creativity 
that marked these successes eventually bleached away.  In playing Stockmann over an 
extended period, Stanislavsky fell back into the “art of representation”: “I imitated the 
external signs of feelings and actions but did not feel real experiences, or real urges to 
action” (254).  This realization contributed to the artistic crisis that prompted 
Stanislavsky to re-evaluate his artistic career in Finland during the summer of 1906 and, 
subsequently, to seek out more systematic methods of creativity. 
When he began to work as a director, Stanislavsky took up the dominant 
pedagogical and directorial methods of the turn-of-the-century Russian theatre, which 
relied heavily upon demonstration and copying.167  While directing Leo Tolstoy’s The 
                                                        




Fruits of Enlightenment in 1891, Stanislavsky followed the demonstrative-imitative 
precedent of his directorial mentor Fedotov: “I showed the actors what I had seen in my 
imagination and they copied me” (MLIA 118).  He was still relying upon the technique of 
demonstration in the early days of the Moscow Art Theatre (174-75), drawing up 
complex production plans in the privacy of his study and demonstrating his conception of 
each role to his actors: “I would write everything down in my study, and play all the parts 
myself so that the young actors could go on copying me until they had fully absorbed 
what I had done.”  Looking back on this period of the MAT’s history, Stanislavsky 
writes, critically: “we went straight for externals, the end results of the creative process, 
ignoring its first, most important phase, the birth of feeling.  In other words, we began 
with the physical form and did not first experience the sprit, the inner content, which then 
had to be given outward shape” (184).  The attempt at one-to-one transmission of the 
“form” of the role from the director’s imaginative conception and demonstration to the 
actor’s copying and demonstration was not fueled by superconscious inspiration; rather 
“[e]verything was always conscious” (191).  In other words, the process of the MAT at 
this time was based almost entirely upon what Belinsky would have called 
“excogitation,” “calculation,” and “judgment” (Belinsky 2001:180), leaving no creative 
space for organic impulsiveness and immediate action. 
 By the time he had reached “artistic maturity” (MLIA 251), however, 
                                                        
categorizes the traditional mode of pedagogy within Russian acting companies as based 
in the imitation of other actors as models: “The pupils were taught just to read and act 
according to a demonstration, so that each of us copied his teacher.”  As a result of 
emulating a fine actor with a characteristic idiosyncrasy – nodding his head while reciting 
– “[w]hole classes of students graduated with nodding heads” (MLIA 61).  Vasili 
Toporkov also discusses the widespread practice of directorial demonstration before 





Stanislavsky had developed a number of practical techniques to shift the actor’s 
consciousness away from imitative modes.  Imitative acting, as theorized by Diderot and 
Coquelin, or as practiced by the youthful Stanislavsky, requires two modes of 
consciousness in combination: attempting, as much as possible, to see oneself from the 
perspective of an “outside eye,” and comparing this conception of one’s external aspect 
against some form at a literal or cognitive distance from the self (another human being, a 
reflection in a mirror, or a mental image of oneself or another human being).  As we have 
already seen, Stanislavsky’s technique of acting as genuine action executed by a subject 
(the actor) upon an object (another actor, the self, or an imagined other) disallows self-
monitoring and self-comparison as valid modes of the actor’s consciousness.  
Furthermore, the mature Stanislavsky forbid his actors to observe themselves in a mirror, 
which “teaches an actor to watch the outside rather than the inside of his soul” (AP 19).  
The mirror is, of course, a critical device in Diderot’s and Coquelin’s conceptions of 
acting technique, and a key analogy in mimetic theories of art going back to Plato. 
Finally, Stanislavsky forbids a mode of imagination that visualizes the self 
“outside” the self: “Real acting begins […] when there is no character as yet, but an ‘I’ in 
the hypothetical circumstances.  If that is not the case, you lost contact with yourself, you 
see the role from outside, you copy it” (in Toporkov 2004:107).  Stanislavsky’s warning 
against “seeing the role from outside” might be read as a chiefly metaphorical way of 
describing an unhelpful attitude or orientation in the actor, but this is not the case.  It 
should be understood as a quite literal injunction, given the phenomenology of the 
imagination laid out in An Actor’s Work.  There Stanislavsky distinguishes between three 




visualized events unfold as a “mere spectator”; a mode in which one observes a figure of 
the self within an imagined scene (“you are your own audience”); and a final mode in 
which one enters the life of the imagination as a “genuine participant” (AW 72), so that 
one no longer sees an image of the self, but rather the persons and objects surrounding 
one, within a kind of “virtual reality.”  Stanislavsky encourages the third, most “active” 
mode of imagination over and above the others.  In this way, a mental image of the 
actor’s onstage actions will never precede his actions-in-the-moment, and he will never 
attempt to embody a behavioral construct pre-imagined as being performed by a figure 
external to the self.  The actor’s action – a sincere and actual doing in the present moment 
– is a primary rather than secondary act, which happens for the first time in rehearsal, and 
then again and again “as if for the first time” (in Toporkov 2004:192) in subsequent 
rehearsals and performances. 
Stanislavsky’s rejection of imitation in theory and practice does not mean, 
however, that all vestiges of a mimetic vocabulary are banished from his theoretical 
works.  At times, Stanislavskian thought reveals a “renegotiated or redefined 
mimeticism” (Halliwell 2002:365), within which the language of image and imitation is 
transformed by Stanislavsky’s post-Idealist, neo-Romantic values.  A prominent 
example: the actors of Stanislavsky’s school aim to present “living, active human 
images” (in Gorchakov 1985:193), infused with emotion and intention.  We can 
understand Stanislavsky’s “living image” in the light of Belinsky’s artistic obraz as well 
as the German Romantic-Idealist keyword Bild from which it was derived: as a nexus of 
spiritualized form and formalized spirit, which gives the life of the soul a physical 




an artwork’s formal, objective, and external aspects – with a subjective dimension.  
Stanislavsky therefore writes: “I life the live of this different human being, the man of my 
part […]  I, the actor, live in his image” [emphasis added] (SAS 223). 
The view that actor and character are separate entities, occupying polar positions 
across an ontological divide, is the very essence of mimeticist theories of acting.  There is 
an unresolved tension in Stanislavskian thought as to whether the character should be 
conceptualized as a being distinct from the actor.  Typically, Stanislavsky holds to an 
organicist-expressive view that the character emerges as a factor of the actor’s absorption 
in the intentions and conditions suggested by the dramatic fiction: “Real acting begins 
[…] when there is no character as yet, but an ‘I’ in the hypothetical circumstances; “The 
character will emerge as a result of your performing truthful actions in the given 
circumstances” (in Toporkov 2004:107, 85).  Stanislavsky repeatedly uses the 
hyphenated terms chelovek-akter (“human being-actor”) and artisto-rol’ (“artist-role”) to 
signal that the actor does not leave behind his or her own identity when rehearsing or 
performing a part.168 
At some moments, however, the character does appear as an entity separate from 
the actor, but usually when Stanislavsky is advocating the goal of “fusion” between 
performer and role.  If the actor pursues the wants, visualizes the images, and carries out 
the physical actions appropriate to the character under the fictional given circumstances, 
“he will come close to the role and will begin to feel as one with it” [emphasis added] 
(AW 19).  For the actor under such conditions, “‘the part and I’ no longer exist, but what 
exists is ‘I-the part,’ since his own individual ‘I’ has disappeared, leaving only the ‘I’ of 
                                                        




his creative intuition” (SAS 174).  Describing his own intuitive success in the role of 
Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People, Stanislavsky writes: “Stockmann’s and Stanislavsky’s 
body and soul fused organically with one another” (118).  Stanislavsky splits actor and 
character from each other in order to conceptualize their union, and we can perhaps best 
understand Stanislavsky’s conception of “fusion” in terms of the Idealist notion of 
“indifference” (Indifferenz), which describes a unity of opposites without preliminary 
separation.  Stanislavsky’s concept of “fusion” really points toward an experiential 
transformation of the actor’s body and consciousness, a shift toward a subjunctive mode 
of being, rather than a literal synthesis of discrete entities.  We may need to accept a 
certain level of paradox as Stanislavsky mixes metaphors of synthesis and genesis: 
through “fusion” with the role, a new being is “birthed” (the actor-role), and the 
emergence of this hybrid entity is marked by the actor’s feeling himself as himself within 
the circumstances of the dramatic fiction. 
 While Stanislavsky consistently conceptualizes his actor’s process in terms of 
genesis or synthesis, in certain, scattered passages he does suggest that the imitation of 
living models can play a positive role in an actor’s development.  Of his youthful 
infatuation with the Italian tragedian Ernesto Rossi, Stanislavsky writes that the 
emulation of a great actor “can be both helpful and harmful.  Harmful because copying is 
a stumbling block to personal creativity, but helpful because by copying a great model we 
grow accustomed to what is good” (MLIA 54).  Taking into oneself the expressive 
characteristics of a great actor, then, can never serve as the right road toward the creation 
of a role, but it can, it seems, provide the mimic with some sense, however diminished, of 




relaxation, sincerity, and emotional availability.  Indeed, Stanislavsky often stresses that 
the route toward “the internal through the external” – while not the “best approach in 
acting” – can sometimes yield benefits (70).   
An even more positive form of imitation – as an organic process, through which 
otherness from an external source is unconsciously incorporated by the self – appears in a 
brief anecdote from My Life in Art: while preparing to play the role of Othello in 1896, 
Stanislavsky studies the bearing and gestures of an Arab gentleman he meets in a Parisian 
restaurant.  Stanislavsky recalls at his naïve enthusiasm at having discovered a living 
model for his part: 
Back in my hotel room I spent half the night standing in front of the mirror draped 
in sheets and towels, to turn myself into an elegant Moor with swift turns of the 
head, movement of the hands and the body like a graceful deer, an imperious 
walk, slender arms with palms turned towards anyone speaking to me. (MLIA 
144) 
 
This anecdote resembles the episode in the first chapter of An Actor’s Work, when the 
student actor Kostya, also preparing to play a scene from Othello, spreads melted 
chocolate across his face and experiments with animalistic movements in front of a 
mirror.169  Stanislavsky’s approach, however, was based in actual observation – rather 
than the gross, racist clichés of Kostya’s posturing – and, over time, yields up unexpected 
results: “I had made the sudden movements of the Arab, his flowing movements, the 
open palms, so much mine that I could not always discard them in my private life.  They 
came spontaneously” (MLIA 146).  The movements of Stanislavsky’s model have been 
so thoroughly incorporated – that is, absorbed into the body – that they arise unbidden, 
spontaneously, organically.  Stanislavsky’s description of the movements of another 
                                                        




become “so much mine” echoes the earliest meanings of mimesis in Greek poetry, drama, 
and philosophy discussed in chapter one of this study.  A cryptic sentence from the 
unfinished, fragmentary conclusion to the Russian version of An Actor’s Work suggests 
that Stanislavsky, felt this archaic understanding of mimesis – as the absorption and re-
expression of otherness – to be central to the very nature of acting: “The sense of being 
forced, subjected to something alien can only disappear when actors have made 
something other than themselves their own” (AW 611).  Despite his general repudiation 
of mimicry as a practical technique and of imitation as a conceptual schema, 
Stanislavsky’s sometimes strained efforts at philosophical self-definition thus bring 
about, if only for fleeting theoretical moments, a reconciliation between mimesis and 
genesis as practical capacities of the human organism. 
 
 The “Truth of the Passions,” “Communion,” and the Oneness of Actor with Spectator 
 
 
If an understanding of imitation as organic summoning rather than artificial copying 
arises, however infrequently, within Stanislavsky’s discussion of acting practice, another 
meaning of mimesis, long established within theatrical theory, surfaces within his 
account of the theatre’s dynamics of reception.  This mimesis describes some kind of 
one-to-one correspondence between the experience of the performer and the experience 
of the audience member.  Stanislavsky interweaves influential theories of aesthetic 
appreciation by Pushkin and Tolstoy with some basic tenets of Hindu philosophy in 
forging his own, idiosyncratic conception of the energetic oneness that unites stage with 
auditorium. 




circumstances” (predlagaemye obstoiatelstva) – one of the few Stanislavskian terms to 
survive its incorporation into the American “Method” almost unscathed – from Pushkin’s 
unfinished “Notes on popular drama and on M.P. Pogodin’s Martha, the Governor’s 
Wife” (written in 1830 and published posthumously).  In this essay, Pushkin offers a 
formula for dramatic art that would become a fundamental postulate of Stanislavskian 
theory and practice: “The truth concerning the passions, a verisimilitude in the feelings 
experienced in given situations – that is what our intelligence demands of a dramatist” 
[emphasis added] (Pushkin 1971:265). Stanislavsky himself dubbed the formula 
“Pushkin’s Aphorism,” repeated it constantly in his writings, and included it in his 
famous diagram of the “System,” where it features as one of the three fundamental bases 
of his “art of experiencing.”170 
In the “Notes on popular drama,” Pushkin stresses the inadequacy of mimetic and 
utilitarian theories of art, declaring that Russian aesthetics still labors under the notions 
that “the beautiful consists in the imitation of the beauties of nature and that the chief 
merit of art lies in its usefulness” (Pushkin 1971:264).171  Rather than assuming 
“verisimilitude” to be “the principal condition of dramatic art,” Pushkin poses the 
provocation: “What if it were to be proved to us that it is precisely verisimilitude which is 
excluded by the very essence of dramatic art?  […]   [W]herein lies the verisimilitude in a 
building, divided into two parts, of which one is filled with spectators?” (164).  Pushkin, 
                                                        
170 For reproductions of Stanislavsky’s diagram of the “System,” see Carnicke 2009:123, 
Whyman 2008:40-41. 
171 Pushkin associates the “imitation of nature” doctrine in particular with the 
Enlightenment aesthetician Johann Christoph Gottsched, whom he calls a “ponderous 
pedant” (Pushkin 1971:264).  Gottsched’s Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst vor die 
Deutschen (“Attempt at a Critical Poetics for the Germans”) of 1730 is heavily indebted 
to Boileau and “hold[s] fast to a strict conceptual interpretation of imitation in the sense 




like Stanislavsky after him, emphasizes the highly unnatural conditions of the basic 
theatrical situation, which architecturally and psychologically divides an assembly of 
human beings into those privileged to watch and those required to perform. 
Rejecting the principle of “verisimilitude” as conventionally understood, Pushkin 
instead offers a robustly affective explanation for drama’s basic appeal, function, and 
requirements: the theatre derives its fundamental interest by “working on the crowd and 
satisfying its curiosity” with “the presentation of passions” and “the outpourings of the 
human spirit” (265).  It is in the course of arguing for this affective basis to theatrical art 
that Pushkin makes his demand for the “truth concerning the passions, a verisimilitude in 
the feelings experienced in given situations.”  Pushkin absolves dramatic artists from the 
need to pursue a verisimilar ideal of one-to-one correspondence between onstage scenes 
and worldly scenarios.  Instead he requires, despite the architectural division that creates 
an asymmetrical dynamic of watching-and-performing, that the theatre provide a felt 
truthfulness of emotion, an experiential correspondence between the passions sparked by 
dramatic scenes and those undergone in lived situations.  In other words, theatrical 
performances need not look like life, but they must feel like life.  Although Stanislavsky 
draws more subtle distinctions about the nature of emotion in the theatre than does 
Pushkin, he adapts the poet’s basic demand as a challenge to the actor: that he or she 
actually experience feelings analogous to those of the character within a fictional 
situation, in order to catalyze such actually experienced feelings in the spectator. 
 The second major Russian literary figure whose affectively based philosophy of 




of Stanislavsky’s icons” (Whyman 2008:2),172 and both Sharon Marie Carnicke and Rose 
Whyman suggest that Stanislavsky was inspired by the broad framework and specific 
vocabulary of Tolstoy’s late-career essay, “What is Art?” (1898).  Tolstoy opens the 
essay with a sweepingly dismissive summary of Germany aesthetics from Baumgarten 
and Kant to Theodor Vischer and Herbart.173  He also subjects the “mystical aesthetics” 
of Hegel to particularly violent criticism, specifically rejecting the central notion of 
Idealist art theory: “Art is not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some 
mysterious idea, beauty, God” (Tolstoy 1995:30, 40).  Instead of considering art in terms 
of its formal properties, its verisimilar correspondence, or its ideal content, Tolstoy 
asserts that art must be considered “one of the conditions of human life,” and, 
specifically, “a means of communion among people” (37).  For Tolstoy, this mode of 
communion (obshchenie) is primarily emotional: “The activity of art is based on the fact 
that man, as he receives through hearing or sight the expressions of another man’s 
feelings, is capable of experiencing the same feelings as the man who expresses them” 
(38).  Artistic activity relies upon the basic “capacity of people to be infected by the 
feelings of other people”; “a man laughs, and another feels merry; he weeps, and the man 
who hears this weeping feels sad.” 
Spontaneous emotional contagion does not, however, yet constitute artistic 
activity: “Art begins when a man, with the purpose of communicating to other people a 
feeling he once experienced, calls it up again within himself and expressing it by certain 
                                                        
172 Stanislavsky met Tolstoy personally on a number of occasions and describes being 
over-awed in the presence of his moral and artistic idol (see MLIA 122-26).  
Stanislavsky’s personal assistant Leopold Sulerzhitsky (the model for Tortsov’s assistant 
“Rakhmanov” in An Actor’s Work) was a fervent Tolstoyan. 




external signs” (38).  Artistic production, therefore, requires a technique of re-
experiencing emotion – what Stanislavsky, under the influence of the French 
psychologist Théodule Ribot, would later call “affective memory” – along with the 
capacity to express this emotion through externally comprehensible forms.  Tolstoy re-
states his definition in sum: “Art is that human activity which consists in one man’s 
consciously conveying to others, by certain external signs, the feelings he has 
experienced, and in others being infected by those feelings and also experiencing them” 
(40).  The fundamental relationship in art, according to Tolstoy, is not the conceptual one 
obtaining between copy and model, or artwork and idea, but rather the affectively rich 
human relationship between artist and receiver. 
 Despite Tolstoy’s famous dislike for the theatre, Tolstoy’s conception of art as 
affectively communicable experience is more directly applicable to the theatre than to 
any other art form of his time.  Both Sharon Marie Carnicke and Rose Whyman suggest 
that Stanislavsky drew the affective keywords “infection” (zarazhenie) and 
“experiencing” (perezhivanie) directly from Tolstoy’s essay.174  If this in indeed the case, 
then Stanislavsky would have named his approach to acting – the “art of experiencing” 
(AW 16) – with direct reference to Tolstoy’s aesthetics.175  Reading Stanislavsky with 
reference to Tolstoy’s “What is Art?” makes clear that perezhivanie not only designates 
the actor’s ideal state of body-and-consciousness but also the shared emotional 
                                                        
174 See Carnicke 2009:133-34, Whyman 2008:13-16, 49-50. 
175 Carnicke has dubbed “experiencing” (perezhivanie) Stanislavsky’s “lost term” 
(Carnicke 2009:129) and her avid championing of a refreshed understanding of 
Stanislavskian theory over the last decade has done much to re-establish the term as a 
Stanislavskian keyword, at least in academic circles.  Perezhivanie is translated variously 
by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood as “the art of living a part,” “to live the scene,” “living 





experience of the actor and the spectator. 
The intersubjective dimension of “experiencing” in Stanislavsky’s theatre 
becomes clearest in those moments when Stanislavsky takes up Tolstoy’s term 
“communion” (obshchenie), a borrowing that neither Carnicke nor Whyman comments 
upon.  An entire chapter of An Actor’s Work is devoted to the phenomenon of 
“communion,” a spiritual bond forged between members of an acting ensemble, in which 
the audience is able to participate indirectly but palpably.  Stanislavsky describes 
communion with one’s acting partner as a mode of “surrender” (AW 231) to full presence 
in the here-and-now with one’s fellow actor: “now, in our scene there are only you and I, 
and no one else in the world except you and I” (SAS 242).  This powerful spiritual 
linkage between actors will naturally extend itself into a bond of communion with the 
audience: “the spectator takes silent part in [the actors’] communication [or 
“communion”176], sees, recognizes, understands, and is infected with their experiencing” 
(in Carnicke 2009:133-34).  Despite the actor’s indirect mode of relation with the 
audience – his primary object of concentration is his fellow actor – he can receive direct 
feedback from the assembly of souls in the auditorium, who provide “spiritual acoustics” 
(AP 204), receiving and reinforcing the affective currents flowing between the actors 
onstage.  Only the “art of experiencing,” Stanislavsky declares with total confidence, 
“enriched with the actor’s own experiences as a living organism […] can fully capture an 
audience and bring them to a point where they not only comprehend but, more 
importantly, experience everything done onstage, and so enrich their own inner lives” 
[emphasis added] (AW 20-21).  In other words, the Stanislavskian ensemble’s 
                                                        





accomplishment of productive intentional actions, their immersion in the fictional 
circumstances provided by the dramatist, and their absorptive communion with their 
scene partners generate an irresistible experiential reality.  The audience partakes in this 
reality and leaves the auditorium having lived through an affectively charged event 
(though as witnesses rather than participants). 
Although theories of the theatre based in passionate “contagion” had been 
prominent since the birth of modern Western acting theory in eighteenth-century France 
(as the second chapter of this study has shown), Stanislavsky breaks with the likes of 
Luigi Riccoboni and Rémond de Sainte-Albine by refusing to situate his conception of 
experiential communion within an ontology of “illusion” or “imitation.”  Although the 
governing paradigm of Stanislavskian aesthetics is indeed an expressive-organic one, 
which views the actor’s creative work as “the expression of the organic life of human 
hearts” [emphasis in original] (Stanislavsky 1961:233), mimetic thinking also asserts 
itself in certain moments when Stanislavsky attempts to articulate the relation between 
the stage and life beyond it.  In particular, he occasionally adopts the language of 
“reflection”: “The theatre […] is the art of reflecting life” (92).  This reflection, however, 
is not formally verisimilar; following the gist of Pushkin’s Aphorism, Stanislavsky sees 
the correspondence between life onstage and life offstage as primarily affective: the 
“creative art of the stage” supplies “a reflection of life in human passions” (228).  In 
other instances, Stanislavsky mixes the relatively static notion of reflection with dynamic 
metaphors of flow more typical of Romantic thought: the theatre becomes “a sea of 
human forces” that “reflects human forces through itself” (92).  The actor is a “force that 




which conducts to the hearts of the spectators those forces which open up new vistas of 
beauty for them” (251). 
Beauty, for Stanislavsky, is not a principle of ideal or verisimilar correspondence, 
but a physiologically intensified and spiritually ennobling experience catalyzed by live 
performers, who serve as “conductors of energy and beauty to all those who come to the 
theatre as spectators” (SAS 106).  Thus, actors must train their psycho-physical 
instruments “so as to enable the living forces of life within them to unite with the same 
living forces of life in each spectator,” so as “to achieve through the stage a union in 
beauty […] among all who take part in a performance on both sides of the footlights” 
[emphasis added] (163).  At times, Stanislavsky speculates that this energetic union, or 
“complete fusion of the stage and the auditorium” (119), is brought about by circulating 
currents of prana, the vital force described by Vedantic philosophy.177  Stanislavsky 
imagines these flows of prana as “rays” that stream out of the eyes of actors, and which 
“engulf” their acting partners along with the spectators (AW 250).178  Acting, then, under 
Stanislavsky’s conception, is not a formally representative art, but an energetically-and-
affectively catalytic one.  The actor’s work on the self ultimately enables the spectator to 
enter into higher, purer psycho-physical states through the co-experiencing of theatrical 
actuality. 
 
The Actor at the Center: 
                                                        
177 See White 2006:79-81, Carnicke 2009:178-79. 
178 Stanislavsky conceives the circulation of prana as a potentially measurable 
phenomenon, “If only we had some gadget which would enable us to see this process of 
emitting and receiving, the exchange that takes place between the state and the 
auditorium at moments of creative intensity, we would be amazed to see how our nerves 
bear up under the pressure of the stream of rays which we are emitting to the auditorium 




Hindu Philosophy, Idealism, and the State of “I AM” 
 
 
The first chapter of An Actor’s Work plunges its reader into the consciousness of the 
young actor Kostya Nazvanov, an alter ego for Stanislavsky’s younger self (“Kostya” is 
the diminutive for “Konstantin”).  Throughout Stanislavsky’s Bildungsroman-style acting 
manual, we take Kostya’s first-person perspective as he carries out a series of 
experiments with attention and imagination, onstage and in the world beyond the theatre, 
in order to discover and solidify those modes of consciousness that are most useful for 
acting practice.  Here, at the beginning of his journey as an actor-in-training, Kostya is 
charged with preparing a short excerpt from Othello.  Stanislavsky renders Kostya’s 
interior monologue as he steps onstage to present his work on the Shakespearean role: 
When I stepped out of the darkness of the wings into the full glare of the 
footlights, the overhead spotlights, and the flood-lights from the wings, I was 
stunned and blinded. […]  But my eyes soon became accustomed to the lights and 
then the blackness of the auditorium became even more frightening, and the pull 
of the audience even stronger. […]  I felt I was the slave of that huge crowd and 
became servile, lacking all principle, ready for any kind of compromise.  I was 
ready to turn myself inside out, to lick their boots, to give them more than I 
genuinely had or was capable of. […] 
 After a superhuman effort to squeeze feelings out of myself and my 
incapacity to achieve the impossible, tension invaded my entire body, ending as 
cramp which gripped my face, my hands, the whole of me, paralysing all 
movement, all motion. […] 
 I had to do more physically.  But I was no longer in a fit state to control 
my hands, legs, my gabbling, and all this was heightened by my overall tension.  I 
was ashamed of every word I uttered, of every gesture I made and immediately 
found wanting.  (AW 13-14) 
 
Kostya does manage to translate his psycho-physical turmoil into one successful moment 
of instinctive brilliance, but his overall performance is a failure.  He is thwarted by the 
disoriented mode of body and consciousness that Stanislavsky calls the “actor’s state” 




something alien, vague, something that is always outside you” (36).  The organic 
functioning of the actor’s body and mind are thrown into disarray by this sense of being 
deficient in relation to a vague something outside the self – a sensation that Stanislavsky 
calls the “state of dislocation.”  Elsewhere, Stanislavsky describes this state as a 
disjuncture between the contents of the actor’s consciousness and his outward 
physicality: “the mind [of the actor] lives its own day-to-day life, his mundane concerns 
for his family, his daily bread, the minor grievances, the successes or failures, while the 
body is obliged to express the most elevated heroic feelings and passions of the 
superconscious” (MLIA 256).  In other words, within the state of dislocation, the actor 
presents external behavior radically disconnected from the subjective life of his 
consciousness. 
 Stanislavsky’s “art of experiencing” helps the actor overcome the “state of 
dislocation” and achieve an organically unified state of body and consciousness.  As 
already shown, Stanislavsky designates this oneness with oneself with the phrase Ia esm’ 
(“I am,” or “I am being”).  When Tortsov first uses the term in An Actor’s Work, his 
students are puzzled, and the acting teacher explains: 
In our vocabulary, ‘I am being’ refers to the fact that I have put myself in the 
centre of a situation I have invented, that I feel I am really inside it, that I really 
exist at its very heart, in a world of imaginary objects, and that I am beginning to 
act as me, with full responsibility for myself.  [emphasis added] (AW 70) 
 
Here the actor’s state of “I am being” emerges as a factor of imaginative immersion – of 
feeling oneself as an acting subject at the center of an imaginative scenario – and of not 
taking the self (or an image of the self) as an object of consciousness.  Later in An Actor’s 
Work, Torstov equates “I am being” with the ideal creative state itself: “‘I am being’ 




almost absolute truth onstage” (AW 186).  The state of “I am being” thus designates 
oneness, organic integrality, and – again borrowing Schelling’s term for fusion without 
preliminary separation – “indifference” between the actor and the role. 
If Torstov at first perplexes his students with the mystical-sounding Ia esm’, the 
phrase has also proven a point of intrigue to recent Stanislavsky scholarship.  R. Andrew 
White and Sharon Marie Carnicke have shown that Stanislavsky’s probable source for the 
phrase – along with other key ideas – was a series of books on yogic philosophy and 
practice by “Yogi Ramacharaka,” translated into Russian from English and recommended 
to Stanislavsky by his son’s tutor Nikolai Demidov in 1911.179  Ramacharaka presents the 
principles and exercises contained within his popularizing books as a means toward 
approaching “the Consciousness of the ‘I AM’”: “consciousness of one’s identity with 
the Universal Life, and [one’s] relationship to, and ‘in-touchness’ with all life” 
(Ramacharaka 1911:vi).  Meditating upon the meaning of the phrase  “I AM” will lead 
the contemplator to the realization 
that the ‘I’ is a part of that great One Reality which pervades all the Universe; that 
it is connected with all other forms of life by countless ties, mental and spiritual 
filaments and relations; that the ‘I’ is a Centre of Consciousness in that great One 
Reality or Spirit, which is behind and back of all Life and Existence, the Centre of 
which Reality or Existence, is the Absolute or God; that the sense of Reality that 
is inherent in the ‘I,’ is really the reflection of the sense of Reality inherent in the 
Whole – the Great ‘I’ of the Universe.  (74) 
 
Differently phrased, this insight amounts to the realization “that under all the forms and 
names of the visible world, there is to be found One Life – One Force – One Substance – 
One Existence – One Reality – ONE” (64).  Ramacharaka here summarizes the 
fundamental doctrine of the Upanishads, Hinduism’s text of primary philosophy: that the 
                                                        




self (atman) is fundamentally identical with the absolute ground of all being 
(brahman).180  Ramacharaka’s tone of rapturously blunt assertion is, however, highly at 
odds with the aphoristic, parabolic style of the Upanishads as well as the argumentative 
mode of the Vedic commentaries. 
 Ramacharaka explains that attaining “the Consciousness of the ‘I AM’” involves 
distinguishing between the “I” and those phenomena that are “not I,” which include the 
body and its instincts, desires, and emotions, and even thought-processes and spiritual 
sentiments.  The basis for this distinction is a fundamental structure of consciousness: the 
highest “I” cannot contemplate itself – it cannot hold itself “at mental arm’s length” – for 
it is itself an indivisible contemplating entity (34).  Ramacharaka writes: 
Can you not see that the “I” cannot be both the considerer and the thing 
considered – the examiner and the thing examined?  Can the sun shine upon itself 
by its own light?  You may consider the “I” of some other person, but it is your 
“I” that is considering.  But you cannot, as an “I,” stand aside and see yourself as 
an “I.”  (38) 
 
Ramacharaka’s technique of distinction between perceiver and object of perception 
seems to be drawn directly from the Advaita Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy.  
Advaita means “non-dualism,” and the school’s founder Sankara (c. 788-820 CE) 
presents a logical method of undoing the erroneous “superimposition” (adhyasa) of 
objects that are “not-I” upon the “I.”  This method of regressive dis-identification leads to 
the realization that the ontology of the self is identical with that of the absolute.  The self 
cannot be an object of perception like external objects because, as the ground of all being, 
it depends upon nothing else and exists for the sake of nothing else: “the knower itself 
                                                        
180 Two of the Upanishads’ “Great Sayings” (mahavakyas), profound truths to be 
meditated upon, explicitly state this doctrine: “I am brahman” (aham brahmasmi), and 




cannot be the object to be known.”181  The principles of the Advaita Vedanta school, 
however, are not in universal accordance with the metaphysics of yoga’s governing 
philosophical system.182  Their inclusion in a treatise titled Raja Yoga therefore arouses 
suspicion over Ramacharaka’s willingness to blend together distinct schools of Hindu 
philosophy for a popular English-language readership. 
There is no reason to assume that the Ramacharaka books were Stanislavsky’s 
only source of information on yoga and Hindu philosophy.  The artistic and intellectual 
elite of Silver Age Russia seized enthusiastically upon new translations of classic Hindu 
texts like the Rig Veda and the Uphanishads as well as the doctrines of new mystical 
movements like Spiritualism, Theosophy, Hermeticism, and Anthroposophy.183  Tenets 
of Hindu thought were very much in the air within Russia’s “culture of the occult” 
(Carlson 1997:136) around the turn of the century, although often diluted or distorted by 
the “comparative esotericism” of the new pseudoreligious thought-systems (140).  
Although R. Andrew White has convincingly highlighted passages of the Ramacharaka 
books that seem to have directly influenced Stanislavsky,184 the Russian theatrical 
reformer, as a member of Moscow’s creative intelligentsia, would have absorbed the 
broad wave of influence of Eastern thought on the Russian occultist vogue in a fashion 
that precise textual correlations might not reveal.185  The last years of the nineteen-teens 
                                                        
181 In Deutsch and van Buitenen 1971:145. 
182 See Klostermaier 1998:103. 
183 See White 2006:76-77, Carlson 1997:135-52, Maydell 1997:153-67. 
184 See White 2006:83-88. 
185 One example of a personal – rather than intertextual – connection with mystical 
thought was Stanislavsky’s acquaintance with the neo-Kantian philosopher Ivan 
Ivanovich Lapshin, author of quasi-mystical treatises on “universal feeling.”  Rose 
Whyman asserts that Stanislavsky corresponded with Lapshin and read the latter’s Mystic 




seem to have been Stanislavsky’s phase of highest enthusiasm for Eastern thought: his 
rehearsal notebooks from the years 1919 to 1920 suggest that he was still directly 
referencing the Hatha Yoga volume almost a decade after his first exposure to it.186  
Stanislavsky’s lectures to the Bolshoi Opera Studio, given between 1919 and 1922,187 
stress over and over again that acting begins with a disciplining of the mind and uses a 
vocabulary resonant with Hindu philosophy and meditational practice.188 
The most significant revelation of R. Andrew White’s groundbreaking essay on 
the influence of yoga and occultism on Stanislavsky’s “System” is that “Yogi 
Ramacharaka” was in fact the pen name of William Walker Atkinson, a Chicago-based 
author and journalist.  Atkinson was a leading figure within “New Thought,” an 
American pseudoreligious movement concerned with healing psychological and physical 
ills through the power of the mind.189  While White notes that Atkinson writes about 
Hindu thought “from a distinctly Western point of view,” presenting “a diluted version of 
Yoga aimed at a curious but largely uninformed readership” (White 2006:82-83), neither 
White nor Sharon Marie Carnicke, in her important discussion of Stanislavsky’s 
                                                        
(1911) in the year 1912  (see Whyman 2008:52-61, 86).  Stanislavsky cites Lapshin’s 
Artistic Creation (1923) in the Russian version of An Actor’s Work (see AW 111). 
186 See White 2006:83. 
187 Stanislavsky’s lectures were transcribed by a student and later translated by David 
Magarshack as Stanislavsky on the Art of the Stage (1961). 
188 In the lectures, Stanislavsky argues that “[t]he centre of man’s creative work is his 
attention,” and the focusing of attention allows the actor to “change [his] habits of mind” 
(SAS 142, 102).  There is evidence that Stanislavsky and his actors experimented with 
yogic techniques of concentration as early as 1906, while working on Chekhov’s Uncle 
Vanya, and that by 1912 students at the MAT’s First Studio were carrying out exercises 
in radiating and receiving “‘prana’ rays of communion” (see White 2006:78-79). 
189 The Christian Science movement, which still shares these goals, was founded by Mary 




borrowings from yoga,190 has shown the extent to which Atkinson accommodates Hindu 
notions to a New Thought worldview.  In order to understand Ramacharaka’s (and 
Stanislavsky’s) “I AM,” therefore, we must uncover the constellation of influences that 
New Thought brought into often reductive synthesis.  This effort throws us back once 
again across the history of ideas to German Romanticism and Idealism. 
The prominence of the key phrase “I am” in Idealist philosophy prominence has 
its roots in Kant’s epistemological project: to ground truth in subjectivity by proving that 
the perceiving subject constitutes the perceptual world.  Fichte, responding to Kant, 
pushes the principle of subjectivity much further: he proposes the self-positing “I” as the 
grounding of all reality and the first principle his system of transcendental idealism.  “I 
am absolutely because I am,” Fichte asserts with provocative bluntness (Fichte 
1868:71).191  Although Schelling and Hegel would depart significantly from Fichte’s 
account of subjectivity, both would have to engage with Fichte’s dramatic proposal of the 
“I am” as a philosophical first principle.192 
The striking parallels between Fichte’s account of subjectivity and the Hindu 
philosopher Sankara’s monistic ontology have been noted by a number of scholars.  It 
seems impossible to argue for a direct influence, although Fichte and Schelling, along 
                                                        
190 See Carnicke 2009: 167-84. 
191 Hölderlin and Novalis both voiced famous critiques of the reductiveness of Fichte’s 
logic, arguing that the very proposition “I am I” implied a splitting of the self into subject 
and object (see Bowie 1990:82-99). 
192 In Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), what was Fichte’s “absolute 
I” becomes an unconscious form of infinite activity that cannot be grasped by reflective 
awareness, even in philosophical discourse, but can be accessed within the intuitive 
medium of art.  Though Hegel’s conception of human history and art’s place within it is 
highly indebted to Schelling’s, as already stated, Hegel distances himself from Fichte: 
Hegel cites Fichte’s “I am I” in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) only to critique and 




with their Romantic contemporaries, were writing at a moment when Hinduism’s sacred 
texts were being read in European languages for the first time.  The French scholar 
Abraham Hyacinth Anquetil-Duperron and the English philologist William Jones, along 
with other members of Jones’s Asiatic Society of Bengal, produced translations of major 
Vedic texts during the last decades of the eighteenth century.  These publications were 
rapidly translated into or summarized in German, igniting an explosion of interest among 
scholars, poets, and philosophers of the Romantic era and prompting the emergence of 
“Oriental Studies” as an academic discipline.  Chief among the enthusiastic parties in 
Germany were Herder, Friedrich Schlegel (who learned Sanskrit), and August Wilhelm 
Schlegel, eventual occupant of the first chair of Indology in Germany.  The burst of 
translation also made it possible for Schelling and Hegel to include discussions of Hindu 
art and philosophy within their trans-historical narratives about the evolution of divine 
consciousness through human culture.  The engagement by German intellectuals with 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and other Asian thought-systems during this period, which 
outstripped that of other European nations in its systematic rigor as well as its 
enthusiasm, has been called “the preeminent reaction to Eastern thought in the West until 
the mid-nineteenth century” (Versluis 1993:16).   
Certain Hindu doctrines hold a basic compatibility with the mystic strands of 
European philosophy – Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism – that fed into German 
Romanticism and Idealism, but despite a historically recurring impulse to construe 
congruity as proof of common origins or historical contact, no proof has been found for a 
transformative confluence of Indic thought and European philosophy before the turn of 




either derives from or draws from the same source as Hindu thought go back as least as 
far as the third century C.E.,193 and a number of apocryphal stories tell of meetings 
between Greek and Hindu philosophers.  The claims for shared origins were renewed by 
the eighteenth-century Indologists and their German Romantic successors: William Jones 
argued that “Pythagoras and Plato derived their sublime theories from the same fountain 
with the sages of India”;194 Herder, Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Novalis were 
able to find compatibilities between Hinduism and Buddhism and the mystic doctrines of 
Plotinus, Eckhart, Böhme, and Tieck;195 Herder and Friedrich Schlegel were particularly 
influential in asserting that “Everything, yes, everything without exception has its origin 
in India.”196  Schlegel believed that Indic philosophy would have as transformative an 
impact on European thought as the rediscovery of classical antiquity during the 
Renaissance.197 
Whether or not some buried pathways of influence between Hindu thought and 
European philosophy actually exist, we can conservatively conclude that the writings of 
figures like the Schlegels and Schelling “were to a considerable degree sparked and 
reinforced by their contacts with Oriental doctrines, even if these were limited” (Versluis 
1993:24).  The poetry, philosophy, and philology of Germany’s Romantic era also set the 
conditions for the chaotically enthusiastic absorption of Hindu thought by less systematic 
intellectual movements of the nineteenth century.  Coleridge, for example, who was 
deeply influenced by Schelling and had read the Bhagavad Gita in English translation, 
                                                        
193 See Halbfass 1988:2-23. 
194 In Halbfass 1988:63. 
195 See Versluis 1993:19-24. 
196 In Schwab 1984:71. 




conceived the human imagination as “a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM” (Coleridge 1834:172).  The notion that human creativity 
echoes nature’s productivity is Schellingian, but Coleridge’s “infinite I AM” fuses an 
Idealist notion of subjectivity with Hinduism’s atman-brahman identity.  
The kind of synthesizing impulse that marked Coleridge’s thought would also fuel 
American Transcendentalism, born in the 1830s and 1840s out of the encounter between 
Unitarian “liberal Christianity,” Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism, German 
Romanticism and Idealist thought, and a gradually expanding understanding of Eastern 
religions (Versluis 1993:6-7).  Ralph Waldo Emerson, founding figure of 
Transcendentalism, was deeply influenced by Romantic and Idealist sources (Herder, 
Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel), and, in addition, by Neoplatonism and the works of 
Coleridge.198  Emerson was also familiar with a number of the major Hindu religious-
philosophical texts and found a basic compatibility between Neoplatonism and the 
teachings of the Upanishads.199  In a journal entry from 1837, Emerson writes: 
Who shall define me as an Individual?  I behold with awe & delight many 
illustrations of the One Universal Mind.  I see my being imbedded in it.  I am only 
a form of him.  He is the soul of Me.  I can even with a mountainous aspiring say, 
I am God.  (in Versluis 1993:55) 
 
Versluis sees in the above passage “a merging of both German mystical Christian and 
Hindu Concepts” (55), within which the Vedantic principle aham brahmasmi (“I am the 
Absolute”) is assimilated and transformed by “Emersonian literary religion” (66). 
 The New Thought movement, to which William Walker Atkinson (aka “Yogi 
Ramacharaka”) belonged, was “a popular outgrowth of Transcendentalism, German 
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Idealist Philosophy, and liberal Protestantism” that emerged in the 1850s and 1860s 
(Satter 1999:15).200  Leading figures in New Thought often cited Emerson as the 
movement’s inspirational “Father” (Braden 1963: 35) as they continued the 
Transcendentalist’s practice of appropriating key principles of Romanticism, Idealism, 
and Hinduism.  The designation of an inner “God-Self” with the phrase “I Am” features 
prominently in the writings of Warren Felt Evans and Emma Curtis Hopkins, two early 
articulators of New Thought doctrine.  In Hopkins’s affirmational treatise The Radiant ‘I 
AM’ (n.d.), the “I AM” phrase no longer designates the bare perception of one’s own 
subjectivity as the ground of all experience.  Now it serves as a formula for rhetorical 
anaphora, inaugurating ever-more-grandiose affirmations of individual potency that 
dwarf Emerson’s “mountainous aspiring”: “I AM the power of strength to the universe.  
Because I AM unalterable, I AM omnipotence. […]  I AM the power of Mind to my 
universe” (Hopkins 2008).  In the closing passages of Hopkins’s text, the Vedic saying “I 
am brahman” has inflated itself into self-identification with the Christian messiah: “I AM 
what I AM… I do what I AM by knowing my Self as Jesus Christ the Heaven-sending 
Center of Being, the Heaven-sending Me” (Hopkins 2008).  The “I AM” declaration here 
becomes an assertion of confidence, power, and exceptionalism, serving an agenda of 
self-aggrandizing individuation. 
Hopkins, sometimes called the “mother of New Thought,”201 provided the 
philosophical framework for the “spectacular late-nineteenth-century growth” of her 
                                                        
200 Beryl Satter’s Each Mind a Kingdom: American Women, Sexual Purity, and the New 
Thought Movement, 1875-1920 (1999) has been my main source for the history of New 
Thought’s early development. 
201 See “A Brief Look at the History of New Thought.” The International New Thought 
Learning Center. <http://www.new-thought-center.com/new-thought-history/> (Accessed 




movement (Satter 1999:80).  William Walker Atkinson (a.k.a. “Yogi Ramacharaka”) 
would have encountered Hopkins’s teachings either firsthand or re-articulated by his own 
mentor, Helen Wilmans, one of Hopkins’s first students.202  Atkinson edited the journals 
Suggestion and New Thought between 1900 and 1905 and popularized New Thought 
teachings through his prolific publications.203  Atkinson’s first stand-alone publication, a 
pamphlet entitled “The Secret of the I AM,” was followed by ten books of New Thought 
philosophy and “practical psychology” written between 1901 and 1911.  Between 1903 
and 1912, Atkinson also began to write under the pseudonym Ramacharaka, publishing 
over a dozen books on Hindu thought.  Atkinson’s New Thought and yogic publications 
were produced concurrently, and a heavy cross-bleeding of ideas from the former into the 
latter is easily detectable.  Comparing the content and vocabulary of Atkinson’s first 
monograph, The Law of the New Thought: A Study of Fundamental Principles and Their 
Application (1902) with those of the Ramacharaka books reveals the extent of Atkinson’s 
laxity in matters of intellectual compartmentalization. 
 The Law of New Thought explains to its reader that a “central thought” has been 
handed down from ancient philosophies both Eastern and Western through the great 
literary works of the Western tradition and via the more recent writings of Emerson and 
Thoreau: “the Oneness of All” (Atkinson 1902:10).  Once an individual becomes aware 
of this “Oneness,” Atkinson explains, the illusion of “Separateness” dissipates.  But this 
does not mean, Atkinson makes sure to emphasize, that “the consciousness of 
Individuality” decreases; on the contrary, it “enlarges – grows – takes on more substance” 
(71).  Atkinson thus preserves a place for the aspirational Western ego, which is situated 
                                                        
202 See Satter 1999:150-180, 233. 




at the “Center” of New Thought’s monistic philosophy, superimposed with the presence 
of God.  The egoistic sentiment of The Law of New Thought carries over directly into 
Raja Yoga, where Atkinson (as Ramacharaka) defines “THE REALIZATION OF THE 
‘I’”: “that YOU are a great Centre of Consciousness – a Centre of Power – a Centre of 
Influence – a Centre of Thought.  And that like the planets circling around the sun, so 
does your world revolve around YOU who are at its centre” (Ramacharaka 1911:11-12).  
Atkinson/Ramacharaka continues:  “After the first dawn of the ‘I’ consciousness has been 
attained, the Candidate [...] is more able to use the powers latent within him […]; to 
manifest a Centre of Consciousness and Influence that will radiate into the outer world 
which is always striving and hunting for such centres around which it may revolve” 
(Ramacharaka 1911: 9).  Mutated by New Thought’s aspirational scheme, self-awakening 
here becomes a precondition for self-advancement, and the “realization of the ‘I’” allows 
the individual to become more influential, desirable, and powerful.  In Atkinson’s 
writings, as in Emma Curtis Hopkins’s, the “I AM” does not signify a yielding up of 
fixed notions of the self when faced with the vastness of the absolute.  Rather, its egoistic 
self-assertion corrupts the fundamental import of the Hindu philosophy it claims to 
explain.204 
Stanislavsky’s Ia esm’ at first seems to mark a “crossroads of East and West” 
(Carnicke 2009:167) or a new point of synthesis between a Western understanding of 
psychology and yoga’s practice-based spirituality.  However, as shown above, a deeper 
look into the history of ideas reveals that Stanislavsky’s philosophy of performance 
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crystallized at the end of a century of discovery, comparison, and assimilation in religious 
and philosophical thought, and that Stanislavsky drew upon sources (like the writings of 
Belinsky, Tolstoy, and Atkinson) that were already thoroughly hybridized.  This is not to 
deride or devalue the uniqueness of the Stanislavsky’s syncretic philosophy of acting.  
Stanislavsky’s Ia esm’ marks Western theatrical thought’s first positing of the “I” of the 
experiencing actor as the source, center, and ground of theatrical reality.  Stanislavsky’s 
is an energetic and dynamic – rather than statically mimeticist – vision of the theatre, but 
it is also a monistic one, within which the actor serves as an energetically enlivening 
force, a center of emanation for the energy flows that draw performers and spectators into 
a circle of communion.  Stanislavsky attempts to repair the longstanding theoretical 
division between the “I” of the actor and the “not-I” of the character that mimeticist 
theories of the theatre have long maintained. 
 This is the theoretical import of Stanislavsky’s Ia esm’.  For Stanislavsky himself, 
however, its practical import is paramount: the phrase denotes an actual state of 
consciousness, within which the self is experienced as integrally unified – in opposition 
to the existential agony of the “state of dislocation.”  The Stanislavskian actor does not 
shape herself into correspondence with an external model – another actor, an ideal 
archetype, a modèle ideal, or an imaginative “analogon.”205  Instead, she stands at the 
center of the theatrical experience, giving expression to the unconscious impulses of her 
organism, living intentionally as another, and that other (the character) exists nowhere 
except as manifested in the actor’s actions.  Her actions are not experienced as being in 
relation to other actions.  Her “now” is not experienced as being in relation to some other 
                                                        




“now.”  She does not feel an imperative to graft onto herself an entity existing somehow 
outside, at a distance from, or at odds with herself.  For Stanislavsky, the theatrical work 
of art is the actor’s organism in a state of imaginative, intentional, and emotional 
activation. 
Secure at the center of his “creative circle,” protected by his “circle of public 
solitude” (SAS 136, 142), the Stanislavskian actor lives as himself as if he were another.  
He avoids approaching the role as “not-I,” and therefore he experiences no mimetic gap 
opening up within the “I” of his consciousness.  Quite to the contrary, Stanislavsky’s 
actor enjoys a liberating experience of wholeness, of oneness, of what Grotowski would 
later call “organicity.”  Prefiguring Grotowski’s conception of acting as ecstatic self-
revelation, Stanislavsky believes that the actor’s “whole inner man, pure and joyous,” can 
be revealed through a line of actions and within given circumstances belonging to a 
fictional being (213).  This has always been, and will always continue to be, one of acting 
practice’s greatest – and most paradoxical – potentials: the possibility for self-discovery 
as another.  This often exhilarating process can sometimes mean that “it is in the theatre 
alone that [the actor’s] life finds its full expression” (100). 
Perhaps we ought to push the above paradox further than Stanislavsky does 
himself, in aiming to achieve a rapprochement between identification and expression in 
the theory of the theatre.  Instead of the “I AM,” we might posit the “I AM ANOTHER” 
as the first principle of a philosophy of acting.  This phrase would mark a unity of 
selfhood and otherness that precedes the binaristic distinctions so often applied to the 
figure of the actor, especially by mimeticist treatments of his art.  The “I AM 




as real, actual, and immediate as the indicative in which we live much of our daily lives.  
Acting onstage and acting in life are, as Stanislavsky emphasizes over and over again, 
practices that overlap at least as much as they differ.  We enter various modes of “I AM 
ANOTHER” with frequency in our everyday experience: when we mimic an observed 
gesture or intonation, or when someone tells a story and we spontaneously take the 
perspective of the teller or one of the story’s characters.  The “I AM ANOTHER” 
becomes even stronger – and more theatrical –when, in moments of intensely absorbed 
spectatorship on a streetcorner or through the proscenium arch of an open window, we 
give ourselves over to vicarious connection with another human being intensely absorbed 
in genuine, fit, and productive action. 
 
“I believe you” / “I don’t believe you”: 
The Watcher as “Mirror” 
 
 
“I don’t believe you!” Stanislavsky calls out from the darkness of the auditorium.  This 
confidently authoritative judgment upon the struggling actor’s performance is entirely 
subjective, and its subjectivity is the very source of its confident authority.  For 
Stanislavsky, the quotient of truth within theatrical experience is not ontologically given, 
but depends upon the “sense of belief and truth” (chuvstvo pravdy i vera) of each member 
of the acting ensemble.206  Stanislavskian truth is not verisimilar correspondence, but an 
immanent quality of the actor’s actions.  The actor feels – and assesses – this immanent 
quality using what Stanislavsky calls a “tuning fork,”207 an organic capacity to judge the 
rightness of his action.  This sense of rightness is a subjective, embodied, and experiential 
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dimension of the actor’s performance itself: “You believe in [your life onstage] not with 
your intelligence but with the things your own nature as an organism senses” (AW 186). 
 This immanent quality – the “organic truth” of the actor’s performance (171) can 
be sensed and assessed by the actor herself, but also by practiced observers: “Truth on the 
stage is whatever we can believe in with sincerity, whether in ourselves or in our 
colleagues” [emphasis in original] (Stanislavski 1936:129).  Hence Stanislavsky’s cry, “I 
don’t believe you!” which appears in both An Actor’s Work (AW 174) and My Life in Art 
(MLIA 58).208  The criterion of “I believe” – and the negative appraisal “I don’t believe 
you!” – became famously identified with Stanislavsky’s approach.  The criterion was 
mocked by Sergei Eisenstein, critiqued by Bertolt Brecht, and adopted by Lee Strasberg 
and Jerzy Grotowski.209  It has retained far greater prominence in the Stanislavsky 
tradition’s verbal lore and practical jargon than in Stanislavsky’s writings or academic 
commentaries upon them. 
The “I believe” suggests that the actor’s “sense of belief and truth” can be both 
subjectively and intersubjectively assessed – by other actors, by the directors, and, finally 
and most crucially, by the members of the audience.  Stanislavsky tells his students at the 
Bolshoi Opera Studio: “If your various ‘I want to’s’ are properly fused with your correct 
physical actions, it is not only my heart that will say to you ‘I believe,’ but all the hearts 
in the auditorium will identify their own feelings with certain feelings of the people you 
are representing on the stage and become one with them” [emphasis added] (SAS 174).  
The actor’s personal sense of “sense of belief and truth” and the sincerity of her 
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communion with her scene partners combine to bring about not only a “union in beauty” 
but a oneness of belief in the actor’s experiencing. 
 As has already been discussed, Stanislavsky forbids his actors to use a mirror for 
self-assessment, for it encourages visualizing the role from an external perspective and 
“teaches an actor to watch the outside rather than the inside of his soul.”  In one special 
case, however, employing a mirror’s feedback is acceptable: when that “mirror” is 
another human subject.  In An Actor’s Work, the acting teacher Tortsov outlines a brief 
ethics of “mirroring”: “Those who are monitoring other people’s work should confine 
themselves to serving as a mirror and to saying honestly, without nit-picking, whether or 
not you believe what you are seeing and hearing and to indicating those moments which 
convince you” [emphasis added] (AW 176).  These living, breathing mirrors do not 
“reflect” an actor’s performance but apprehend it as another human subject, and this 
apprehension carries within it an immediate, instinctive assessment of the other’s 
sincerity. 
Mimetic theories of the theatre tend to fabricate models or originals in order to 
explain the sensation of rightness that is one of the theatre’s basic pleasures.  Aristotle, 
who claims that “the pleasure felt in things imitated” is art’s fundamental source of 
interest, explains that “the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in 
contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, ‘Ah, that 
is he’” (Aristotle 1951:15).  But what process of the mind enables this assessment of 
rightness?  In the theatre, does the spectator judge the rightness of an actor’s performance 
– the rightness that produces the satisfied murmur, “Ah, that is he” – by constantly 




analogous individual once encountered in life and now called up in memory?  Or is the 
perception of rightness immanent within the act of spectatorship? 
Let us take a simple instance, drawn from everyday life, in pursuing this question 
of rightness: the face of someone we care about deeply seems troubled, and we blurt out 
the question, “What’s wrong?”  When this happens, do we see another face – a face of 
happiness or equanimity – against which we compare the worried face?  No, the 
awareness of difference is integral to our perception of the face.  Perhaps, on the level of 
brain activity, there is some neurological process occurring that we could label as 
“reference” or “comparison,” but no act of setting-one-thing-in-relation-to-another is 
present to our consciousness.  Similarly, when we have the feeling that someone is lying 
to us, we do not derive this suspicion from a comparison between a lying face and an 
imagined or remembered truthful face, but from a sense of wrongness in the liar’s 
behavior.   
In the same way, when it comes to theatrical perception, it may be that a sense of 
truthfulness has some grounding in what Francis Fergusson called the “mimetic 
perception of action” (Fergusson 1949:250): the way that we, as human agents-become-
observers, as subjective “mirrors” of the actor’s subjectivity, apprehend the actor’s 
action.   The danger of talking about the theatre in terms of “representation,” “reference,” 
and “reproduction” is that these words put two things in relation to one another in a way 
that the consciousness of the spectating subject typically does not.  This does not mean, 
of course, that our own personal histories or knowledge of the world have no bearing 
upon onstage events.  The words and actions of actors may spark specific associations 




in the auditorium; a dramatic event may suddenly resonate with the “given 
circumstances” of our own lives.  These associations are not evidence, however, that we 
understand the import of onstage events through one-to-one comparison with our past 
experiences – that is, through a cognitive process of holding-X-up-against-Y. 
 Through his criterion of “I believe” and his conception of the watcher as 
subjective “mirror,” Stanislavsky adds an intersubjective dimension to his subjectively 
based conception of theatrical truth.  As the first writings in the Western tradition that 
begin to do justice to the complex inner lives of the “I” of the actor and the  
“I” of the spectator, Stanislavskian theory speaks back to philosophers of theatre like 
Diderot who attempt to make the complex psycho-physical processes of acting and 
spectating conform to prefabricated conceptual models.  Stanislavsky’s philosophy of 
acting also speaks back to thought-systems that strive to erect themselves on a first 
principle of pure subjectivity.  Against the solipsistic perspective of the lone 
contemplator, Stanislavsky forwards the inter-relational perspective of a man of the 
theatre, whose views on social being and doing are profoundly theatrical.  Although 
Stanislavsky makes place in his theatrical philosophy for the actor’s pleasurable 
experience of the truth and integrity of his individual technique – and for the euphoric 
experience of oneness with the self that such technique can, at rare and precious 
moments, enable – he also proposes the intersubjective truth of “I believe you.” 
In life, as in the theatre, we come to know ourselves by coming to know others, 
and we can know others better by coming to know ourselves more deeply.  For most of 
us, who lack the privilege or desire to spend our lives immersed in ascetic or meditational 




existence as is the bare experience of the self.  Since its emergence as a form of cultural 
performance, the theatre has provided a site in which the intersubjective phenomena of 
the “I-I” relationship can rise to an exceptional level of intensity.  We might even think of 
the theatre as a collective meditational practice, in which the “I-I” relation allows the 
spectator to feel currents of “experiencing” moving through him even as he follows the 
actor’s “experiencing” from a distance.  Sensing this process in the auditorium, the actor 
simultaneously adjusts her performance to the shifts in the spectator’s vicarious 
experience, completing the “autopoetic feedback loop” (Fischer-Lichte 2008:50) that 
defines the experience of live performance.  
Drawing upon many sources, under pressure from a host of influences, 
Stanislavsky’s philosophy of acting broaches new phenomenological territory, but leaves 
much of the realm of theatrical (inter)subjectivity, within which both actor and spectator 
experience otherness as themselves, for future phenomenologists of performance to 
describe.  As these philosophers of the theatre go about their work of observation, 
introspection, and reflection, they will need to guard against the pull of one-to-one 
thinking, lest they be seduced by the fantasy of exact correspondence that has long 




4.  Mimesis with an Attitude: 




If the actor doesn’t take it easy he makes it impossible for the audience to do so. 
 




Hitler as Führer 
 
 
“Es spricht der Führer!” (The Leader speaks!).  Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess makes the 
declaration at gives over the stage at Nuremberg to Adolf Hitler.210  Hitler approaches the 
podium and arranges the pages of his speech with unassuming matter-of-factness.  As he 
stares forward, waiting for the audience’s applause to die down, his face betrays the 
symptoms of mild performance anxiety: repeated swallowing, clenching of the jaw 
muscles, pupils flitting sideways.  He composes himself with a downward glance into 
empty space – a glance that, though brief, holds a quality of entrancement – and begins to 
speak in measured tones.  A slight shifting of weight from one leg to another is the only 
forewarning of the strikingly rapid transformation about to take place. 
As he moves from recounting the difficult, early days of Nazism to glorying in the 
party’s present supremacy, Hitler begins to warm up, and the characteristic gestures begin 
to unleash themselves: he beats his right fist against his chest; he plunges his clenched 
right hand downward for repeated emphasis; he grasps the air and shakes both fists; his 
right hand, stiffened into a plane, punctures and slashes the air in front of him; his tensed 
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fingers seem to clutch invisible orbs from beneath; he presses the knuckles of his fists 
against one another and suddenly raises his arms over his shoulders in a pose not unlike a 
strongman’s showing off his biceps.  The gestures are predominantly but by no means 
entirely of the tautly aggressive kind: Hitler also wags his index finger with a gesture of 
instruction or scolding; he passes his palms through the air with an undulating 
raconteurial sweep; he spreads his arms wide in a messianic gesture of embrace; he 
shakes his open hands, fingers spread wide, as if invoking the heavens, and concludes 
this series of gesticulations with hands crossed over his sternum.  How much of this is 
rehearsed, how much spontaneous, is impossible to know.  And then there are the odd, 
reflexive mannerisms: both hands spring to his hips with elbows at a ninety-degree angle; 
he folds his arms in toward his chest with hands clasped around the elbows or forearms in 
a gesture of self-containment; his bent-wristed personal salute erupts at an incongruous 
moment; he rises on tiptoe as he approaches the end of a phrase, as if squeezing the last 
ounce of breath from his lungs, before dropping back onto the soles of his feet with a 
punctuating jolt. 
I am less interested in the semiotics of Hitlerian oratorical performance than I am 
in the effort-qualities of its characteristic gestures – gestures of clutching, grasping, 
punching, striking, slashing, clasping, pounding, crushing, and pressing.  We can describe 
these qualities – the how rather than the what of Hitler’s most histrionic gestures – as 
tense, taut, rigid, constrictive, and strained.  Or, to employ Rudolf von Laban’s basic 




“Sudden” (rather than “Sustained”), “Direct” (rather than “Indirect,” or “Flexible”), 
“Bound” (rather than “Free”).211 
The effort-qualities of Hitler’s movements themselves carry embodied meaning 
and are crucial to their performative function: sometimes they achieve rhythmic and 
rhetorical punctuation; at other times they seem to do violence to an invisible entity 
standing before him; at all times, however, they seem also to be working upon Hitler 
himself, as he rises into a state of frenzy.  Hitler’s physical labor of working-himself-up 
also works with remarkable efficacy upon the hall full of Nazi partisans seated before 
him.  Hitler’s histrionic movements are agitated and agitating, excited and excitational.  
As his effort of self-galvanization – which is at the same time one of collective excitation 
– succeeds, one can see that Hitler begins to enjoy himself.  Perspiration runs down his 
brows and his voice rises to stentorian stridency; his eyes gleam and a hint of smile plays 
around the usually contracted lips.  When he shrieks his final words, “Es lebe 
Deutschland!” (Long live Germany!), and unleashes one last salute, synchronized ecstatic 
cries of “Sieg Heil!” emanate from the sea of pulsating right arms thrust diagonally 
toward him.  Hitler himself, however, collects his papers and turns from the podium with 
an office clerk’s manner, as if instantly purged of the psycho-physiological frenzy that 
has held him – and his auditors – so tightly in its grip. 
 
Brecht on Hitler as Führer 
 
 
Brecht didn’t think much of Hitler’s acting.  Or, rather, he thought Hitlerian solo 
performance utterly ridiculous from one point of view and thoroughly effective from 
                                                        




another.  It was all a matter of the attitude one brought to bear upon it.  For a critical 
observer (like Brecht, Theodor Adorno, or Charlie Chaplin), troubled by Hitler’s politics 
and revulsed by his personal mannerisms, Hitler was an alternately ridiculous, grotesque, 
and terrifying figure.  Brecht’s characteristic attitude toward Hitler was indeed one of 
aggressive derision: in his essays and journal entries Brecht insistently refers to Hitler 
with the mocking nickname “the housepainter,”212 denying him both his proper name and 
the honorific title Führer.  At the same time, Hitler the political entity fascinated Brecht.  
Numerous photographs of Hitler found among Brecht’s personal papers after his death 
speak to the intensity of this fascination.213 
Brecht seized upon the anecdote – apparently a true one – that Hitler had taken 
lessons in declamation from Fritz Basil (1862-1938), an actor of the court theatre in 
Hanover, and parodied the incident in The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui.  In that play, Ui is 
coached by an ageing classical actor in how to walk with the toes landing first 
(reminiscent of the goose-stepping marching style of the Wehrmacht), stand with arms 
crossed so that the backs of his hands remain visible, and sit with hands on thighs and 
elbows turned outward for an indefinite period – all, to Brecht, characteristic of the Nazi 
leader’s concocted physicality.  Ui incorporates these theatrical postures in order to shape 
himself into “the little man’s image of his master” (Brecht 2002:45).  Re-viewing Hitler’s 
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which shows Hitler doing a jig of victory after hearing that France is about to surrender 
after the occupation of Paris.  The Life commentator writes: “[Hitler] is in an ecstasy of 
joy.  Keeping his heels smartly together, he clenches his fists and jerks his arms stiffly up 




performance at Nuremberg in light of the Basil anecdote and the Ui scene, one begins to 
see in the Nazi leader’s fervid gesticulations the traces of the exaggerated conventions of 
nineteenth-century German stage declamation.214 
While Arturo Ui presents Hitlerian histrionics as an object of scorn, Brecht argued 
elsewhere that it was the Nazi leader’s overt theatricality that made his oratorical style 
dangerously compelling.  In “On the Theatricality of Fascism” (1939), Brecht concedes 
that Hitler’s imitating the “affectation and pomposity” of an actor (Basil) working within 
an outdated tradition contains an element of the ridiculous (Brecht 2003:195), but he goes 
on to warn that Hitler possesses a dangerously powerful capacity to generate that nemesis 
of Brecht’s “critical attitude”: empathy (in German, Einfühlung).  Hitlerian oratory 
induces “that empathy of the public for the protagonists,” “that feeling of being swept 
along, that transformation of the spectators into a unified mass” upon which the 
“dramatic” theatre of “Aristotelian” dramaturgy relies (197).  The rest of Brecht’s 
dialogic essay analyzes how Hitler “makes use of the artistic means of empathy” for 
political ends (197-98).  Brecht argues that, unlike most politicians, who cultivate 
composure in their public appearances, Hitler the orator 
submits himself, in order to facilitate empathy, to intensely personal feelings, 
feelings which are readily accessible to the private individual. […] He’s an 
individual, a hero in the drama, and it’s his purpose to make the people (or rather 
the audience) say what he says.  Or more precisely, feel what he feels. […] He 
loses himself in furious tirades like some Homeric hero, insists on his innocence, 
implies that he can only barely stop himself leaping at his opponent’s throat, 
addresses him [his political opponent] directly, flings challenges at him, ridicules 
him, and so on.  In all this, his audience follow him emotionally, they participate 
in the speaker’s triumphs, adopt his attitudes.  Without doubt, the house painter 
                                                        
214 Somewhat ironically, because the Ui role is typically approached by contemporary 
actors as a Hitler parody, the Führer’s histrionic gestures have been resuscitated again 




[…] has taken up a theatrical method, by which he can persuade his audience to 
follow him almost blindly.  [emphasis added] (198) 
 
Not only do Hitler’s auditors participate in his emotions, they “adopt his attitudes” – that 
is, the postures that organize the Führer’s body and instantiate its dispositions toward the 
world.  The keyword in question here is Haltung (“attitude,” “stance,” “bearing”), which, 
as we shall see, brings together the physical, the psychological, and the social in 
Brechtian thought. 
“On the Theatricality of Fascism” then moves beyond the instance of Hitler and 
Nazism to make an objection against empathy/Einfühlung itself, regardless of the 
emotions, attitudes, and doctrines modeled by any given “protagonist,” dramatic or 
political.  In other words, empathizing with a protagonist is not only dangerous when that 
protagonist is Hitler; the empathic state is inherently perilous.  It is, of course, a matter of 
serious concern whether a political leader leads his public along a “right path” or a 
“dangerous path,” concedes Brecht, but, ultimately: “The concept of the right path is less 
appropriate than the right way of walking.”  Brecht continues: “A right path can never be 
followed on a harness” (200).  Empathy/Einfühlung, as understood by Brecht, straps the 
political and theatrical spectator into a harness of the emotional-and-perceptual kind: 
Whoever empathises with someone, and does so completely, relinquishes 
criticism both of the object of their empathy and of themselves.  Instead of 
awakening, they sleepwalk.  Instead of doing something, they let something be 
done with them. […] They have only the illusion that they are living, in reality 
they are vegetating.  They are, so to speak, passively lived.  (Brecht 2003:201) 
 
Hitler “involves his audience in himself, implicates them in his movements, lets them 
‘participate’ in his troubles and his triumphs, and dissuades them from any criticism, 
even from a fleeting glance at their surroundings from their own viewpoint” (199).  




and mobile intellect.  As a state of psycho-physiological connection, empathy/Einfühlung 
does away with all three, producing “vegetating bodies” without agency or animus.  
Hitler follows his path toward global conflagration “like a sleepwalker” (Brecht 
2003:199), and his followers, their critical faculties neutralized by feeling what Hitler 
feels, stumble blindly toward their destruction in his wake.215 
 
* * * 
 
“On the Theatricality of Fascism” covers Brecht’s objections to the total identification of 
spectator with performer more comprehensively than do any of his purely theatrical 
essays.  English-language readers will associate these objections with Brecht’s theoretical 
onslaught against “empathy,” but, in fact, Brecht never objected to “empathy” per se, or 
to the term’s contemporary German analog, Empathie.  The state of psycho-physiological 
participation against which Brecht inveighed was Einfühlung, a term whose provenance 
lies in nineteenth-century German philosophy and turn-of-the-century psychology.  
Coined by the aesthetician Robert Vischer in 1873 and influentially developed by the 
psychologically oriented philosophers Theodor Lipps and Karl Groos, the term 
Einfühlung – literally, “in-feeling,” or “feeling-into,” with the double meaning “one-
feeling” – designated the projection of a viewing subject’s ego into a object of aesthetic 
contemplation.  The early theorists of Einfühlung held that perceiving subjects felt-
themselves-into the animate and inanimate forms surrounding them, unconsciously 
investing these objects and figures with their own inner impulses, volitions, and strivings. 
                                                        
215 Brecht’s War Primer displays a newspaper cutting of a glassy-eyed Hitler at a 
microphone stand, with the caption: “Like one who dreams the road ahead is steep / I 
know the way Fate has prescribed for us / That narrow way towards a precipice. / Just 




Einfühlung was first translated into English as “empathy” in Edward Titchener’s 
Psychology of Thought Processes (1909).  The British-born Titchener had studied under 
the pioneering German experimental psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, and would have been 
exposed to the Einfühlung concept during his time at Wundt’s laboratory at the 
University of Leipzig during the 1890s.  Titchener’s neo-Greek coinage combined the 
roots em- (“into”) and pathein (“to feel”) in roughly the same way that Robert Vischer 
assembled the term Einfühlung almost four decades earlier.216  “Empathy,” then, as a 
theoretical term coined by the inchoate discipline of Anglo-American psychology, is 
scarcely a century old, and its predecessor term Einfühlung dates back less than fifty 
years earlier. 
 Over the past few decades, the early history of the Einfühlung concept has been 
extensively rehearsed by scholars interested in psychology’s and aesthetic theory’s 
histories of ideas.217  Einfühlung’s phases of conceptual development are now well 
marked out.  Much more recently, a historicist approach to the question of what precisely 
we might mean when we talk about “empathy” has surfaced within the field of theatre 
and performance studies: David Krasner has provided a useful overview of the empathy 
concept’s history and continued relevance to theatre scholarship and Susan Leigh Foster 
                                                        
216 The ancient Greeks did use the term empatheia, but, in the classical term, the prefix 
em- functioned as an intensifier.  Empatheia therefore signified a state of heightened 
passion in the individual, and not a mode of connection with the emotional experience of 
another.  Whereas the contemporary connotations of the term “sympathy” have much in 
common with those of the ancient Greek sumpatheia, grafting a modern conception of 
“empathy” onto Greek usages of empatheia can only lead to serious confusion.  It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt an untangling of the terms “empathy” and 
“sympathy,” which have come to hold considerable overlap since “empathy” entered 
popular discourse on our mental and emotional life. 





has given a partial summary of Einfühlung’s origins as part of a broader exploration of 
the kinesthetic connection between dancing and spectating bodies.218  My project in this 
chapter, however, is one not yet undertaken: to put Brechtian theory, theatrical thought’s 
most influential – and polemical – treatment of the “the empathy operation” (Brecht 
1964:136), back into contact with the physiological specifics of the Einfühlung state as 
characterized by its early theorists.  I will not argue that Brecht came into direct contact 
with the ideas of Vischer, Groos, or Lipps – although, as will be shown, this is highly 
possible, even likely.  Neither will I argue that Brecht’s understanding of Einfühlung 
preserves the precise details of Vischer’s or Lipps’s treatment.  Brecht took pride in a 
personal commitment to “crude thinking” (plumpes Denken), and his thinking about 
Einfühlung is indisputably crude.  I will argue, however, that without a period-specific 
knowledge of Einfühlung’s connotations during the first decades of the twentieth century 
Brecht’s position on feeling in the theatre becomes severely distorted indeed. 
 This chapter also aims to undo some of the unwittingly revisionist over-writing of 
the “empathy” concept back across the history of theatrical thought.  Edward Titchener’s 
choice of Greek as his language for neologism, combined with the translation into 
English of Brecht’s “anti-Aristotelian” writings, has had unfortunate repercussions for 
theatre scholarship.  Theatrical theory’s foundational text is, of course, Aristotle’s 
Poetics, a work in which the term empatheia never arises.219  The tragic theatre, as 
analyzed in the Poetics, is a theatre of pity (eleos), fear (phobos), and affective purgation 
                                                        
218 See Krasner 2006, Foster 2011. 
219 Aristotle does use the verb-form empathein in his Rhetoric (1411b 32), but in 
describing the function of metaphor, which he deems a device for “making the lifeless 
living,” of endowing the objects and figures of poetic description with “activity” or 




(katharsis), but it is not a theatre of empathy.  Nevertheless, Brecht writes authoritatively 
in The Messingkauf Dialogues: “The theatrical experience comes about by means of an 
act of empathy; this is established in Aristotle’s Poetics” (Brecht 1965:101).  This is, in 
fact, the foundational postulate of Brecht’s theory of theatrical emotion: in order to 
construct a model for a socially productive theatre in which emotions have a radically 
alternative function, Brecht must first define – swiftly and crudely – the affective 
dynamics of the traditional theatre he is attacking.  John Willett, the principal English-
language translator of Brecht’s theatrical essays, consistently renders Brecht’s Einfühlung 
as “empathy,” and the term’s apparently Greek etymology falsely suggests to readers of 
Brecht in English translation that it might be an Aristotelian keyword.  It is a grand irony 
that Brecht’s objections to Einfühlung have, in English translation, fed the misconception 
that the theatre’s affective dynamics have always been held, from classical Greece to the 
present, to be dominated by “empathy.” 
 The chief objective of this chapter, however, is to show the powerful corporeal 
emphasis of the Einfühlung concept’s early articulations carries over into Brechtian 
theory.  After demonstrating that Brecht does indeed – at least at certain theoretical 
moments – conceive Einfühlung as an embodied attunement between actor and spectator, 
I will explore how this mode of one-feeling participates in the epic theatre’s mimesis of 
social action.  Although the key source behind Brecht’s one-to-one thinking is clearly 
Aristotle’s Poetics, I will show that a strand of mimeticism also ran through the 
philosophical accounts of Einfühlung to which Brecht was responding.  Probing Brecht’s 
philosophy of the body, and drawing upon the recent work of Darko Suvin and Rainer 




clearer understanding of the bodily mission of the actor in the epic theatre.   
I argue that, rather than rejecting Einfühlung outright, Brecht preserves a positive 
role for the process of one-feeling, through which the actor can model for the spectator a 
specific set of physical-and-cognitive states based in lightness, easefulness, and 
adaptability.  In other words, the Brechtian actor need not show the spectator the precise 
route toward truth, but must demonstrate, with resources of both body and mind, a 
productive way of walking – or, to put things more literally, a way of acting that is also 
an embodied mode of critical thought.  Rejecting Stanislavsky’s Romantic vision of the 
“experiencing” actor, who galvanizes vicarious experience in the spectator, Brecht 
renews the mimetic paradigm in service of Marxist social criticism.  Within Brechtian 
thought, however, the one-to-one of mimetic thinking tangles with the one-against-
another of dialectics to produce a new conception of theatrical mimesis: one in which the 
theatre can realistically imitate human action while at the same time taking up a critical 
attitude toward that action.  While the attitude of criticism frees the epic theatre from a 
purely duplicative obligation, its actor extends this critical freedom to the spectator 
through what Brecht conceives as a one-to-one process of embodied attunement.  
Brechtian thought is thus marked by a struggle between two conceptual schemata: the 
one-against-another of dialectics and the one-as-another of Einfühlung (or mimesis).  The 
mature Brecht notes these tendencies and attempts to bring them into reconciliation – an 
attempt that I hope to further in this chapter’s conclusion. 
 





My goal over the following few pages will be to “defamiliarize” or “alienate” the 
empathy/Einfühlung concept, to render it strange and thereby, hopefully, to refresh its 
interest.  Every theoretical innovation functions best in the immediate aftermath of its 
coinage, when those who encounter it do not assume they know what it means.  True to 
Brechtian method, I will accomplish this act of theoretical Verfremdungs by historicizing 
the concept – that is, by drawing attention to the fact that how we think of “empathy” 
today is not at all how it was thought of a century or a century-and-a-half ago. 
Einfühlung theory emerged from a diverse set of attempts in nineteenth-century 
German aesthetics, philosophy, and psychology to come to terms with our subjective 
response to the formal properties of artworks and natural phenomena.220  The question of 
the relation between the subjectivity of the observer and the objective characteristics of 
the work of art had been influentially broached by Kant and Schopenhauer and taken up 
by Johann Friedrich Herbart, Robert Zimmerman, and the pioneering empirical 
psychologist Wilhelm Wundt.  By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the subjective 
apprehension of form had become the central problem of German aesthetics – a problem 
that was generating increasingly detailed accounts of the psychological and physiological 
processes of the perceiving subject. 
The history of the Einfühlung concept proper begins with the exploration of the 
role of feeling (Gefühl) and sensation (Empfindung) in aesthetic apprehension by the 
philosopher of art Friedrich Theodor Vischer, Robert Vischer’s more famous father.  F.T. 
Vischer’s monumental Aesthetik; oder, Wissenschaft des Schönen [Aesthetics; or, The 
                                                        
220 In laying out the pre-history of Einfühlung theory that follows, I have relied heavily on 
Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou’s Empathy, Form, and Space: 




Science of the Beautiful] (1846-1857) and his later essay, “Kritik meiner Aesthetik” 
[Critique of My Aesthetics] (1866), proposed a new theory of artistic symbolism, arguing 
that our mode of relation with art-objects depends upon the “symbolic interjection of 
emotions into objective forms” (in Mallgrave and Ikonomou 1994:20).  Vischer senior’s 
“symbol” is therefore not an abstract or arbitrary signifier, but a locus “in which image 
and content are immediately felt as one [ineinsgefühlt]” (in Pigman 1995:239).  Vischer 
contends that the human inclination toward “symbolic interjection” is produced by a 
“pantheistic urge to merge our spirit with the sensuous world” that persists as a remnant 
of humankind’s primordial existence (in Mallgrave and Ikonomou 1994:20).  In the 
psychology of aesthetic experience, then, the philosopher finds evidence that “the 
universe, nature and spirit at their root must be one” (in Pigman 1995:239).  In light of 
F.T. Vischer’s work on aesthetic symbolism, the double meaning of his son Robert’s 
Einfühlung becomes clearer: the term designates the process of “in-feeling” or “feeling-
into” through which the aesthetic contemplator engages with the object of perception, but 
also a spiritual “one-feeling” that unites the human being with the cosmos.221 
Karl Köstlin, Friedrich Vischer’s colleague and collaborator (and, later, his son 
Robert’s dissertation adviser), extended Vischer’s “symbolism of form” (Formsymbolik) 
into an account of visual-imaginative associations.  At the same time, though working 
independently of Vischer and Köstlin, the philosopher Hermann Lotze had produced his 
highly influential and sprawlingly ambitious work of speculative anthropology, 
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Mikrokosmos [Microcosm] (1856-64).222  In a famous discussion of human sentience, 
Lotze argued that our cognitive life is thoroughly infused with “sensations” that 
constantly remind us “of the contour of our bodily frame” and of “what fullness of 
muscular power, what delicate susceptibility or patient strength, what graceful frailty or 
iron rigidity, is latent in each several part of that frame” (Lotze 1885:585).  “Every 
movement which we execute, every attitude in which we repose,” writes Lotze, “has its 
meaning rendered plain to us by the feeling of exertion or of enjoyment” (585).  
According to Lotze, we apply this kinesthetically experienced meaning to the world of 
natural phenomena – animate and inanimate – that surrounds us.  For Lotze, “the world 
becomes alive to us” through “aesthetic enjoyment,” when “we sympathetically expand 
our sentience beyond the limits of our body” and invest organic and man-made forms 
with our own “kinetic energy” (584-86).  Like F.T. Vischer and the other aestheticians of 
his era, Lotze attempted to trace a correlation between the formal characteristics and 
motive properties of worldly phenomena and the subjective states of their human 
apprehenders. 
 It was into this lively theoretical conversation on subjective engagement with 
animate and inanimate form – a conversation rich with introspective insight as well as 
speculative overreaching – that Robert Vischer, a precocious doctoral candidate in 
philosophy at the University of Tübingen and the son of F.T. Vischer, was to enter 
decisively with his doctoral thesis, Über das optische Formgefühl [“On the Optical 
Feeling of Form”] (1873).  Extending his father’s pursuit of  “a pure symbolism of form,” 
Vischer took inspiration from the philosopher Karl Albert Scherner’s Das Leben des 
                                                        
222 Lotze’s volume was much cited by later theorists of Einfühlung, including Johannes 




Traums [“The Life of Dreams”] (1861), in which Scherner describes how the dreaming 
body “unconsciously projects its own bodily form” into other objects within the 
dreamscape.  Vischer derived his own theory of the “wonderful ability to project and 
incorporate our own physical form into an objective form” in waking aesthetic activity 
from Scherner’s text (Vischer 1994:104) and coined the term Einfühlung to denote this 
spontaneous injection of subjective experience into the external world. 
The psycho-physiological basis for Vischer’s Einfühlung is the way in which the 
symmetrical structure of the human body imposes an “organic norm” on the objects of 
vision.  Pleasure taken in the forms of these objects depends upon the capacity of the 
imagination to “insinuate itself into the forms as a kinetic, volitional, empathetic 
sensation” [Einempfindung] (102).  Vision itself, when active and intentional, brings 
about “an impelling animation of the dead phenomenon, a rhythmic enlivening and 
revitalization of it” (94).  In other words, we perceive in inanimate objects impulsions, 
movements, and rhythms that correspond to our own, internal “self-motions” (97).  “We 
move in and with the forms” we see, writes Vischer: we are carried along by floating 
clouds, we undulate along a mountain range in the distance, we scale the rising form of a 
fir tree, and imaginatively plunge into a valley below us (101).   
If, as above, we experience a powerful feeling of kinesthetic enlivening even 
when apprehending inanimate nature, the sight of another human form produces “an 
immediate spiritual empathy” (120), resulting from the “pure and complete union 
between the subjective and objective imagination” (103).  Einfühlung animates lifeless 
forms and anthropomorphizes animals, but directed toward other human beings it 




transplanted and magically transformed into [the] Other” (104).  For Vischer, the 
Mitempfindung and Mitgefühl (literally, “with-sensation” and “with-feeling”) we have for 
a single human form like our own can expand into a felt connection with the species as a 
whole, and Einfühlung takes on a morally uplifting, quasi-spiritual power. 
Beyond its account of aesthetic self-objectivation, Vischer’s Über das optische 
Formgefühl also contains an implicit theory of mimesis, as a principle of both artistic 
form and human physiology.  When pressing his discussion of Einfühlung into the 
phenomenologically difficult realm of the imagination, Vischer contends that the state 
arises when an imaginative idea of the self’s bodily form is brought into relation with a 
real or imagined object.  This object provokes “a related idea of the self in sensory or 
motor form,” and the phenomenon becomes an “analogy,” or roughly mimetic 
counterpart, for the bodily structure (101).  The process of Einfühlung thus involves 
bringing the “image of our own [human, bodily] perfection” into mental relation with the 
“image presented by nature” (114).  For Vischer, Einfühlung is therefore based in 
“imitation” (Nachahmung), but not in “simple mimicry of a living form or action” (114).  
Instead, the imitation that characterizes Einfühlung consists in the repetition of the 
contours and movements of the object in another, radically different medium: that of 
human feeling (Fühlung).  Feelings provoked in response to the form of an object are 
therefore “already imitations, or better said, mediations between subject and object” 
(114). 
When it comes to artistic creation, feeling-as-imitation-as-mediation unites the 
inner experience of the artist and the form of the artwork.  According to Vischer, the truly 




nature”; instead, he “transposes the intuitive and rational human norm to the object,” 
describing “in everything his own facial expression as it is transfigured in the illusionary 
splendor of the world” (114-15).  A relationship of one-to-one correspondence connects 
the inner experience of the artist with the formal properties of the artwork and displaces 
the verisimilar relation between work and world.  Furthermore, the “rhythmic motion” of 
the act of creation itself – the application of paint to canvas, or chisel to stone – has a 
dynamic residue in the art object, producing what Vischer calls the “symbolism of the 
presentation” (117-18).  The contemplator of the art object can therefore experience 
feelings evoked by the formal properties of the represented object or figure itself but also 
impulses stimulated by traces of the artistic act left in the medium of the artwork. 
According to Vischer, then, the artist’s mimesis is not that of the external world, but of 
his own dynamically subjective experience, pulsating with “the energy of a living act” 
(121), which is endowed with sensuous form and offered up to the perception of viewers. 
Vischer’s account of Einfühlung would provoke vigorous debates across the 
emerging boundaries between philosophy, psychology, and physiology in Germany 
during the last decades of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries. 
The concept was taken up, critiqued, and elaborated upon by a number of theorists 
working in the domain of psychological aesthetics as well as psychology proper.223  The 
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Volkelt’s influential Der Symbol-Begriff in der neuesten Aesthetik [“The Concept of the 
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Hermann Siebeck’s Das Wesen der ästhetischen Anschauung (1875), Karl Groos’s 
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two most important figures in the spread and elaboration of Einfühlung theory were the 
evolutionary psychologist Karl Groos and the philosopher Theodor Lipps.  Groos 
advanced a highly physiological version of Einfühlung based in “inner mimicry” or 
“inner imitation” (innere Nachahmung), which consisted in “actual motor processes” –  
“movement and postural sensations, […] light muscular innervation, together with visual 
and respiratory movement” – called forth by the object of perception (Groos 1913:330, 
328).224  It was Lipps, however, whose work transformed Einfühlung “from a concept of 
philosophical aesthetics into a central category of the philosophy of the social and human 
sciences” (Stueber 2008).  Indeed, Lipps’s prolific and influential writings on Einfühlung 
led many subsequent theorists to presume that he had originated the concept.  Lipps 
forwarded Einfühlung not simply as a psychological mechanism driving aesthetic activity 
but as the basic means by which we comprehend the inner experience of other human 
beings. 
 Lipps defines the very essence of human life as “activity” – “power, inner 
working, striving, achieving” (Lipps 1965:404) – and argues that we engage with the 
world around us through this inner activity.  In Lipps’s terms, we “grasp” or “apperceive” 
the forms of nature by endowing them with the dynamic volitional impulses of human 
life: 
The striving in nature is my striving, the activity in it is my activity, the power in 
it is my power […].  In grasping things with the understanding, I permeate them 
with such striving, activity, and power, and these are part of their essence.  Insofar 
as things are my ‘objects’ [of perception], they are part of my very being.  (409) 
                                                        
224 Groos developed his conception of “inner imitation”-based Einfühlung across a 
number of works: Einleitung in die Aesthetik [“Introduction to Aesthetics”] (1893), Der 
Ästhetische Genuss [“Aesthetic Pleasure”] (1902), and his two influential works on the 
play instinct, Die Spiele der Tiere [“The Play of Animals”] (1896) and Die Spiele der 





This projection or “objectivation” of one’s “inner motion of striving” into a sensuous 
object is for Lipps the basic form of Einfühlung (405).  Lipps writes of the relation 
between subject and object at the heart of his definition of Einfühlung: “Empathy is the 
fact here established, that the object is myself and by the very same token this self of 
mine is the object” (Lipps 1935:376). 
Lipps’s phenomenology of Einfühlung is actually rather simple but requires 
clarification: the subject does not experience vicariously the energetic or motive qualities 
belonging to the external object itself; rather, the external object elicits a feeling of inner 
activity in the ego, which the subject experiences as projected into that object.  The 
feeling of striving therefore belongs to the ego, but the ego experiences this striving 
within the object of perception.  Lipps therefore writes: “Empathy means, not a sensation 
in one’s body, but feeling something, namely, oneself, into the esthetic object” (Lipps 
1935:381).  Were the subject’s own bodily sensations to become an object of conscious 
awareness, aesthetic contemplation would immediately cease, for the state of in-
feeling/one-feeling requires that inner strivings felt-into the object of perception occupy 
entirely the contemplator’s consciousness.  In his earlier works, Lipps, like Groos, 
sometimes discusses Einfühlung in terms of unconscious and involuntary processes of 
“inner imitation” (innere Nachahmung).  However, Lipps would eventually abandon the 
terminology of “inner imitation” as misleading,225 for imitation implies a model and 
Lipps’s conception of Einfühlung holds that the external object is not a model but a site 
for the ego’s self-projection. 
                                                        




For Lipps, like Vischer, the “highest evocation” of Einfühlung is stimulated by the 
“sensuous appearance of the human being” (Lipps 1965:409).  When confronted by a 
laughing or grief-stricken face, we immediately assume a corresponding “inner attitude” 
and “surrender to this inner activity or to the action of the whole inner being” (409).  The 
facial expression of another “awakens [in us] impulses to such movements that are suited 
to call just this expression into existence”; these movement-impulses “form a psychic 
unity” with the emotional state itself, so that our automatic tendency to imitate facial 
emotion in another evokes a corresponding emotion within us (in Pigman 1995:242).226  
Indeed, contemplation of the human form holds a central place throughout Lipps’s 
writings on “esthetic empathy,” which for Lipps is not confined to the engagement with 
works of art but occurs regularly in everyday experience.  In “esthetic empathy,” writes 
Lipps: 
I feel active in the movement or in the moving figure, and through projecting 
myself into it I feel myself striving and performing this same movement. […]  I 
am now with my feeling of activity entirely and wholly in the moving figure. […]  
I am transported into it.  I am, so far as my consciousness is concerned, entirely 
and wholly identical with it.  (Lipps 1935:379) 
 
For Lipps, then, Einfühlung enables a “free inner participation” (freies inneres 
Mitmachen) in the external world of objects and others (in Jahoda 2005:158).  This 
participation is typically presented as being pleasurable, expansive, even joyous: the 
projection of our “active or vital feeling” into external objects leads to “objectivated self-
enjoyment” (Lipps 1965:403), and we feel “free, light, proud” as a result (in Jahoda 
2005:155).  Aesthetic Einfühlung liberates the experiencing subject, and “apperceptive 
                                                        
226 Lipps’s introspective and speculative conclusions thus foreshadow the findings of the 
pioneering psychologist of facial expressions Paul Ekman, who since the 1970s has 
argued for the transcultural universality of basic emotional expressions and their capacity 




surrender” to this state produces an intense feeling of pleasure – “the feeling of freedom 
and unconstricted ease in the activity which the thing elicits from me” (Lipps 1965:407-
8).   
As one might expect from the above account of Einfühlung’s centrality to human 
experience of the world, Lipps argues that Einfühlung is the very basis of artistic 
production and reception.  Art satisfies our “yearning to live” by allowing us to 
experience the essence of human life – “vitality, strength, power of volition, in short, 
activity” (Lipps 1965:412) – through our subjective projection into objective artworks.  
As one might expect, Lipps dwells most often on works that depict the human form.  For 
Lipps, however, the work of art is more “ideal” than an accidentally encountered object, 
and therefore compels a more heightened mode of aesthetic engagement: 
[The] work of art leads me and forces me, the observer, to step out of and beyond 
myself, and the more it deserves the name of a work of art the more forcibly it 
does so, immersing me and confining me in an ideal world. [emphasis added] 
(412) 
 
For Lipps, it is no paradox that the subject’s feelings of vital expansion and energetic 
liberation, of “freedom and unconstricted ease,” come through total surrender to the 
artwork’s coercive power.  Uncontrolled self-abandon to the object of aesthetic 
contemplation, to the extent that one loses oneself – or, perhaps better, finds oneself – 
within it, lies at the very heart of the Einfühlung experience.  As we shall see, the forcible 
immersion and confinement that Lipps celebrates in the passage above receives a very 
different valuation in Brechtian thought. 
Writing in 1905, Lipps declared confidently that Einfühlung was “the basic idea 
of present-day aesthetics” (Lipps 1965:403), and, indeed, by this time, the concept had 




psychology and aesthetics compiled in 1911 lists 161 works (see Pigman 1995: 237).  
However, Einfühlung’s process of theoretical diffusion was not without controversy.227  
Diffusion, elaboration, and debate thus led to the kind of mutation that critical keywords 
inevitably undergo.  By 1910, Einfühlung was being used to refer to a variety of modes of 
psychic participation and intersubjective connection, and the term began to take on the 
semantic amorphousness that characterizes the present-day usage of the term 
“empathy.”228  As the Einfühlung concept continued to diffuse through German and 
eventually Anglo-American philosophic and psychological discourse, even more of its 
original specificity was lost. 
 
Brecht on Einfühlung 
 
 
In October 1917, the nineteen-year-old Eugen Bertolt Brecht enrolled at the Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität in Munich as a student in the Faculty of Philosophy.  Brecht 
registered for lectures in philosophy and natural science as well as a course in literary 
                                                        
227 Konrad Lange and Max Scheler were sharply critical of Einfühlung theory.  Antonin 
Prandtl, Edith Stein, and Johannes Volkelt accepted much of Lipps’s thought while 
disputing and extending other aspects.  Wilhelm Worringer wove Einfühlung theory into 
a speculative history of art that would become an inspirational text for Expressionist 
aesthetics.  Edmund Husserl embedded the term within his own, highly original 
phenomenological meditations.  The works in question here are: Konrad Lange, Das 
Wesen der Kunst (1901); Johannes Volkelt, System der Aesthetik (1905); Antonin 
Prantl/Prandtl, Die Einfühlung (1910); Max Scheler, Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie 
der Sympathiegefühle (1913); Edith Stein, Zum Problem der Einfühlung [“On The 
Problem of Empathy”] (1917); Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung 
[“Abstraction and Empathy”] (1907); Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie [“Ideas for a Pure 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy”] (1913). For a more comprehensive 
survey of Einfühlung theory in the wake of Lipps, see Jahoda 2005 and Hunsdahl 1967. 
228  For example, Freud, who admired Lipps a great deal and was familiar with the work 
of Groos, used the term Einfühlung across several works to describe a largely intellectual 




criticism, all of which, according to Klaus Völker, “he attended with varying regularity” 
(Völker 1978:6-17).  Here at Munich, Theodor Lipps had recently stepped down from the 
chair of “Systematic Philosophy” after a two-decade-long tenure (1894-1913), during 
which he had championed a psychological approach to philosophy as a science of 
consciousness.  Most formative among the young Brecht’s university experiences was his 
participation in Artur Kutscher’s theatre seminar at the university.  Kutscher, one of the 
founding figures of German Theaterwissenschaft, had taken up his academic post at 
Munich in 1915.  Despite his contentious relationship with his professor and the other 
seminar participants, Kutscher’s emphasis on Mimus, the physicality of acting, as the 
essence of theatrical art,229 seems to have had some lasting influence on his intractable 
pupil’s vision of the epic theatre as a material, corporeal, and gestural apparatus for the 
mimesis of social actions. 
It seems likely that Brecht’s first sustained contact with the Einfühlung concept 
came during his university days, though whether this contact came through curricular 
encounter, in philosophy lectures or the Kutscher seminar,230 or simply through 
participation in the university’s intellectual culture is unclear.  Brecht’s university 
experience ended in 1921; he did not attend the summer term of classes and his name was 
removed from the student register in November, possibly for non-payment of fees (see 
Völker 1978: 43).  Though Brecht’s investment in his university studies was sporadic, it 
brought him into contact with the then-current terminologies of literary and theatrical 
                                                        
229 See Melnitz 1951:136. 
230 Kutscher’s two-volume magnum opus, Grundriss der Theaterwissenschaft (1932-36), 
cites the work of F.T. Vischer, Groos, and Lipps, though never with reference to their 




criticism.  These may have included the terms episches (“epic”)231 and Einfühlung as well 
as Aristotelian terminology – terms that, like almost everything that stimulated him 
intellectually, Brecht appropriated and transformed. 
As already mentioned, by the end of the twentieth century’s first decade, the 
Einfühlung concept had undergone considerable semantic loosening, and Brecht’s 
writings, with their crude thinking and absolutist claims, would further this trend.  In the 
following pages, I will survey Brecht’s thinking on Einfühlung without attempting to 
reconcile his various positions into an internally consistent theoretical doctrine.  As Sean 
Carney rightly warns, “The last thing we should look for in Brecht is consistency of 
thinking” (Carney 2005:6).  Brecht was always experimenting with ideas, and he 
discarded maxims and jargon as soon as they had outlived their usefulness. 
Most of the time, Brecht uses the term Einfühlung to refer to a vaguely defined 
mode of “self-identification with the character” (Brecht 1964:195), which can take place 
either between actor and character or spectator and actor-as-character.  In the latter case, 
Einfühlung is a prime obstacle for the Brechtian theatre of criticism because it results in 
the “automatic transfer of emotions” between stage and auditorium, through which the 
spectator is “carried away” into an affectively arousing “experience” (94).  Brecht’s late-
career theatrical dialogue, “Conversation about being Forced into Empathy” [Gespräch 
über die Nötigung zur Einfühlung], re-rehearses Horace’s famous injunction from the Ars 
Poetica, a passage long embedded in acting theory’s history of ideas: “So, if you want me 
                                                        
231 As a term used in German dramaturgical analysis, episches (“epic”) dates back at least 
as far as Schiller’s correspondence with Goethe (see Brecht 1964:210).  Brecht’s use of 
the term also owes a well-known debt to Erwin Piscator, as well as to Aristotle’s 
discussions of epic narrative and episodic plot-structure, “in which the episodes follow in 




to weep / First show me your own eye full of tears” (Brecht 1964:270).  Brecht posits 
Einfühlung as the psychological mechanism behind the direct transmission of passion, a 
sine qua non of classical oratory, seventeenth-century declamation, eighteenth-century 
acting practice, and the nineteenth century’s romantic stages.  While the discourses 
surrounding these historical stage practices celebrated the actor’s enlivening the spectator 
with the vicarious experience of passion, Brecht frames this process as a coercive act: in 
the conventional theatre, the actor “force[s] me to surrender at all costs to his sorrow, 
which he wants me at all costs to feel” (271).  Audience members submit passively to this 
process, which results in their total identification with a play’s protagonists.  Brecht 
argues: “in a performance of Oedipus once has for all practical purposes an auditorium 
full of little Oedipuses, an auditorium full of Emperor Joneses for a performance of The 
Emperor Jones” (87).  This is crude thinking indeed, but Brecht’s basic point is clear: 
Einfühlung leads to spectators’ assimilation to the actions, emotions, and interests of 
fictional characters (and, therefore, to a diminished connection to their own). 
If Brecht often writes as if Einfühlung is the sole means of contact between actor 
and spectator in the traditional theatre, he also frequently lets himself imagine that all 
actors are fanatical disciples of Stanislavsky, totally immersed in the “given 
circumstances” of their characters’ lives.  When discussing acting technique, Brecht often 
equates the actor’s Einfühlung with the process of the Stanislavskian performer, which he 
describes as a “complete conversion operation” (Brecht 1964:93),232 and when he uses 
the word “experience” derogatively, he seems to be citing Stanislavsky’s key term 
                                                        
232 At times, especially in his later writings while based in the GDR, where cultural 
policy mandated an attitude of at least grudging respect toward Stanislavsky, Brecht 
conceded that such a summary account reduces the complexity of the Russian acting 




perezhivanie (“experiencing”).233  For Brecht, the “crudest form of empathy” begins with 
the actor’s asking, “What should I be like if this or that were to happen to me?” (195) – 
the psychological departure-point of the Stanislavskian approach.  The highest form of 
Einfühlung comes in the “complete transformation” of actor into character, by means of 
which “the actor eliminates his own consciousness and replaces it with that of the 
character” (Brecht 1966:133-34).  Brecht usually writes about the actor’s Einfühlung as 
an emotionally subjunctive – rather than a kinesthetically projective – process of entering 
into the fictional life-circumstances of a role.  A nuanced first-person account of the 
actor’s imaginative process, however, is by no means a strong point of Brechtian 
theatrical theory.  As Grotowski comments, “Brecht did study the technique of the actor 
in great detail, but always from the standpoint of the producer [i.e., director] observing 
the actor” (Grotowski 1969:173).  Though Brecht himself might have responded that his 
primary perspective was that of a playwright, Grotowski’s basic criticism holds: as a 
playwright-and-director with little experience in feeling-himself-into a dramatic 
character, Brecht wrote authoritatively on the actor’s process in order to demand that the 
actor become more like him: a distanced observer of theatrical action. 
At subtler theoretical moments, however, Brecht concedes that total immersion by 
the actor within the character’s imaginative-and-emotional life may be a theoretical 
fantasy.  The Actor in The Messingkauf Dialogues, for example, puts dialectical pressure 
on the Brechtian Philosopher’s understanding of acting practice, saying: “I fancy you’ve 
                                                        
233 The term “experience” sometimes appears in quotation marks in the essays collected 
in Brecht on Theatre (see, for example, Brecht 1964:25, 35, 126), but John Willett offers 
no opinion on Brecht’s source.  Understanding that Stanislavsky may sometimes be in the 
background of Brecht’s “experience” (in German, Erlebnis) significantly clarifies 




got an exaggerated view, which amounts to almost an illusion, of the degree to which we 
old-fashioned actors identify ourselves with our parts.  I may as well tell you that when 
we play King Lear we think of all kinds of things that would hardly have entered Lear’s 
mind.”  The Philosopher counters that this may well be true, but that these performance-
specific thought processes – about the placement of props or adjustments to other actors, 
for example – “may interfere with [the actor’s] empathy, but they only add to that of the 
audience” (Brecht 1965:55).  Here the spectator’s Einfühlung is depicted not as a state of 
feeling-into the actor’s actually experienced emotions and their physical manifestation in 
histrionic gestures, but as a mode of psychological identification with the character as an 
illusory – but still emotionally provocative – construct (as in the Oedipus/Emperor Jones 
example). 
 The tendency to accommodate oneself to the ethical decisions and emotional 
responses of onstage figures that Einfühlung promotes in an audience is a serious 
problem for a theatre of social critique, argues Brecht, because the state of one-feeling 
with the character leads the spectator into taking historically and societally contingent 
forms of behavior as natural and unchangeable.  Einfühlung is totally incompatible with 
the “critical attitude” (kritische Haltung) so valued by Brecht both in theatre and in life.  
The “Aristotelian” theatre only provokes criticism when its attempts at empathy-
generation fall short – that is, when the production fails to capture its audience through 
under-rehearsal, bad acting, or poor dramatic material.  Such a theatre does not possess 
the means to stimulate criticism of the presented “incidents” themselves – that is, the 




rubric of “epic” theatre, “theatre of a scientific age,” or “dialectical” theatre,”234 Brecht’s 
theatrical reform project remained remarkably constant: to depict “happenings between 
humans,” or “men’s life together” (Brecht 1964:182, 185) with accuracy, while pointing 
out that these happenings are contingent and alterable.  Brecht, an ethicist even before he 
became a Marxist, envisions his theatre as a laboratory for experimenting with the 
conditions under which acts of goodness, kindness, and compassion become more and 
more possible.  Einfühlung subverts this project by making the happenings between these 
figures seem natural, universal, and unalterable; the state of one-feeling encourages the 
uncritical assessment, “that is how it is” (Brecht 1964:188), which closes down 
awareness of contradictions and the entertaining of alternatives. 
The Brechtian theatre must therefore deploy an array of devices aimed at the 
disruption of Einfühlung.  Each of these devices is aimed at generating Verfremdung 
(“defamiliarization,” “making-strange,” “alienation”),235 a mode of consciousness that 
Brecht places in direct opposition to Einfühlung: “If empathy makes something ordinary 
of a special event, alienation makes something special of an ordinary event” (Brecht 
1965:76).  The Einfühlung process depends upon instinctive modes of seeing and a lack 
of self-awareness; Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt is, on the other hand, a means for 
refreshing perception and bringing phenomena into consciousness.  If classical 
Einfühlung theory rests on the principles of union, merger, and oneness, Brecht’s 
theatrical philosophy is one of gaps, distances, juxtapositions, contradictions, and 
                                                        
234 Brecht experimented with alternative terms for his ideal theatre from the late 1940s 
onward. 
235 John Willett’s decision to translate Verfremdungs consistently as “alienation” has been 
much criticized.  I deem the terms “defamiliarization” or “making-strange” more 




comparisons. For Brecht, the most productive attitude is always the critical one, and 
criticism can only work across the cognitive distance opened up by the 
Vefremdungseffekt.  From a cognitive perspective, the epic theatre is a theatre of the two-
as-two, not the two-as-one of the Einfühlung state.  At times, Brechtian theatrical 
philosophy even moves toward encouraging the one-as-two:  “Spectator and actor ought 
to move apart.  Each ought to move away from himself” (Brecht 1964:26).  Brecht is 
describing a mitosis of consciousness that promotes reflection, self-observation, and self-
analysis. 
 For Brecht, “the smallest social unit is not the single person but two people” 
(197).  This principle holds as much in the theatrical auditorium as it does on the street 
corner, on the factory floor, or in the halls of power.  The epic theatre does not attempt to 
close the gap between social agents, to effect the “fusion” between spectator and actor-as-
character that the “dramatic” theatre of contagious emotions compels.236  In the dramatic 
theatre, the spectator is “involved,” “in the thick of it, shares the experience”; in the epic 
theatre the spectator “stands outside,” “is made to face something” [emphasis added] 
(37).  Brecht might as well have written that the epic theater’s spectator is made to face 
someone – that is, not to merge with the actor-as-character as another self, but to face the 
character as another social agent, whose actions might have some relevance when held up 
in comparison with one’s own life-decisions.  The two-as-two of Brechtian theatre – 
sometimes the actor and spectator, sometimes the actor and character – are, like the 
episodes of epic dramaturgy, “set off against one against another” (201).  What each 
individual undergoes is of less consequence that the mode of active betweenness that 
                                                        
236 See Brecht 1964:125, 235, and elsewhere.  Brecht’s pejorative use of the term 




holds them apart.  Against the two-as-one of Einfühlung, Brecht mobilizes an 
intersubjective counterpoising that we might call Gegenfühlung (“against-feeling”). 
Brecht’s arguments against Einfühlung do not, however, amount to a rejection of 
emotion in the theatre.  Brecht calls this misinterpretation of his theatrical project “a 
frequently occurring mistake” (Brecht 1964:88).  Even his earliest articulations of “epic” 
theory preserve an important place for emotion in a theatre of social criticism and rational 
activation.  Brecht writes that the epic theatre often aims to “arouse” or “reinforce” 
certain affective states – in particular, the “sense of justice, the urge to freedom, and 
righteous anger” (227) – and that these affective upsurges need not interfere with the 
operation of the rational faculty.  While Brecht demands rather than rejects powerful 
emotion in the theatre, he does discourage the spectator’s following a shared or parallel 
emotional process to that of the actor-as-character.  In the “dramatic” theatre, the 
spectator says, “I weep when they weep, I laugh when they laugh”; in the epic theatre of 
Verfremdung, the motto instead goes: “I laugh when they weep, I weep when they laugh” 
(71).  When the Brechtian actor looks out at the audience, observing himself even as he 
acknowledges his being observing by others, he knows: “We are not feeling the same 
thing and / We are not feeling it at the same time” (342).  Looking back over his early 
career while in exile from Hitler’s Germany, Brecht summarized in the third-person 
dialogic mode of the Messingkauf one of the most pervasive misunderstandings about his 
theatrical sensibility: “his objections to empathy in art were taken as objections to feeling 




die Gefühle in der Kunst hielt].237  A more literal translation of the German would render 
the point much more clearly: that Brecht’s objections to one-feeling were taken as 
objections to feelings themselves.  In other words, the epic theatre never renounced the 
spectator’s feeling-toward or feeling-in-response-to the figures populating the stage, but 
it did deploy a host of devices to disrupt the spectator’s feeling-into or feeling-at-one-
with these figures. 
Brecht’s theoretical oeuvre has been described as a sustained “critique of 
empathic aesthetics” (Adorno 1997:243) and a “systematic attack on Einfühlung 
(empathy) as the central bourgeois aesthetic category” (Nägele 1991:65).  Even more 
dramatically, Brecht has been said to have waged “a lifelong battle against hegemonic 
empathy” (Suvin 2008:64).  It is certainly true that, most of the time, intent on breaking 
Einfühlung’s dominance, Brecht depicts the state of one-feeling as the poisonous nemesis 
of Verfremdung.  At other theoretical moments, however, Brecht preserves a positive 
function for one-feeling in the epic theatre.  By the early to mid-1930s Brecht was writing 
that the epic theatre “makes nothing like such a free use as does the aristotelian [sic] of 
the passive empathy of the spectator,” that it “more or less renounces empathy” 
[emphasis added] (Brecht 1964:57, 101).  This qualified phrasing acknowledges that 
subjective experience in the theatre can never be as monolithic as Brecht was sometimes 
wont to argue.  Later in his career, Brecht also conceded that many moments in his plays 
written after the Lehrstücke phase were indeed stirringly emotional, inciting strong 
identification with one of the main characters.  For example, Brecht wrote of the scene in 
                                                        
237 The German quoted here is excerpted from Brecht 1963:165; the English translation is 




Mother Courage in which Courage’s daughter Kattrin beats the drum to warn the 
inhabitants of a nearby town of impending attack: 
Members of the audience may identify themselves with dumb Kattrin in this 
scene; they may get into her skin by empathy and enjoy feeling that they 
themselves have the same latent strength.  But they will not have experienced 
empathy throughout the whole play, hardly in the opening scenes for instance.  
(221) 
 
Brecht’s choice of the act of drumming for this climactic scene is hardly arbitrary.  
Kattrin’s manifestation of “latent strength” cannot be held separate from the act of 
drumming itself, either dramaturgically or experientially.  A spectator’s emotional 
response to Kattrin’s act of heroism will certainly arises out of an understanding of the 
life-or-death stakes of her decision, but this response will also by evoked by the effortful 
tension in the actress’s arms as she strikes the drum.  The ferocity of Kattrin’s intention – 
to save the townspeople, to deny the soldiers who threaten her – is channeled into a 
robustly physical action.  The spectators’ identification with Kattrin’s intention will be 
informed by the way they apprehend, and perhaps feel-themselves-into, the kinetic 
qualities of the actress’s rhythmic pounding. 
 Brecht’s mature theory further acknowledges Einfühlung as an inescapable – and 
even embraceable – theatrical dynamic.  By 1940 Brecht was encouraging actors to make 
use of the “psychological operation” of feeling-into during the process of preparing a 
role.  They were to do so in the same way that witnesses, demonstrators, and mimics do 
in everyday life, in order to “feel their way into their characters’ skins with a view to 
acquiring their characteristics” (137).  The actor seeking to produce the 




performance. 238  The posthumously discovered “Appendices to the Short Organum,” in 
which Brecht discards the term “epic theatre” in favor of “dialectical theatre,” offer an 
even more radical revision of Brecht’s stance toward Einfühlung in acting.  In the 
“Appendices,” “acting (demonstration)” and “experience (empathy)” become 
dialectically contradictory principles of the actor’s art.  These “two mutually hostile 
processes […] fuse in the actor’s work,” and the actor’s “particular effectiveness comes 
from the tussle and tension of the two opposites” (277).  The mature Brecht concedes that 
presentation of behavior for a set of observers and subjunctive engagement with fictional 
circumstances are both essential elements of the actor’s artform, inextricable from one 
another in practice.  The total extermination of Einfühlung, which was always more a 
rhetorical pose than an actual project, is no longer seen as necessary, or even possible. 
 The real positive function of Einfühlung in the epic theatre, however, comes when 
the spectator feels-himself-at-one-with the experiences of the actor-as-actor rather than 
the subjunctive states specific to the character.  In the epic theatre, as in the “Chinese 
theatre” (Beijing opera), “the spectator’s empathy [is] not entirely rejected.  The audience 
identifies itself with the actor as being an observer, and accordingly develops his attitude 
of observing or looking on” (93).  Here Einfühlung is indeed the psychological 
mechanism driving the spectator’s vicarious connection with the performer, but the 
spectator does not partake in the actor-as-character’s emotional movements; instead, she 
                                                        
238 In his later writings, Brecht often describes the rehearsal methods of the Berliner 
Ensemble actors as involving three distinct phases: 1) first contact with the character, 
during which the actor’s reactions of surprise or astonishment at the character’s behavior 
are noted and preserved; 2) a second phase in which Einfühlung is permitted, enabling 
“the search for the character’s truth in the subjective sense”; 3) a final phase, during 
which the actor relinquishes identification with the character and submits it to a social 




feels-herself-into the performer-as-demonstrator’s attitude of observational criticism.  
Crude mimetic thinking and Einfühlung theory combine, allowing the epic actor-as-actor 
to become a positive model for spectatorial Einfühlung.  Furthermore, epic actors may 
model for the spectators not only the role of observer, as above, but also that of someone 
observed: The Messingkauf Dialogues hold that the actor can also serve as “a model to be 
imitated” by showing the spectator how “to behave in everyday life like a man under 
observation” – something beneficial both to the individual and society (Brecht 1965:47).  
This proposal is drawn from a short fragment of the unfinished Messingkauf, and Brecht 
does not spell out precisely what the social benefits of self-observation might be, but they 
seem to involve reflection upon one’s actions in the moment of doing, which brings 
social behavior into conscious awareness.  In Brecht’s famous first treatment of the 
Verfremdungseffekt, “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting,” the Chinese actor’s mode of 
self-observation is explicitly defamiliarizing, so that he models an estranging gaze for the 
spectator: “The artist’s object is to appear strange and even surprising to the audience.  
He achieves this by looking strangely at himself and his work” (Brecht 1964:92). 
At other moments in Brechtian theory, the actor also models for the spectator a 
mode of emotional relation to the character – for, as has already been shown, Brechtian 
thought sees no incompatibility between emotion and criticism.  Writing late in his 
career, Brecht encourages the actors of the Berliner Ensemble to approach their 
character’s emotions “with an emotion of some force: thus, the character’s despair with 
genuine anger on our part, or his anger with genuine despair” (248-49).  Even if the 
specific combination of contradictory emotions modeled by the Ensemble actor – anger at 




contradiction itself is.  In other words, the Ensemble actor models a mode of emotional 
relation toward the character – a dialectical mode of feeling-against – that Brecht 
imagines the spectator will spontaneously reproduce.  Over and over again, Brecht’s 
tendency toward one-to-one thinking leads him to argue that the primary way for 
performers to lead spectators toward certain modes of consciousness – whether 
observational, self-observational, defamiliarizing, or emotionally contradictory – is to 
model those modes themselves. 
 
The Body in Brechtian Einfühlung 
 
 
As we have seen, Brecht’s Einfühlung is a loosely defined concept, one that encompasses 
both the actor’s immersion within the fictional circumstances of the character and the 
spectator’s following-along-with or being-carried-away-by the actor’s or character’s 
emotional processes.  In other words, Brechtian one-feeling includes both imaginative 
identification and emotional synchrony, which Brecht usually discusses as predominantly 
psychological – rather than physiological – processes.  Nevertheless, the instances in 
which the body does enter into Brecht’s treatment of Einfühlung are significant and point 
toward a connection with classical Einfühlung theory’s positions on the embodied 
correspondence between perceiver and aesthetic object. 
I will deal at length with Brecht’s prescriptions about the physicality of the actor, 
but will first examine his treatment of the physicality of the spectator, a topic that takes 
us more directly into Brecht’s crude account of Einfühlung’s bodily basis.  The spectating 
body appears most prominently in Brecht’s vivid depictions of the mental-and-physical 




identification-based acting practices. Brecht’s Short Organum invites its reader into one 
of the auditoria of the conventional theatre and summons a dream-vision of Einfühlung’s 
virulent effects on spectating bodies: 
Looking about us, we see somewhat motionless figures in a peculiar condition: 
they seem strenuously to be tensing all their muscles, except where these are 
flabby and exhausted.  They scarcely communicate with each other; their relations 
are those of a lot of sleepers, though of such as dream restlessly [...].  They look at 
the stage as if in a trance: an expression which comes from the Middle Ages, they 
days of witches and priests.  Seeing and hearing are activities, and can be pleasant 
ones, but these people seem relieved of activity and like men to whom something 
is being done.  (187) 
 
Like Vergil shepherding Dante through one of the circles of hell, or Socrates describing 
the prisoners in the subterranean cave of Republic VII, Brecht conjures a nightmarish 
vision of bodily and perceptual thralldom.  We could compare Brecht’s “cowed, 
credulous, hypnotized mass” of theatergoers (188) to addicts in an opium den, except that 
their bodies are not languid: rather, “they seem strenuously to be tensing all their 
muscles.”  Brecht’s spectator-prisoners are held fast in a straightjacket – or harness – of 
unrelenting muscular contraction, which produces a contracted way of seeing.  This 
trance-like gaze at the stage also arises in Brecht’s theatre poem, “Speech to Danish 
Working-Class Actors on the Art of Observation,” in which Brecht addresses actors 
accustomed to practicing a technique of emotional immersion.  Brecht imagines himself 
as a victimized audience member, who goes to the theatre seeking “a little tautening / Of 
slackened nerves,” and accuses the performers: “we, the spectators […] sit with glassy 
eyes and goggle / Fixed in your grip, at your grimaces and convulsions” (Brecht 
1976:234-35). 
To this point, Brecht’s visions of one-feeling have resonated with classical 




has been a passive, unconscious, and corporeally grounded one.  A rhetorical question 
within the Short Organum, however, brings the intersubjective dynamic behind Brechtian 
Einfühlung into closest alignment with the projective or introjective process described by 
Vischer and Lipps.  Brecht asks: 
How much longer are our souls, leaving our ‘mere’ bodies under cover of the 
darkness, to plunge into those dreamlike figures up on the stage, there to take part 
in the crescendos and climaxes which ‘normal’ life denies us?  (Brecht 1964:189) 
 
Brecht’s vision of onstage figures – that is, actors-as-characters – as dreamlike entities, 
into which the souls of audience members plunge, summons the scenario of projection 
laid out in Scherner’s Das Leben des Traums, original inspiration for Robert Vischer’s 
theory of aesthetic Einfühlung.  Brechtian one-feeling, however, is not the liberating, 
euphoric, expansive state described by Vischer and Lipps.  Instead of “the feeling of 
freedom and unconstricted ease” of the aesthetic contemplator that Lipps describes 
(Lipps 1965:407-8), Brecht’s Einfühlung is a nightmare-state of muscularly constricted 
self-negation that only the Verfremdungseffekt can dispel. 
If the audience members in the conventional theatre are typically “relieved of 
activity,” “like men to whom something is being done,” the actors who appear before 
them are the perpetrators of the “something” that subjugates and enervates them.  
Brecht’s poem, “Theatre of Emotions,” attacks the actors of the dramatic theatre for their 
complicity in establishing Einfühlung’s oppressive regime: 
 The emotions you manufacture are turbid and impure 
 General and blurred, no less false 
 Than thoughts can be.  Dull blows on the backbone 
 Cause the dregs of the soul to rise to the surface. 
 With glassy eyes 
 Sweaty brow and tightened calves 
 The poisoned audience follows 





Brecht would certainly have agreed that the Einfühlung-experience is sustained by the 
entire theatrical “apparatus” – the institutions, protocols, and functions of the theatre at 
any given historical-cultural moment – but here he lays blame squarely with the actors 
who serve this apparatus.  Brecht sees the theatre as part of the social world, not a place 
apart for aesthetic contemplation.  The actors who actively collaborate in the emotional 
poisoning of those who pay to see them are therefore social agents, no different from 
dealers in narcotics, pamphleteers for a perverse ideology, or thugs bludgeoning the 
political opponents of their boss.  As a final note, pay close attention to Brecht’s key 
symptoms of emotional immersion and affective victimization: the sweaty brow and the 
tightened calf.  We have already seen how the sweaty brow signaled the heights of 
Hitlerian frenzy.  The tightened calf-muscle will have further significance later on in this 
chapter. 
How do actors in the dramatic theatre take captive the bodies, minds, and gazes of 
their audiences so effectively?  According to Brecht, they rely first and foremost upon 
“that so-called temperament which is mechanically switched on, quite independently of 
the meaning of any scene, as soon as the curtain goes up – representing an attempt on the 
actor’s part, which has usually by now become unconscious, to excite the audience by 
means of his own excitement” (Brecht 1964:244).  According to Brecht, an actor seeking 
affective immersion often uses purely physical means to “infect himself” with the 
emotions appropriate to his character: “thus, by letting his voice rise, holding his breath 
and tightening his neck muscles so that the blood shoots to his head, the actor can easily 
conjure up a rage” (94).  Brecht presents this process as physically taxing and 




the actor is able to produce a “‘magnetic’ way of acting” (219), which takes a “grip on 
the audience’s nerves” (132).  This way of acting also takes hold of the audience’s 
musculature: the actor’s displays of histrionic affect mean that the spectators are 
“‘worked up’ by a display of temperament” and  “‘swept away’ by acting with tautened 
muscles.”  Muscularly overtaxed acting sets up “hypnotic tensions” between stage and 
auditorium (136) – tensions sustained by the corresponding tautness of acting and 
spectating bodies.  Brecht puts this view most bluntly in his early essay, “Emphasis on 
Sport”: the actor in the dramatic theatre exhausts himself with “feigned intensity,” in the 
process exhausting those who watch him, for “a man who strains himself on the stage is 
bound, if he is any good, to strain all the people sitting in the stalls” [emphasis in 
original] (8).  This embodied mimesis of strain, enabled by the psycho-physical operation 
that is Einfühlung, enervates even as it innervates, but its addicts still crave the tensile 
stimulations it provides. 
 Brecht sees the “dramatic” actor’s act of emotional exploitation as one of physical 
coercion.  The performer aiming at the Verfremdungseffekt must therefore guard against 
the emotional actor’s characteristic state of body-and-consciousness: 
Aiming not to put his audience into a trance, he must not go into a trance himself.  
His muscles must remain loose, for a turn of the head, e.g. with tautened neck 
muscles, will ‘magically’ lead the spectators eyes to and even their heads to turn 
with it, and this can only detract from any speculation or reaction which the 
gesture may bring about.  [emphasis added] (193) 
 
By turning his head with tautened neck muscles, the actor forcefully focalizes the 
spectator’s attention, locking his audience into a coercive corporeal apparatus.  The 
vision of hundreds of heads turning, tautly and simultaneously, at an actor’s physical cue, 




shadow-world of the prisoners in Plato’s cave, who “are in it [the cave] from childhood 
with their legs and necks in bonds so that they are fixed, seeing only in front of them, 
unable because of the bond to turn their heads all the way around” (Plato 1968:193, Rep. 
514a-b).239 
At his most coarse, Brecht describes the emotional actor’s excitation of the 
audience as an act of physical violation, in contrast with the affective freedom allowed by 
the epic actor’s detachment: by “holding himself remote from the character portrayed,” 
the epic actor “is careful not to make its sensations into those of the spectator.  Nobody 
gets raped by the individual he portrays” (Brecht 1964:93).  Here as elsewhere, Brecht 
reverses the directionality of the Einfühlung process by placing initiative and agency in 
the performer rather that the spectator.  The spontaneous and impulsive feeling-into-
another of the aesthetic observer within classical Einfühlung theory becomes, in 
Brechtian theatrical thought, that other’s forced introjection of his subjectivity into the 
observer – an act of aesthetic rape. 
Excessive muscularity, rigidity, and physical strain appear as negative values 
across Brechtian thought, not just as undesired qualities of theatrical performance.  
Strain, tautness, and over-exertion signal something amiss in social relationships just as 
they do in the theatrical relation between actor and spectator.  In particular, strain and its 
affiliated corporeal qualities are associated with the dominators and exploiters within the 
capitalist system (and its precursors) and their character-analogues in Brechtian drama.  
                                                        
239 In the Messingkauf fragments, Brecht experimented with a new terminology of visual 
focalization in the theatre. A rigid fixity and uniformity of gazes was, according to 
Brecht, typical of theatre of the “roundabout” or “merry-go-round type” (K-Typus), 
which sweeps the audience member forward like the rider of a carousel horse.  The epic 
theatre, on the other hand, is a theatre of the “planetarium type” (P-Typus), within which 




Brecht describes how the facial makeup for the nobles in his Antigone adaptation was 
intended to communicate “the ravages left on the face by the habit of commanding” (214) 
– the wrinkles, creases, and points of permanent contraction wrought by the habitual 
contortions of a superior social class.  Late plays like The Caucasian Chalk Circle and 
The Good Person of Szechuan explicitly thematize the monstrous self-transformation that 
human beings undergo when granted wealth, privilege, and command by birth or 
circumstance.  For Brecht, this transformation is a psychological as well as physical one, 
as his poem “The Mask of Evil” makes clear: 
 On my wall hangs a Japanese carving 
 The mask of an evil demon, decorated with gold lacquer, 
 Sympathetically [Mitfühlend] I observe 
 The swollen veins of the forehead, indicating 
 What a strain it is to be evil.  (Brecht 1976:383) 
 
Brecht’s Mitfühlend, an adverb used liberally by the early philosophers of Einfühlung, 
and which is today typically translated either as “sympathetically” or “empathetically,” 
may convey a double meaning: that Brecht pities (feels-for) the Noh demon’s facially 
manifested plight240 but also that he feels-along-with the grotesque topography of the 
demon mask’s features, entering into a Lippsian “psychic unity” with the anger made 
manifest in their contours.  The face of the Führer, glaring fixedly out of staged 
photographs and propaganda posters, looms in the background of “The Mask of Evil” 
(written c. 1942).  Hitler’s permanently contracted brow, with its deep creases above the 
bridge of the nose, and forward-staring gaze signal an inflexibly confrontational attitude 
toward political opponents at home and the purported enemies of Nazi Germany abroad – 
                                                        
240 This compassion for the demon-face, which is quite at odds with Brecht’s typical 
coldness toward dominators, exploiters, and other doers of evil deeds, can perhaps be 





a rigidity read as heroically stalwart by his supporters, as sinister or even maniacal by his 
detractors.241  Hitler’s public face, held in tensed impassivity until declamatory 
contortions animate it, models inflexibility and narrowness of purpose as virtues, in 
radical opposition to the Brechtian virtues of ease, adaptability, and openness to multiple 
possibilities. 
 
In Praise of Leichtigkeit 
 
 
If strain, tautness, and rigidity are consistently derogated in Brecht’s philosophy of life 
and theatre, Brecht pits against them the positive values of lightness, malleability, and 
deftness.  These are qualities of the intellect as well as the body – or, better, of the 
embodied intellect – across Brechtian thought.  For Brecht, thinking is “a way of 
behaving, and behaving socially at that.  It’s something that the whole body takes part in, 
with all its senses” (Brecht 1964:90).  As we shall see, the “free and highly mobile” 
intellect necessary for criticism (191) arises out of an easeful and adaptable body.  The 
keyword around which the various attributes of the Brechtian body accrue is Leichtigkeit 
(“lightness,” “ease”).  For Brecht, lightness is more than a quality of theatrical 
performance; it is a mode of bodily being in the social world that he celebrates and 
encourages throughout his prose, poetry, and drama.  We find Leichtigkeit in the young 
Brecht’s enthusiasm over the corporeal qualities of “elegance, lightness, dryness, 
objectivity” (8) he sees in cabaret and vaudeville performers (Frank Wedekind and Karl 
                                                        
241 Adorno and Horkheimer comment at length on Hitler’s “grimace,” which they deem a 
“manipulated expression,” like those of “the film actor, the lynch mob,” and of “fascist 
rabble-rousers and camp commanders” (149-50).  For an extensive analysis of the 
manifold political uses to which images of Hitler’s face were put during the years 1913 to 
1949, see Claudia Schmölders, Hitler's Face: The Biography of an Image, Trans. Adrian 




Valentin), cinematic comedians (Charlie Chaplin), and professional athletes (the boxer 
Paul Samson-Körner).  We also find it in the mature Brecht’s poetry: Antigone moves 
with “the light step / Of total certainty,” and Helene Weigel, appearing as Mother 
Courage at the Deutsches Theater in 1949, is encouraged to “step in your easy way / On 
to the old stage in our demolished city” (Brecht 1976:414, 415). 
It is within the Messingkauf fragments, however, that Brecht gives Leichtigkeit his 
most concentrated attention.  The Messingkauf’s Philosopher makes an eloquent case for 
lightness as an intrinsic theatrical quality: 
However much of what’s considered essential to the art of the theatre we may 
wish to abandon for the sake of our new aims, there is one thing which we must, 
in my view, preserve at all costs, and that’s its quality of ease.  It can’t be any 
handicap to us, and if we gave it up it would mean straining and spoiling our 
resources.  There is something naturally light and easy about the theatre. […]  The 
surgeon who has heavy responsibilities needs the little scalpel to lie lightly and 
easily in his hand.  The world is out of joint, certainly, and it will take powerful 
movements to manipulate it all back again.  But among the various relevant 
instruments there can be one that is slight and delicate and needs to be handled 
with ease.  (Brecht 1965:94) 
 
Despite its weighty social objectives – or, better, precisely because of their weightiness – 
the builders of the epic theatre must maintain a deft-and-easy touch in embodying the 
momentous human incidents they are given to portray.  The image of the scalpel lying 
lightly and easily in the surgeon’s hand activates the reader’s kinesthetic imagination; 
achieving some bodily sense of the deft-and-easy performance quality under description 
is as vital in understanding Brecht’s theatrical sensibility as is a conceptual understanding 
of a key term like Verfremdung. 
Brecht’s poem, “In Praise of Lightness,” destined for inclusion in the unfinished 





 Observe the ease 
 With which the mighty 
 River tears down its banks! 
 The earthquake 
Shakes the ground with relaxed hand.   
The dreadful fire 
Cheerfully reaches for the many-housed city 
And devours it in comfort: 
A practised consumer.  (Brecht 1964:174-75) 
 
Brecht, always an enthusiast over modern man’s capacity to transform the natural world 
on a massive scale, here projects a human movement-quality of lightness onto nature’s 
most powerfully obliterative forces.  Faced with a raging torrent, the shaking earth, or a 
flaming conflagration, Robert Vischer’s aesthetic contemplator might well project human 
impulses of angry violence, or at least reckless ferocity, into the observed natural 
phenomenon.  Brecht’s poem, on the other hand, invites us into an unconventional way of 
anthropomorphizing nature, in keeping with his own sociological aesthetics, which values 
ease over agitation.  The poem arouses our interest through defamiliarization: a set of 
physical actions – tearing down, shaking, reaching, and devouring – generally seen as 
vigorous if not violent are estranged by Brecht’s attribution to them of an unfamiliar, 
even counter-intuitive, set of performance-qualities. 
 Brecht does not, however, champion lightness only in the mode of generalized 
poetic exhortation and philosophical musing.  Lightness is a performance quality that 
must be concretely – that is, corporeally – achieved, by those invested in the art of the 
stage as well as those, like Brecht, for whom living is an art whose practice can be 
progressively improved.242  If Brecht places blame for the histrionically muscular 
tensions connecting stage and auditorium squarely at the feet of the actors of the 
                                                        




conventional theatre, he makes the actors of the epic theatre responsible for the 
achievement of lightness: 
When your work is complete, it must look light, easy.  The ease must recall effort; 
it is effort conquered or effort victorious.  From the outset of our work you must 
adopt the attitude that aims at achieving ease.  You mustn’t leave out the 
difficulties, but must collect them and make them come easy through your work.  
For the only worthwhile kind of ease is that which is a victory of effort.  (Brecht 
1964:174) 
 
For Brecht, however, lightness is not only an end-result, a quality of the finished 
performance; it is also something to be cultivated at every phase of theatrical preparation.  
Effort-qualities of strain block its ultimate achievement.  In other words, lightness is a 
right “way of walking” – or, in the theatre, a right way of stepping onto the stage – 
regardless of the obstacles encountered.  Brecht therefore enjoins the actor: “If you want 
to master something difficult, take it easy” (Brecht 1964:243), and encourages being 
“economical” in one’s efforts, guarding against “undue strain” (175).  This light touch in 
role-preparation allows the actor to take sensual pleasure in rehearsals: Brecht writes that 
the actor “must ‘arrange’ his movements […] in such a way that he gets fun out of their 
sweep and rhythm.  All these are tasks for the senses, and his training is of a physical 
kind” (243).  Lest this attitude of taking-one’s-ease seem merely a nice idea, rather than a 
principle of performance practice, it should be emphasized that the lightness of effort 
victorious was a quality made concrete in the bodies of the Berliner Ensemble’s 
performers under Brecht’s direction,243 and one often commented upon by reviewers.  
Kenneth Tynan, for example, wrote of the Ensemble’s “light, relaxed, and aesthetically 
                                                        
243 Tynan saw this style of playing as depending on rehearsal conditions that promoted 
easeful creativity.  Writing of a rehearsal after Brecht’s death, Tynan recounted: “[Erich] 
Engel and two young assistants interrupted from time to time, talking with the easy, 
probing frankness that comes of no haste, no pressure, no need to worry about publicity, 




spare” style of playing (Tynan 1959:113).  Brecht’s final message for the Berliner 
Ensemble rehearsal board at the Theater am Schiffbauerdamm, written nine days before 
his death on 14 August 1956, reads:  “So our playing needs to be quick, light, strong.  
This is not a question of hurry, but of speed, not simply of quick playing, but of quick 
thinking” (Brecht 1964:283).  Lightness in the body, lightness of thought: for Brecht, the 
two were inextricable. 
 
The Body of Criticism 
 
 
Pressing further my investigation of the epic theatre’s embodied mimesis requires 
stepping back for a moment from the line of this chapter’s argument in order to achieve a 
better grasp of the relationship between the physical, the psychological, and the social in 
Brechtian thought.  Key to such an understanding is a nuanced appreciation for two 
Brechtian keywords, gestus and Haltung, both of which are as applicable to behavior in 
the social world as they are to an actor’s re-performance of such behavior onstage.  For 
Brecht, social bodies are always making gesten and taking up Haltungen toward one 
another.  The actor’s task is to observe and reproduce these gestures and stances 
accurately, while retaining the epic theatre’s underlying gestus of showing and Haltung 
of criticism. 
English-language scholarship has capably emphasized the importance of the term 
gestus in understanding Brecht’s theatrical thought.  John Willett, whose editions of 
Brecht’s plays and theatre essays have made Brecht accessible to several generations of 
English-language readers, glosses gestus as “both gist and gesture; an attitude or single 




provides a slightly longer definition of gestus in his study The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht, 
calling it “at once gesture and gist, attitude or point: one aspect of the relation between 
two people, studied singly, cut to essentials and physically or verbally expressed” (Willett 
1959:173).  Both of these excellent definitions omit, somewhat surprisingly, the socially 
habituated element of Brechtian gestus, which is fundamental to its meaning.  Brecht 
himself writes: “By social gest [gestus] is meant the mimetic and gestural expression of 
the social relationships prevailing within people of a given period” (Brecht 1964:139).  
Brecht is interested in typical gestures that replay themselves over and over again 
between bodies within a given social formation. 
Willett’s definition of gestus points the way toward another Brechtian keyword: 
Haltung (“attitude,” “bearing,” “stance”).  The importance of this concept has only 
recently been highlighted in English-language Brecht scholarship.  Reading the work of 
Darko Suvin, Frederic Jameson, and Rainer Nägele together244 makes it clear that 
Haltung ought to be accorded a place among the most important of Brechtian keywords, 
along with gestus and Verfremdung.  Suvin calls Haltung “a fruitful polysemy or pun 
meaning bearing, stance, attitude, posture, behavior, and also poise or self-control.”  
Nägele highlights the prominence of the term Haltung in the writings of Brecht’s friend, 
colleague, and confidante Walter Benjamin and notes the word’s close relation to “the 
three major German verbs of position – setzen, stellen, legen – and their intransitive 
counterparts – sitzen, stehen, liegen (to sit, to stand, to lie)” (Nägele 1991:140).  As a way 
of sitting, standing, or lying – that is, as way of organizing and orienting the body – 
                                                        




Haltung is “a kind of Verhalten (behavior) compacted into a certain degree of 
permanence and firmness,” one which “guarantees a physiognomy and a face” (147). 
The relationship between gestus and Haltung is a variable one in Brecht’s and 
Benjamin’s writings.  In some instances, the terms seem virtually interchangeable: “The 
realm of attitudes adopted by the characters toward one another is what we call the realm 
of gest [gestus]” (Brecht 1964:198).  At other moments, gestus appears as “the smallest 
element of a Haltung” (Nägele 1991:152), capturing the varied momentary 
manifestations of a more enduring stance toward existence with a kind of photographic 
freeze-frame effect.  Such is the opinion of Benjamin, for whom gestus functions 
dialectically by spotlighting the “strict, frame-like, enclosed nature of each moment of an 
attitude which, after all, is as a whole in a state of living flux” (Benjamin 1988:13).  
Taken together, then, gestus and Haltung unite the physical, psychological, and the 
sociological in Brechtian theory. 
Both Willett and Suvin rightly note the principle of externalization in a theatre 
that makes meaning by staging stance and gesture.245  Nägele also writes: “As a 
physiognomic force, Haltung replaces interiority, the constitutive space of the bourgeois 
subject” (Nägele 1991:148).  The groupings, gestures, and postures of the actors on the 
epic stage comprise a series of “moral tableaux” (Brecht 1964:38) that communicate 
social decisions ranging from the unthinkingly habitual to the agonizingly impossible.  
The goal of the Brechtian ensemble is to supplement the dramatic Fabel (“story,” “plot”) 
with shifting constellations of gesten and Haltungen, which tell a story of human 
relationships and decisions in corporeal form.  The essential Brechtian attitudes of greed, 
                                                        




appetite, predation, survival, skepticism, curiosity, instruction, resistance, endurance, 
protection, and altruism manifest themselves in concrete gestures, specific to moment and 
motive: Grusha picks up the abandoned child to save its life; Azdak extends his open 
palms to receive bribes; Galileo carries the boy Andrea around a washstand to 
demonstrate the movement of the earth around the sun; Mother Courage hitches herself to 
her wagon and trundles forward into the only future she can imagine.  Brechtian psycho-
sociality is always already physicalized, exteriorized, and inter-relational.  In the epic 
theatre, thought, emotion, and intention manifest themselves as gesten and Haltungen, 
shaping and being shaped by the body’s social morphologies. 
 How are gestus and Haltung employed by the actors in the epic theatre?  As has 
already been discussed, epic actors performers are responsible for observing carefully the 
gestures and attitudes of the social world that surrounds them so that they may accurately 
reproduce them onstage.  These reproductions will not be exact replicas, however, 
because they will contain an element of “quotation” or “underlining.”246  More 
importantly, they will be defamiliarized by the actors’ “general gest[us] of showing, 
which always underlies that which is being shown” (Brecht 1964:203), even as the actors 
re-present the diverse gestures, postures, and expressions that make up the life of society.  
Brecht’s theatre poem, “Showing Has to be Shown,” makes this point most emphatically: 
 Show that you are showing!  Among all the varied attitudes 
 Which you show when showing how men play their parts 
 The attitude of showing must never be forgotten. 
All attitudes must be based on the attitude of showing.  (Brecht 1976:341) 
 
Individuals “play parts” in social life as much as actors do onstage, and these social roles 
involve consciously and unconsciously presented attitudes toward one another.  When 
                                                        




placed on a theatrical stage, however, a gestus or Haltung is always a hybrid of 
performance qualities – qualities that capture how the gesture or attitude would be 
embodied in its original social context, as well as qualities specific to its theatrical re-
performance.  A theatrical performance quality of lightness is especially efficacious 
because it can defamiliarize social behavior.  Brecht writes: “Special elegance, power, 
and grace of gesture bring about the A-effect” (Brecht 1964:139), and “the achievement 
of an A-effect absolutely depends on lightness and naturalness of performance” (95).  
Brecht often compares such qualities of re-performance with the deft, light, and 
purposeful matter-of-factness of a skilled craftsperson at work, or, work completed, 
presenting a finished article to the customer for inspection (see Brecht 1976: 341, and 
elsewhere).  The professional polish of the craftsperson’s demonstration – of showing 
how it’s done, or showing off the finished item to best effect – provides a basic model for 
the epic actor’s relationship with gesture, just as the street-corner testimonial provides a 
basic model for his relationship with text and character.247 
 We now come to the very crux of lightness’s function in the epic theatre: Brecht’s 
crudely mimetic thinking combines with Einfühlung theory’s doctrine of bodily 
correspondence to enable the spectator’s participation in the corporeal lightness of the 
actor.  The epic actor’s easeful quality of physical-and-vocal delivery “make[s] it 
possible for the audience to take [the actor’s] art, his mastery of technique, lightly too” 
(Brecht 1964:139).  The epic actor’s detached stance toward his character finds tensile 
manifestation in the lightness with which he presents the social gestures appropriate to 
this character, and this attitude of “taking it lightly” allows the spectator the freedom of 
                                                        




mind and body to adopt the same attitude toward the character’s actions.  Unlike the 
emotional actor of the dramatic theatre, who compels the spectator into an affectively taut 
identification with onstage happenings, the epic actor models for the spectator an easeful 
and critical orientation toward the decisions and statements of the characters presented.  
Audience members in the epic theatre may indeed feel-themselves-into onstage actions, 
but these actions are the light-and-easy demonstrations carried out by a team of 
sociological experimenters (the epic acting ensemble), not the emotionally intense 
experiences of their experimental subjects (the characters of the dramatic fiction). 
To further trace the connection between bodily lightness and intellectual freedom 
within Brechtian thought requires re-engagement with the Haltung concept.  For Brecht, 
thought shapes the body and the body gives shape to thought, and this shape is Haltung.  
Brecht, along with his alter egos Galileo and Azdak, approaches thinking as a bodily 
process – like eating, drinking, and working – that provides sensual pleasure.  As Suvin 
and Nägele note, the anecdotes, proverbs, and parables of Mr. Keuner, “the thinking 
man” (another of Brecht’s many alter egos), provide a rich site for understanding 
Brechtian Haltung.  In the terse anecdote “What’s wise about the wise man is his stance,” 
Keuner meets a professor of philosophy.  After listening to the philosopher speak for a 
while, Keuner comments: “You sit uncomfortably, you talk uncomfortably, you think 
uncomfortably.”  The philosopher protests angrily: “I didn’t want to hear anything about 
myself but about the substance of what I was saying.”  “It has no substance,” Keuner 
responds.  “Seeing your stance, I’m not interested in what you’re getting at.”  In this 




inseparable.  Bodily substance supports productive intellectual inquiry and exchange – 
and, in the negative case of the philosopher, for the awkward discharge of empty words. 
 A related incident occurs in The Messingkauf Dialogues, when the Actor, a 
sentimental but not entirely dim-witted ham, having newly glimpsed the theatre’s 
potential as a philosophic art, “strikes an attitude” of thinking.  (We can perhaps imagine 
him inclining his head downward with knuckles supporting his chin, in the manner of 
Rodin’s The Thinker, or gazing into the distance with an earnestly furrowed brow).  The 
Philosopher, “feeling his [the actor’s] calf muscles,” critiques his pose: “No.  Your 
muscles aren’t relaxed enough” (Brecht 1965:20).  The actor’s Haltung is a histrionically 
stereotyped and overly contracted one, bearing no resemblance to the easeful, 
comfortable, and malleable thinking body of Brechtian philosophy.  We have already 
noted the tensed calf muscle as a symptom of the spectator’s psycho-physiological 
entrancement in the dramatic theatre.  Here it crops up again, as a muscular contraction 
that obstructs the free flow of thought. 
 The most valued Haltung within Brechtian thought is the productively critical 
one.  Brecht’s enthusiasm for the idea of a “smoker’s theatre,” in which spectators are 
encouraged to smoke and comment upon the onstage action, can only be understood in 
relation to his valuation of the Haltung of easeful criticism (kritische Haltung).  Both 
acting and mise-en-scène in the epic theatre are intended to facilitate in the spectator an 
“attitude of smoking-and-watching” (see Brecht 1964:44), which involves the act of 
smoking itself, but also the way of sitting and inclining the head that the act of smoking 
encourages:  “As you know, a man smoking is in an attitude highly conducive to 




everything from an assured position, is only half with it” (Brecht 1965:19).  The easy, 
relaxed posture of leaning-back, along with the raising and lowering of a cigarette or 
cigar to the mouth, immunizes the smoker-and-watcher against the “hypnotic tensions” of 
the “dramatic” theatre.  Instead of the self-opening or self-surrender required to attain the 
heights of aesthetic Einfühlung, the Brechtian spectator occupies a posture of self-
withdrawal.  His leaning-back sets him at a distance from the onstage action; the raising 
and lowering of his cigarette is an activity that reminds him of his own body; the slight 
turn of the head toward the cigarette, or towards his companion to whisper a comment, 
disrupts the coercive focalization of his gaze. 
Understanding the Haltung concept helps one better appreciate the literalness – 
which is also the materiality and corporeality – of Brechtian theory.  Brecht is not calling 
for a metaphorical “smoker’s theatre.”  He is calling for a theatre in which the theatrical 
spectacle promotes the actual bodily qualities of the smoker-and-watcher in its audience 
members, regardless of whether these audience members are actually smoking.  We 
should also appreciate that Brecht’s ideal smoker is Brecht himself, iconic cigar in 
mouth.  Brecht’s personal biography from his schooldays onward embodies his maxim 
that “the right attitude to any really important phenomenon is a casual (contemptuous) 
one, because it is the only one which permits complete concentration and real alertness,” 
as well as a high degree of “personal freedom” (Brecht 1964:10).  The casually 
concentrated, contemptuously free and alert attitude that Brecht encourages is one with 
which he is intimately and corporeally familiar.  It is a mark of Brecht’s imperturbable 
egoism that he theorizes the epic theatre as a means for disseminating his personal mode 




To summarize: while demonstrating the varied gesten and Haltungen of their 
dramatic characters, the epic ensemble never ceases to occupy the Haltung of criticism or 
employ the gestus of showing, made manifest in their corporeal qualities of lightness, 
ease, deftness, alertness, and adaptability.  By feeling-himself-into these performance 
qualities, the spectator adopts the attitude of the actor.  As a result, actor and spectator 
share an attitude of observing-and-criticizing and a bodily quality of lightness, even 
though their bodies occupy different postures (the actor standing and gesturing, the 
spectator sitting back in his seat).  Through sustained engagement with the corporeal 
attitudes and gestures that comprise what Robert Vischer might have called the 
“symbolism” of epic presentation – the dynamism of the artistic medium rather than the 
artistic content – the audience member leaves the auditorium “productively disposed” 
(Brecht 1964:205) toward criticism. 
 
Mimesis with an Attitude 
 
 
Brecht’s conception of how the world onstage relates to the social world offstage is 
heavily mimeticist.  Brecht’s mimetic thinking derives from the fundamentally 
Aristotelian grounding of his theatrical thought (despite his objections to the affective 
dynamics he deems “Aristotelian”) as well as from his Marxist orientation toward 
aesthetics.  It is within the unfinished fragments of the Messingkauf Dialogues, which 
Brecht plundered in composing the Short Organum, that Brecht’s outlines his theory of 
mimesis most comprehensively.  The Messingkauf’s Philosopher defines art – theatrical, 
visual, or literary – as “skill in preparing reproductions of human beings’ life together 




stimulated in the same way or to the same extent by seeing or experiencing the reality 
produced” (Brecht 1965:95).  Artistic representation is thus never politically neutral; it 
always leads to some transformation of the observer’s relationship with social reality. 
The “Aristotelian” theatre, argues the Messingkauf’s Philosopher, has for 
millennia been using “imitations of reality” to “release all sorts of emotions and 
passions” (97); its agenda has been an emotionalist one, and its primary source of 
pleasure has been affective arousal.  The Philosopher is out to reform this longstanding 
agenda, but requires some raw material upon which to work.  Like the scrap metal dealer 
who buys a trumpet for its brass content, he is out to “ransack” the conventional theatre 
for its “imitations”248: “I’m looking for a way of getting incidents between people 
imitated for certain purposes; I’ve heard that you supply such imitations; and now I hope 
to find out if they are the kind of imitations I can use” (16).  The accuracy of these 
“imitations” must first be improved by being “checked against reality” (Brecht 
1964:114), and then re-deployed toward the Philosopher’s “certain purposes”: to 
represent social actions “for perfectly practical ends, simply in order to find out the best 
way to behave” (Brecht 1965:17).  The Philosopher’s theatre will present accurate 
imitations of “men’s life together in society” (Brecht 1964:205) with a view toward 
ethical improvement.  
The Messingkauf calls the “imitations” in which the theatre traffics 
“representations” and “reproductions,” but also, as Brecht tries on the vocabulary of 
Platonism, as “images” and “pictures.”  When Brecht claims that the epic theatre offers 
not an “experience” but a “picture of the world” (Brecht 1964:37), Brecht is forcefully 
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renewing the mimetic paradigm against Stanislavsky’s theatre of organicist  
“experiencing” [perezhivanie].  Though the accuracy of its “images” is of profound 
import, the Brechtian theatre is not purely reduplicative.  If it holds a mirror up to nature, 
it is a “special mirror,” shaped by Brecht’s Marxist agenda.249  Rather, epic theatrical 
praxis undertakes the “representation of reality with a view to influencing it” (227).  In 
other words, its mimesis must have an ethical payoff; it must promote “applicable 
conclusions about human actions” (Brecht 1964:48) and does not satisfy itself with 
simply presenting the actions themselves.  The Messingkauf’s philosopher therefore 
requires that “something equivalent to comment [be] incorporated” within his theatre’s 
representations of human behavior (Brecht 1965:32).  The necessary element of 
“comment” is supplied by the gestus of showing and the Haltung of critique, which 
animate epic acting and define the curvature of the mirror of Brechtian mimesis.  In the 
epic theatre, writes Brecht, “The gestic principle takes over, as it were, from the principle 
of imitation” (Brecht 1964:86).  In Brecht’s theatre, the critical attitude of the ensemble is 
manifested as an embedded part of the “happenings between humans” taking place 
onstage, so that the audience perceives the represented content and the attitude of its 
presentation simultaneously, in the performance qualities of the gestures, movements, 
and postures of the acting bodies who inhabit the stage.250 
In the epic theatre, a gestic relationship operates across the divide between stage 
and auditorium: the spectators hold a critical attitude toward the presented actions; the 
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actor also holds a critical attitude toward the actions of the character he presents, while at 
the same time directing his underlying gestus of showing toward the spectator.  Like the 
individual scenes of epic dramaturgy, actor and spectator are “set off against” one other 
by their attitudes.  Einfühlung, on the other hand, lacks attitude.  In the theatre of one-
feeling, the spectator becomes one with the actor through a fusion that requires a loss of 
self-awareness, becoming (within the spectator’s consciousness) an experiencing monad.  
In the epic theatre, actor and spectator also form a unit, but it is a Brechtian unit of the 
two-as-two: “not the single person but two people.”  Like the interrelational dynamics of 
street corner and factory floor that caught Brecht’s sociologist’s eye, the epic theatre’s 
social dynamic is that of one-against-the-other.  But the quality of this feeling- or being-
against arises from the attitude of criticism, and not from the exploitative, transactional, 
and predatory ways of being-against that, for Brecht the Marxist, drive so much of our 
social existence. 
 Beneath this attitudinal counter-poising, I would like to argue, can exist 
synchrony.  This chapter’s chief argument is that the Brechtian theatre’s critical-and-
productive stance of feeling-against is not incompatible with a corporeally grounded 
mode of feeling-at-one-with-another.  A dually operational mimesis drives the operations 
of the Brechtian theatre: the mimesis of the social world, which produces accurate images 
of human interactions, co-exists with an embodied mimesis connecting acting bodies with 
spectating bodies.  The spectator feels-himself-into the performance qualities of the epic 
actor – ease, deftness, and alertness – and in the process is relieved of the constrictual 
urge toward Einfühlung and the tightening of thought it entails. The images of social 




to be taut” (Brecht 1964:194); consequently, these images “leave the spectator’s intellect 
free and highly mobile” (Brecht 1964:191).  If Hitler’s effort at putting across the “little 
man’s image of his master” left him and his audience strained to exhaustion, the epic 
theatre’s theatrical mimesis promotes an attitude of easeful resistance that can inoculate 
the spectator against the corporeal regimes of the dramatic theatre – and perhaps, by 
extension, the fascist spectacle that co-opts its devices. 
In sum, Brechtian mimesis demands an attitude, and this attitude is a bodily one.  
Brechtian mimesis relies most of all upon the Mimus of the performing body, and it is 
through engagement with the performance qualities of this body that the spectator is 
primed to take up a productive attitude toward embodied social actions presented by this 
body.  The lightness of the Brechtian actor frees the in-feeling spectator from his rigidly 
held, upright posture, with calf-muscles tensed and perspiration trickling down his brow, 
and invites him to lean back in his seat, narrow his eyes, cast his gaze around the stage, 
and perhaps murmur a comment or a joke to his companion.  The epic actor’s 
demonstration of social behavior is therefore an act of liberation, like the transformation 
of nature, or that of society, and the spectator, inoculated against one-feeling, is left free 
to partake in “the joys of liberation” conveyed by “the theatre of a scientific age” (Brecht 
1964:196).  This freedom requires the uninhibited wielding of the critical faculty, which 
the early theorists of Einfühlung argued was disruptive – and, indeed, antithetical – 
to the “the feeling of freedom and unconstricted ease”251 that aesthetic experience allows. 
Of course, subscribing to the above account of epic theatre as a critically 
attitudinal, corporeally grounded mimetic apparatus requires accepting that Brechtian 
                                                        




praxis does what Brecht says it does – something that Brecht’s critics, past and present, 
have been reluctant to grant.  Perhaps the most trenchant critique of the intellectually 
liberatory potential of Brecht’s theatre comes from Theodor Adorno, who writes: 
[Brecht’s] theater of alienation intended to motivate the viewer to think. […] His 
didactic style, however, is intolerant of the ambiguity in which thought originates: 
It is authoritarian. This may have been Brecht's response to the ineffectuality of 
his didactic plays: As a virtuoso of manipulative technique, he wanted to coerce 
the desired effect just as he once planned to organize his rise to fame.  (Adorno 
1997:242) 
 
It may be true that Brecht’s plays sometimes disguise didacticism as entertainment by 
representing prefabricated processes of learning instead of promoting such processes in 
their audiences, or staging debates in which one voice holds authorially sanctioned 
positions, and that these devices contain an element of intellectual coercion.  However, 
we can find considerable good faith in Brecht’s injunctions regarding the organization of 
the performing body – in particular, in his renunciation of the hypnotically tense 
histrionics that work so effectively upon the bodies of spectators in the “dramatic” 
theatre.  A performance quality of ease can be deployed for invitation, seduction, perhaps 
even manipulation, but it is damnably difficult to deploy it toward coercion or violent 
galvanization.  Even if we accept Adorno’s critique of the Brechtian project, we can 
perhaps allow that, by championing Leichtigkeit, Brecht grants his spectator at least a 
measure of corporeal freedom – and that this freedom in the body allows at least some 
space for undirected intellectual impulses. 
Sean Carney argues convincingly that Brecht’s theatrical theory cannot be 
separated from its Marxist project.252  Likewise, we cannot understand the mimesis 
undertaken by Brecht’s theatre unless we hold it up in opposition to the forms of mimetic 
                                                        




behavior sweeping Germany in the decades leading up to the second World War.  Brecht 
denies himself the devices that support the ritualized organization of mimesis in service 
of political domination that Adorno and Horkheimer attribute to European fascism in 
their Dialectic of Enlightenment.  Fascism’s rigidifying corporeal regimes, argue Adorno 
and Horkheimer, exploit “the organic adaptation to otherness” that is “mimetic behavior 
proper,” as a result “automating mental processes, turning them into blind sequences” 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 2002:148-49).  There is a world of difference between the 
fascist way of walking – with its tautly percussive, machine-like, lock-step strutting – and 
the light step of Helene Weigel.  This difference ought not to be overlooked by critics 
attempting to paint Brecht’s epic theatre as disingenuously totalitarian.  Like the rise of 
Arturo Ui or Adolf Hitler, Einfühlung is for Brecht an eminently resistible process, and 
the epic actor models a mode of resistance against its “hypnotic tensions” that may carry 
over into the spectator’s engagement with social performances beyond the walls of the 
theatre. 
We may ordinarily think of resistance as requiring the meeting of force with 
force, of tension with tension, of pressure with counter-pressure, but an equally effective 
mode of resistance – and one championed across Brecht’s oeuvre – is to meet force with 
lightness.  The attitude of “taking it lightly” allows its possessor to sidestep collision and 
enables evasion, absorption, equivocation, misdirection, and, as a last resort, escape.  
Brecht, who fled Nazi Germany the day after the burning of the Reichstag in 1933 and 
boarded a transatlantic flight to Europe the day after his hearing before the House Un-
American Activities Committee in 1947, knew well the virtues of Leichtigkeit: 
 Early on I learned to change everything quickly 




 Lightly I do so, yet still I see 
 How others want to take too much with them. 
    Leave your ship light, leave lightly behind 
    Leave too your ship lightly behind when they tell you 
    To take the road inland.253 
 
Lightness is a way of walking, a quality of performance.  For Brecht, it is the right way of 
walking the “road inland” into the unknown future.  Brecht and the early theorists of 
Einfühlung would agree that lightness can be appreciated – and even learned – by 
watching and feeling-ourselves-into the way others walk, lightly, and that this process of 
apperceptive attunement can occur both in the social world and in the social world that is 
the theatre. 
 
* * * 
 
In concluding, I would like to take a cue from Brecht’s passion for dialectics – in 
particular, from his late view that the “tussle and tension” between “acting 
(demonstration)” and “experience (empathy)” generates much of the “particular 
effectiveness” of the actor’s art.  I would like to push Brecht’s thinking about 
Einfühlung’s role in the epic theatre’s critical mimesis a step further, in order to broker a 
more general, dialectical reconciliation between correspondence and contradiction in 
theatrical theory – that is, to argue that feeling-with and feeling-against are not as 
mutually exclusive as we might often think, either in social relations or their theatrical 
variants. 
When I find that my opinions differ from yours, I can disagree with you lightly or 
I can disagree with you heavily.  You can argue with me easefully or you can argue with 
                                                        





me tensely.  We can be “against” each other in our point of view but “with” each other in 
our way of being.  We can both take pleasure in an argument, in the vivacious exchange 
of contradictory views, because we have agreed – probably implicitly rather than 
explicitly – to take things lightly.  Our voices will not rise to stridency; we will not jerk 
pointed index-fingers at each other; we will not shift uncomfortably in our seats; our 
faces will not flush, beads of sweat will not run down our brows, and the veins of our 
temples will not swell with strain.  An agreement to lightness can serve as the basis for an 
ethics of mutual respect.  Physical performance-qualities infuse everything we do, and the 
courses and outcomes of our social interactions, both on the street corner and in the 
theatrical auditorium, depend as much on the how as the what of our attitudes, actions, 
and words. 
The above description of agreement-within-argument attempts to summon, with 
the efficiency of abstraction, qualities of dialectical engagement made corporeal in 
countless meetings between Brecht and his friends, confidantes, and collaborators over a 
lifetime of energetic conversation and collective artistic activity.254  Brecht’s lightness 
made him well loved, as well as giving him some measure of freedom from the shocks of 
an often inhospitable world.  A little story recounted by the playwright Erwin Strittmatter 
renders Brecht’s Haltung of taking-things-lightly amusingly concrete: 
[Brecht’s] understanding relationship with assistants and actors is well known.  Of 
course there were rows, even “fearful rows.” […]  But secretly I doubt that they 
were “genuine.” In a “Katzgraben” rehearsal one point would simply not go right.  
Brecht continued rehearsing with a lot of patience, but I could not go on.  He 
tapped my shoulder and said: “Don’t say anything or there will be a genuine row.  
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I’ll make a theatre row and not get excited.”  He made the row.  It worked.  He 
smiled: “That’s the way to do it.”255 
 
Brecht’s “theatre row” may present an accurate “image” or “imitation” of a row, but what 
makes it theatrical – in a thoroughly Brechtian sense – is its embedded lightness, along 
with the clarity of intent infusing this performance quality.  Brecht argues lightly to avoid 
poisoning the atmosphere of collaboration with strain: a tautened neck muscle or a 
clenched fist could quickly promote emotional contractions in all assembled, through the 
swift and uncritical attunement with otherness that Plato once attacked under the rubric of 
mimesis, and which the younger Brecht objected to under the name of Einfühlung.  
                                                        





Beyond the One-to-One 
 
This study of mimesis within acting theory’s history of ideas cannot be exhaustive.  It has 
left many strands of one-to-one conceptualization untraced, many pockets of mimeticist 
thinking unprobed.  In expanding its scope, one might, for example examine Vsevolod 
Meyerhold’s and Sergei Eisenstein’s writings on “Biomechanics,” a system of body-
based actor-training whose theoretical articulations, as is well known, were harmonized 
with Soviet materialist ideology.  However, biomechanical thought also draws upon the 
psychology of William James, Theodor Lipps’s conception of Einfühlung (discussed in 
chapter four of this study), and the Russian “Objective Psychology” of Pavlov, Sechenov, 
and Bekhterev.  All of these bodies of thought analyze imitation as a social phenomenon: 
James’s Principles of Psychology examined the instinctive “imitative tendency” among 
children and adults (James 1890:408), Lipps at first theorized Einfühlung in terms of 
“inner imitation,”256 and Bekhterev argued that a “mimico-somatic association reflex” 
provides the primary mechanism for empathy (Bechterev 1933:240). 
The political objective of Biomechanical training is the development of the 
actor’s physical capacity to trigger spectatorial “arousal” in the service of the Soviet state.  
In his late essay, “The Reconstruction of the Theatre” (1930), Meyerhold envisions of 
tens of thousands of human bodies within a stadium-theatre of the future, vibrating at the 
same physical-emotional frequency, galvanized in their commitment to cultural 
reformation by the “invigorating shock” delivered by the actor’s physical expressivity 
(Meyerhold 1969:270).  This is embodied mimesis on a mass scale.  According to 
                                                        




Eisenstein, Meyerhold’s protégé and the chief theoretician of Biomechanics in written 
form, “arousal” spreads between actor and spectator through the “imitative, mimical 
infectiousness” of the former’s expressive movement – in other words, its capacity to 
provoke “direct or reverse imitation in the auditorium” (in Law and Gordon 1996:187, 
206).  Gripped by a physiological mimetic drive, the spectator “in turn reflexively repeats 
in weakened form the entire system of the actor’s movements: as a result of the produced 
movements, the spectator’s incipient muscular tensions are released in the desired 
emotion” (187).  Giving over even further to one-to-one conceptualization, Eisenstein 
suggests that the Biomechanical actor reproduces in physical form the intellectual 
movement of dialectics, which proceeds through negation and counter-negation.  
Eisenstein conceives this reproduction of thought in movement as quite literal, but a less 
ideologically driven reader will almost certainly take it as largely metaphorical, 
metaphysically materialist kind of mimesis. 
 Expanding the scope of this study even further, one could also pursue mimesis 
into the theory and practice of the Polish director and “theatre guru” Jerzy Grotowski.  In 
his early career, Grotowski extends Stanislavsky technique of acting as action in pursuing 
the performer’s real act of self-revelation before an audience.  This act is not an imitation 
of action, or even action in the fictionally informed mood of Stanislavsky’s “as if.”  For 
Grotowski, it is action itself – a “total act” of “self-penetration” (34) carried out by the 
actor upon him- or herself (Grotowski 1968:212, 34).  Whether such an action takes place 
within rather than without the walls of a performance venue is irrelevant with respect to 
its realness.  Grotowski’s turn away from the “Theatre of Productions” toward facilitated 




practices toward the end of that decade, has often been discussed as a movement “beyond 
representation” or one of “abandoning mimesis.”257  It is certainly true that Grotowski 
held no interest in the realistic representation of social behavior at this phase of his 
career.  But as someone who trained for two months at the Workcenter of Jerzy 
Grotowski and Thomas Richards in Pontedera, Italy, during the summer of 2008, I can 
state my belief that the “other mimesis” explored in this study – mimesis as embodied 
attunement – powerfully sustains processes of contagion and transmission within current 
Workcenter practice, which centers on the creation of performances using songs of ritual 
traditions. 
Mimesis also makes explicit or disguised appearances in theoretical articulations 
of this practice: for example, when Thomas Richards, artistic director of the Workcenter, 
discusses imitation as a sometimes valid strategy for new members of his Workcenter 
ensemble: “in part, through imitating they can learn to do” (Richards 2008:114).  
Mimetic thinking also pushes itself upward beneath the surface of Richards’s explanation 
of the term “induction,” which Grotowski used to describe the flow of energy between 
performers (or “doers”) as well as between performers and witnesses: 
If you have an electrical wire with current flowing through it, and you take 
another without current in it and put it nearby, traces of an electrical current may 
appear in this second wire.  This is the phenomenon of induction, and it can also 
happen when someone is witnessing the performing structure in which the doers 
are approaching [a] transformation of energy.  As they’re watching, witnesses 
might begin to perceive inside themselves something of what is happening in the 
doers […] and afterwards in the analysis someone says, for example, ‘Ah, when 
performing, you were singing.  And I don’t know what exactly happened, but it 
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was almost like a movement inside me – inside my body?  I was just sitting, 
watching.’  We can see, ah, there was induction.  (14) 
 
In the image of two wire filaments held up in parallel, we have a hieroglyph of the one-
to-one schema itself.  But the play of electricity within and between these filaments – and 
the fact that the energetic fluctuations of one wire can participate in without replicating 
those of the other – adds a further dimension of conceptual nuance, one that moves us 
beyond the one-to-one.  In addition, the properties of electricity are, for most of us, as 
mysterious as the mechanisms behind affective contagion or kinesthetic response, and 
Grotowski and Richards are gesturing toward an experiential phenomenon with an image 
rather than seeking a conceptually perfect analogy. 
To bring this study of one-to-one thinking about the actor’s art up to the very 
present, one would have examine the application of cognitive neuroscience’s “mirror 
neuron” theory to theatre scholarship.  One would also have to reckon with the 
enthusiastic reception that the notion of the mirror neuron has received within popular 
culture – and, more generally, within the artistic sub-cultures of the professional theatre 
and dance world.  During the early 1990s, a group of neuroscientists at the University of 
Parma discovered that certain neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys 
activated both when a monkey performed a physical action – like grasping, holding, or 
tearing – and when that monkey observed the action being carried out by a human 
experimenter.  This was taken as evidence that macaques – and, by extension, other 
primates and humans – might comprehend the behavior of other agents through “action 
understanding,”258 some form of vicarious experience of the purposive behavior of those 
agents.  In other words, there might be a secret dimension of doing – often undetectable 
                                                        




to the conscious mind – in one’s observation of the doings of others.  Vittorio Gallese, 
one of the Parma scientists responsible for the discovery of mirror neurons, writes of this 
shared embodiment of intention: 
Although we do not overtly reproduce the observed action, nevertheless our motor 
system becomes active as if we were executing that very same action that we are 
observing.  To spell it out in different words, action observation implies action 
simulation.  (Gallese 2001:37) 
 
The subjunctive mode, so central to theories of performance from Stanislavsky to 
Richard Schechner, here appears as a state of the human organism, a condition of psycho-
motor activation pulsing through the neural networks of the observer as he or she watches 
an agent in action. 
While experimental studies have so far focused almost entirely on physical 
activities and movements, Gallese, the most philosophically minded of the Parma 
scientists, speculates that there may exist in the brain a whole array of “mirror matching 
mechanisms” governing attitudes, emotions, and other contagious forms of subjectivity 
(see Gallese 2001:46).  Gallese has even proposed the mirror neuron system may be the 
primary mechanism behind the human capacity for “simulation”: the basic ability to 
know other minds from a first-person perspective.259  Under this view, our sensitivity to 
the motivations and sensations of others would derive not from the observation and 
interpretation of behavioral data, but from our placing ourselves – or, better, finding 
ourselves – “inside” the experience of the other.  Gallese argues that the coordinated 
firing of mirror neurons in interactions between an agent and an observer brings into 
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being a “shared manifold of intersubjectivity” that enables a cognitive “self-other 
identity” (Gallese 2005:104).  Neural synchronization produces a “‘we’ centric” 
intentional space governed by a “‘being like me’ analogy” (111).  The polar positions 
“self” and “other” are correlative and exchangeable within this “dynamic system 
governed by reversibility rules” (114).  Rational thought and hypothesis formation in our 
relations with others are pre-empted and rendered unnecessary by a form of 
intersubjective knowing-as-doing. 
 In essence, mirror neuron theory provides a “hard science” version of Francis 
Fergusson’s conception of the “mimetic perception of action” (Fergusson 1949:250) – 
Fergusson’s poetically expressed notion that some form of subconscious attunement with 
the actor’s action must inform the spectator’s experience.  There is little wonder that the 
mirror neuron data and the speculative extrapolations it has provoked have been 
embraced by theatre and performance scholarship: Bruce McConachie’s Engaging 
Audiences: A Cognitive Approach to Spectating in the Theatre (2008) applies mirror 
neuron theory to the dynamics of spectatorship; Susan Leigh Foster touches briefly upon 
the science of mirror neurons in exploring the role of “kinesthetic empathy” and 
“kinesthetic impact” in dance spectatorship;260 and Rhonda Blair’s The Actor, Image, and 
Action (2008) uses mirror neuron theory to blur rhetorically “the boundaries between 
your feelings and mine, your actions and mine” (Blair 2008:14).  McConachie employs 
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the mirror neuron concept to import – as did Fergusson, writing more than half a century 
earlier – an Aristotelian mimesis of praxis into the mind and body of the spectator: 
In conventional mimetic theory, playwrights and actors do the imitating.  
Cognitive scientists and philosophers, in contrast, have strong evidence that it is 
audiences who mirror the actions of those they watch on stage; cognitive imitation 
is a crucial part of spectating.  (McConachie 2008:72)  
 
 The excitement of theatre scholars over the findings and hypotheses of cognitive 
science is genuine, and the implications of the mirror neuron data are indeed provocative.  
There is serious reason to question, however, the evidence upon which these implications 
are based.  Mirror neuron theory has come under attack from a series of scientists, 
psychologists, and philosophers since the earliest publications of the Parma 
neuroscientists in the mid-1990s, with the main charges being laid that: 
 
“Mirror neuron” activity has been definitively measured only in macaque 
monkeys, and all discussion of such activity in humans is overreachingly 
speculative; 
 
“Mirror neuron” activity need not depend upon a particular class of neurons, but 
might be a neural phenomenon associated with particular kinds of mental-and-
physical activity; 
 
“Mirror neurons” may not be “hard-wired” into the monkey brain; rather, their 
“mirroring” function may emerge out of social interactions – in particular, the 
unnaturally repetitive interactions between monkey and human experimenter 
within a laboratory environment.261 
 
Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence – at least, from a layperson’s perspective – 
is that macaque monkeys do not imitate each other.262  This fact seems to throw cold 
water over the claim that mirror neurons may be responsible for social learning, 
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emotional contagion, and interpersonal understanding in the human being, often dubbed 
Homo imitans.263 
 An additional – and much more basic – critique can be leveled against mirror 
neuron theory: that its basic assumptions and methodologies privilege correspondence 
over difference.  The superstructure of mirror neuron theory is built upon a familiar 
conceptual schema: the one-to-one.  In its most ridigly skeletal form, this schema cannot 
accommodate difference, and must discard differentials in measured neural activity as 
irrelevant to the mirror neuron hypothesis.  This methodology can only generate the kind 
of speculative one-to-one thinking about human experience that this study has traced 
through the intertwined histories of philosophy, aesthetics, and acting theory.  As 
evidenced by its rapid diffusion through popular discourse, the “mirror neuron” notion 
relies upon a seductively simple conceptual schema – and several scientific critics of 
mirror neuron theory have argued as much.264 
 Mirror neuron theory, as the latest manifestation of one-to-one thinking about 
theatrical experience, is therefore dangerous.  It is only dangerous, however, when its 
hypothesis of intentional synchrony is taken as a definitive answer rather than a 
provocation to thought.  A public conversation between Vittorio Gallese and a handful of 
theatre professionals on the subject of “Acting and Mirror Neurons” held at New York’s 
Philoctetes Center for the Multidisciplinary Study of the Imagination in 2007 reveals the 
perils of indiscriminately applying a new conceptual toy: the conversants speculate 
loosely that mirror neurons may be responsible for processes as diverse as subjunctive 
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imagination, spectator-actor empathy, the suspense generated by gestural incompletion, 
and a director’s identification with an ensemble of actors.265  For practitioners, scholars, 
and lovers of the theatre, however, there is an easy and effective way to resist the pull of 
one-to-one conceptualization, to scramble free of the parallel grooves of mimetic 
thinking: this is, quite simply, is to refer back to the complexity of our own theatrical 
experiences.  In other words, in testing the validity of the one-to-one, we can call 
ourselves back in memory into the material locale of the theatre, or we can carry one-to-
one hypotheses with us to a live performance and test them against our experiences-in-
the-moment.  In bringing this study to a close, I offer a case study for overcoming the 
compelling insufficiency of the one-to-one – an example that brings both retrospection 
and introspection to bear upon a textual anecdote. 
 
Stanislavsky as “Mirror” 
 
 
Giving in to the impulses of an admiring disciple, Nikolai Gorchakov266 steals furtive 
glances at the great man Stanislavsky during a Moscow Art Theatre dress rehearsal in 
1920: 
From my seat in the auditorium I could observe Stanislavsky and at the same time 
watch the performance on the stage.  On the stage I saw the scenes of Byron’s 
tragedy Cain as they were played one after another, and I also saw how every 
move and every word of the actors was reflected on Stanislavsky’s face.  I have 
never seen a more mobile, a more expressive, or a more impressionable face.  
What childish joy it reflected when the actors worked well!  When they did not, 
his hands wrote rapidly on the paper in front of him and his lips moved 
impatiently, whispering something.  The change in expression on his face was 
instantaneous.  It was alive every minute, either nervous or happy or sad, 
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reflecting whatever experience the actors on stage were going through. 
(Gorchakov 1954:4) 
 
The mode of invested spectatorship described by Gorchakov seems to have been 
characteristic rather than unusual for Stanislavsky.  In 1935, a decade and a half after the 
production of Byron’s Cain Gorchakov describes, American theatre scholar Norris 
Houghton observed an aging and infirm Stanislavsky at a rehearsal of Bizet’s Carmen: 
For two and a half hours [the rehearsal] lasted, the maestro completely lost in the 
work.  As the action progressed his whole body was thrown into the action – he 
leaned forward in his chair, his hands alternately clutching its arms and relaxing, 
his face working with excitement.  (Houghton 1936:84)267 
 
According to Gorchakov, Stanislavsky’s face “reflect[ed] whatever experience the actors 
on stage were going through,” and it would be no great leap to say that Stanislavsky was 
“mirroring” the emotional processes of his performers.  Stanislavsky himself might have 
accepted this metaphor, given his belief that the observer could serve as a subjective 
“mirror” for the actor, assessing the latter’s “sense of truth and belief.”268  A mirror 
neuron enthusiast, reading the passages above, might be convinced that Stanislavsky 
entered a “‘we’ centric” space of total identification – one that allowed a “self-other 
identity” between him and any given actor within his gaze. 
 Referring to my own experiences as an actor and director, however, I would argue 
that the intersubjective situation above is one much more complicated than the language 
of “mirroring” allows us to describe.  As a young actor, I witnessed the above symptoms 
– the muscularly engaged body, the over-active facial expressions – in several of my 
acting teachers, and, as a director of young actors, I have noticed them arise in myself.  
As a result, I can offer the following observations: first of all, Stanislavsky is no typical 
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spectator.  As a director and pedagogue, Stanislavsky’s relationship with the human 
strivings carried out by his actors is powerfully shaped by his personal “tasks” or 
“objectives” (zadachi): to ready the production for opening, to give his actors 
constructive feedback, to lead his students toward improving their technique of body and 
consciousness.  Stanislavsky watches his actors work with more appraisal and investment 
than would a “disinterested” spectator.  His way of watching also holds more 
“dynamism” or “activeness” (aktivnost’) than that of an ordinary spectator: as he 
observes his actors, he is acting upon them – or trying to act upon them – with a series of 
“inner” or “silent” actions (deisvtii): he praises, celebrates, and encourages his actors 
when they work well (his face expressing “childish joy”); he suffers the actors’ mistakes 
and oversights, perhaps chastising them or himself (muttering “impatiently”); he analyzes 
what is lacking and decides what needs to be done (as he scribbles his notes).  In other 
words, at those moments when his actors are playing well, Stanislavsky may slide into a 
more identificatory way of watching, but, generally, his objectives and actions will be 
specific to the psychically pressurized “given circumstances” (predlagaemye 
obstoiatelstva) of a director during the leadup to opening night. 
 Stanislavsky as an experiencing human subject passes through a series of states 
that we can only point toward with terms like “identification,” “empathy,” 
“appreciation,” “appraisal,” and “critique.”  At any given theatrical performance, an 
audience member will also pass through a variety of these same states, though their 
sequence, duration, and modality will both upon onstage events and events in the 
spectator’s mental life.  In order to understand acting and spectating as complex multi-




somewhere, but it cannot get us all the way across our desired distance.   When we pick 
up the mimesis concept – and give over to the one-to-one thinking it inspires – we must 
use it, as Plato did, as a provocation to dialectical exploration rather than a rigid 
conceptual template that closes down thought.  Human beings, whether acting onstage or 
in the world, whether observing from an auditorium or from behind the heads of a crowd 
in a public square, are infinitely complex entities.  When it functions at is best, mimesis 
can serve as a vehicle that takes us into the thick of the subjective and intersubjective 
complexity of human experience, but there will come a point at which we must abandon 
it, and forge ahead using our own resources of perspicacity and reflectiveness. 
Theatre scholars who decide to take up, dust off, and retool the mimesis concept 
two and a half millennia after its philosophical rebirth will do well to call to mind the 
image of the ageing Stanislavsky, inclining toward his actors with wide eyes, smiling, 
frowning, muttering, and gesturing like a madman in the darkness of the Moscow Art 
Theatre auditorium.  We will do well to recall his image because it will keep us from 
neglecting the “other mimesis”: mimesis as embodied attunement, a form of the one-to-
one that, in the theatre, always exists alongside the one-to-one of ideal or empirical 
verisimilitude, and which brings self and other into affective relation without collapsing 
identity and alterity into sameness.  At other times, we must call to mind our own 
memories of acting and spectating, or take our philosophical questions with us into 
performance venues, in order to delve into the complexity of theatrical experience.  
Doing so will help us resist the aesthetic orthodoxies, physiological models, political 
agendae, metaphysical assumptions, and theoretical enthusiasms that proclaim the one-to-
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